' Muhammad Ashiq Baig owned land measuring 132 Kanlas, 3 Marlas. He had appointed his son Irshad Baig as general attorney on 23-9-1962. Irshad Baig sold land measuring 53 Kanlas, 3 Marlas in favour of Shahnawaz his brother-in-law (sister's husband) on 26-8-1963. It was through Mutation No.106, dated 4-12-1970 that Irshad Baig sold land measuring 79 Kanals 1 Marla also in favour of said Shahnawaz. Through Mutation No.107 of the same date Shahnawaz sold the same land i.e. 79 Kanlas 1 Marla in favour of Irshad Baig. The said Irshad Baig then sold land measuring 132 Kanals 1 Marla on 12-12-1970 to Allah Rakha respondent. These transactions/mutations were assailed by the petitioners in the Revenue Courts and the matter was remanded by the Collector to Assistant Collector on 31-10-1972. The successors of Ashiq Baig then instituted the suit on 25-5-1980. The suit was contested by Allah Rakha respondent No.3, inter alia that the same was not maintainable seeking declaration simpliciter that it was time barred and that Allah Rakha respondent was bona fide purchaser for value of the land in dispute. After framing necessary issues and recording evidence led by the parties, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit vide its judgment and decree, dated 5-3-1992. Appeal preferred thereagainst by the petitioners was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge on 11-4-1993. This revision petition has been filed to assail the above mentioned judgments.
2. It is contended by the learned counsel that Ashiq Baig had died on _20-8-1963, therefore, the transactions made by his attorney Irshad Baig after that date were wholly ineffective and inconsequential as the power given by the deceased to Irshad Baig ceased on his death. It is contended that Allah Rakha who claims to be bona fide purchaser for value is not so as sale by Irshad Baig in his favour on 12-12-1970 was without any valid justification. Reference in this context has been made to Fida Muhammad v. Pir Muhammad Khan (deceased) through Legal heirs and others PLD 1985 SC 341, Haji Faqir Muhammad and others v. Pir Muhammad and another 1997 SCMR 1811, Muhammad Yamin and others v. Settlement Commissioner and others 1976 SCMR 489 and Muhammad Aslam and another v. Abdul Hamid and others 1991 SCMR 552. According to the learned counsel findings recorded by the two Courts below thus are based on misconception of the legal position. It is further contended that since the transactions were void, the petitioners could not be non-suited on the ground of limitation as they continued to be co-owners till the invalid sale was made by Irshad Baig. Reliance is placed upon Muhammad Yaqoob v. Muhammad Yaqoob Arif and another 1988 CLC 2341, Abdur Rehman v. Abdul Haq and others PLD 1960 (W.P.) Karachi 625, Badaruddin v. Aymana Khatun PLD 1956 Dacca 274, Mst Hamida Begum v. Mst. Murad Begum and others PLD 1975 SC 624 and Gulab Din v. Muhammad Bashir and another 1986 MLD 877. An application (Civil Miscellaneous No.1-C of 2003) has been filed seeking amendment in the plaint for adding prayer for possession, in support whereof reliance has been placed upon Keramat Ali and another v. Muhammad Yunus Haji and others PLD 1963 SC 191, Mst. Ghulam Bibi and others v. Sarsa Khan and others PLD 1985 SC 345, Muhammad Akram and 2 others v. Muhammad Ashraf and 5 others 1998 CLC 555, Jane Margrete William v. Abdul Hamid Mian 1994 CLC 1437 and Jane Margrete William v. Abdul Hamid Mian 1994 SCMR 1555 to contend that amendment of such nature can be sought and allowed at any stage of the proceedings.
3. The learned counsel for the contesting respondent has raised a preliminary objection to seek dismissal of the revision petition that the same was barred by time. According to him it was not filed within the period of 90 days and the time given by the office for removal of objections. It is contended that neither section 5 -nor section 12(2) of Limitation Act, 1908 applies to a revision petition under section 115, C.P.C. Therefore, delay cannot be condoned. It is contended that even on merits the concurrent findings and view taken by the two Courts below do not warrant interference by this Court and that the findings on issue No.5-A that the suit was, time barred, cannot be displaced on a simple assertion that no limitation runs against alleged void order/transaction. It is contended that the petitioners were fully aware of the transactions/ mutations as they had themselves agitated the matter in the Revenue hierarchy and order, dated 31-10-1972 was passed by the Collector Sheikhupura at their instance, but did not agitate the matter in that hierarchy further and filed the suit in Civil Court on 25-5-1980 which was grossly time barred. Reference has been made by him to Ahmad Din v. Muhammad Shafi and others. PLD 1971 SC 762, Langer and other v. Ch. Muhammad Shafi 1994' MLD 2169, Muhammad Bashir v. Mst. Sattar. Bibi PLD 1995 Lah.
