This is an appeal against the decision dated 13-6-1978 of Punjab Labour Court No. 9, Multan.
2. Amanatullah, appellant, was employed as a cashier in the National Bank of Pakistan, Multan.
There were charges of breach of trust and misappropriation of money against him. On 20-6-1975 a charge-sheet was issued to him. On 15-11-1975 he was suspended. On 25-2-1978 he filed a petition under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 before the Labour Court challenging his suspension order. The learned Labour Court dismissed the petition on the ground that it was barred by time and that since the suspension was not a penalty under the Wage Board Award, the appellant had no cause of grievance.
3. Aggrieved by the above decision the appellant has preferred this appeal.
4. The first point for determination is as to whether the petition was within time.
5. The appellant was suspended on 15-11-1975 and- he filed the petition under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 on 25-2-1978, i.e. More than 2 years from the date of suspension order. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that there was no specific stipulation for keeping the appellant under suspension, therefore, the cause of grievance would arise when he felt that his patience had expired to face further suspension. He also contended that the appellant could not press the employer to finish his suspension period and proceed further because no machinery was provided in law, therefore, it was a continuing breach of wrong as provided under, section 23 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Under these circumstances a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time during which the breach or the wrong, as the case may be continued. This conten--tion has no force because section 23 of the Limitation Act is not applicable in view of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, which reads as under :- "Where any special or local law prescribed for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefore by the First Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefore in that Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law;
(a) the provisions contained in section 4, sections 9 to 18, and section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law ; and
(b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply."
6. Now the next point for determination is as to whether the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 is applicable in this case.
Under section 28-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 the Federal Government is competent to appoint a Wage Commission. Under section 38-D of the said Ordinance decisions of the Wages Commission is deemed to be an award of the Commission. Under section 38-1 of the said Ordinance the provi--sions of sections 38-A, 38-B, 38-C, 38-D, 38-E, 38-F, 38-G and 38-H shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith, contained in any other law or in the terms of award, agreement or contract of service, whether made before or after the coming into force of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Ordinance, 1974. The expression "notwithstanding" has been given in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Federation o Pakistan v. Saeed Ahmad Khan and others (PLD 1974 SC 151) wherein it was observed :---- "Let us now examine as to what exactly has been done by President's Order No. 3 of 1973 and Article 269 of the permanent Constitution. The President's Order No. 3 of 1973 has merely added in the last but one line of clause (2) of Article 281 of the Interim Constitution after the words "shall be deemed" the words "notwithstanding any judgment of any Court" and then in the last line after the words "taken or done" added "and shall not be called in question in any Court" and provided that the above-mentioned two additions" shall be deemed always to have been so inserted". It will be noticed that no change has been made in the earlier provisions of this clause at all. What then is the result ? Does the clause, as now amended, mean anything more than this that the ouster of jurisdiction will operate with regard to those acts which under the earlier provisions "shall be deemed, notwithstanding any judgment of any Court, to be and always to have been validly made"? If so then obviously the ouster will not apply to any act, order, proceeding or thing done which is not to be so deemed to have been validly made. The question, therefore, still remains as to what is to be deemed under these provisions of clause (2) to have been validly done, taken or made. The words "notwithstanding any judgment of any Court" were; it appears, introduced to take away the effect of the decision of this Court in the case of Miss Asma Jilani under which these acts would have been invalid."
Thus it is clear that the expression "notwithstanding" in section 38-I takes away the effects of any other law or in terms of any award, agreement or contract of service, whether made before or after the coming into force of the Industrial Relations (Amendments) Ordinance, 1974, if they are inconsistent with the provisions of sections 38-A to section 38-H of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. In other words the award is to supersede all other laws or awards etc.
7. According to Wage Board of 1975 which was made applicable to all Banks and Financial Institutions came into force from 1-1-1975. Appellant was suspended on 15-11-1975, therefore, the aforementioned award will be applicable. According to paragraph 258 of the award, where the penalties are provided, the penalty of suspension is not included. Under sub-rule (3) of paragraph 258 a competent authority can suspend an employee pending enquiry by order in writing. There is no fixed period provided for suspension but under the Standing Order 15 (5) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, on the other band, a workman cannot be suspended for a period of exceeding 4 days at a time and the total period of such suspension cannot exceed 4 weeks. Thus there is a conflict between the Standing Orders Ordinance and Wages Commission Award. Sub-clause (c) of clause (1) (4) of Article 1 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, provides as follows;--- "(4) it applies to :-----
(c) such class or classes of other industrial and commercial establishments as Government may from time to time, by notification in the official Gazette, specify in this behalf; Provided that nothing in this Ordinance shall apply to industrial and commercial establishments carried on by or under the authority of the Central or Provincial Government, where statutory rules of service, conduct or discipline are applicable to the workmen employed therein."
The foregoing provisions would seem to exclude the nationalised Commercial Banks and Financial Institutions having statutory rules, of service, conduct or discipline under the Federal Government from the purview of the Ordinance. Besides, under section 38-I read with section 38-A (1) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 which enables the Commission to determine the terms and conditions of service, have precedence over any other law.
In view of the above I hold that the Standing Orders Ordinance is not applicable to the Banks and Financial Institutions.
8. Further the Labour Court is a Court of limited jurisdiction and can take cognizance of those matters which the law allows. In other words the Labour Court is fettered by the statute under which it is created, and if exceeds the conditions for the exercise of its jurisdiction, its order will be void. I am fortified in this view by the judgment in the case Nasim Silk Industry v. 5th Labour Court etc. (1977 PLC 489). Under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 a petition can be filed in respect of any right guaranteed and secured by or under any law or any award or settlement. In the instant case no right has been infringed because the Wage Commission Award gives a right to the employer to suspend a person for an indefinite period.
In view of the above the petition under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 was not maintainable because no right has been infringed.
9. I, accordingly, find no merit in this appeal, which is hereby dismissed.