321 and few other precedents that the question of limitation cannot be overcome on such a plea as the petitioners had full knowledge of the orders/transactions. It is contended that respondent No.3 is a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration and entitled to protection under the law.
Reference has been made to Rehman Shah v. Muhammad Shah and others 1974 SCMR 255, Officer on. Special. Duty Central Record Officer and Others v. Bashir Ahmad and 9 others 1977 SCMR 208, Mukhtar Ahmed v. Bashir Ahmad etc. PLD 1994 SC 674 and Muhammad Din and another v. Mst.
Sardar Bibi and others AIR 1927 Lahore 666. It is further contended that the amendment sought for in the plaint is inconsequential and of no use at present as the suit has been dismissed on the point of,limitation as also on merits. According to him, even an amendment sought at such a belated stage is not permissible under the taw. Reference has been made to Mulchand v. Smt.
Indra and others PLD 1985 Kar. 362, Ismail and 5 others v. Mst. Umar Bibi and 12 others 1982 SCMR 871, Ghulam Haider v. Muhammad Ayub 2001 SCMR 133 and Syed Shaukat Ali Shah v. Additional District Judge Camp at Shakargarh, District Narowal and 2 others PLD 2003 Lah.
192.
4. In the contest of the controversy Issues Nos.1, 5 and 5-A which are reproduced for the sake of convenience were of relevance:--
(1) Whether the plaintiffs 'are owner in possession of the disputed property and Mutation No.106, dated 4-12-1970, Mutation No.107, dated 4-12-1970, registered deed, dated 24-8-1963, Mutation No.152, dated 27-2-1965, registered deed, dated 28-8-1963, registered deed, dated 12-12-1970 are illegal, void and against the interest of the plaintiffs? OPP
(5) Whether defendant No.3 is the bona fide purchaser for consideration of the suit property, if so its effect? OPD (5-A) Whether the suit is within time? OPP
5. On consideration of the evidence that was produced by the parties, the learned trial Judge returned finding on issue No.1 that the petitioners/plaintiffs had failed to prove the issue through any substantial evidence. It was also found that respondent/defendant No.3 was bona fide purchaser for consideration and that the suit was time barred. The findings so recorded by the trial Court have been upheld and affirmed by the Appellate Court. It has been found as a fact that date of death of Ashiq Baig was 2-9-1963 and not 20-8-1963. Findings so recorded are fully borne out from the evidence on the record, documentary and oral. The main stress of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that all transactions of sale inter se Irshad Baig, (the son/attorney of deceased Ashiq Baig) Shahnawaz and then sale in favour of Allah Rakha respondent No.3, be treated as void and ineffective. There are again concurrent findings by the two Courts below on Issues Nos.1 and 5 that Allah Rakha respondent, was bona fide purchaser for value and also on issue No.5-A that the suit was time barred. In view of the facts established on the record it cannot be denied that the petitioners/plaintiffs were fully aware of the mutations, as the same were assailed by them through appeal before the Collector who passed the order on 31-10-1972 remanding the matter to the Assistant Collector. Suit out of which the present proceedings have arisen was filed by them on 25- 5-1980. There is no plausible explanation or justification brought forth for the long delay in instituting the suit. The declaratory suit in the circumstances could be instituted within six years under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908. In Ahmad Din v. Muhammad Shafi and others PLD 1971 SC 762 it was held that "The suit which was filed in 1962 to challenge an order of mutation made in 1953 was therefore, clearly beyond six years and was, therefore, barred by limitation." It was also held that the period spent in prosecuting a time-barred appeal cannot be excluded in computing the period of limitation under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Similar view was taken in Zil Muhammad and 3 others v. Mst. Hayat Bibi and 2 others 1971 SCMR 514, Mst. Rasul Bibi v. Mst Rehmat Bibi 1987 SCMR 2036 and Langer and others v. Ch. Muhammad Shafi 1994 MLD 2169. The suit instituted-by the petitioners therefore, has rightly been found as barred by time. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that by treating the transactions of sale as illegal and void, the limitation should be ignored, is untenable, inasmuch as even if an order is assumed as illegal or void, the same has got to be set aside and removed from the field through appropriate proceedings on acquiring knowledge thereabout. It is well settled that with the elapse of time valuable rights accrue in favour of the other side, that is why a litigant is required to explain each days delay in approaching the Court, No such B explanation has come on the record in the present case. The view taken by the two Courts below thus hardly justifies any interference by this Court.
6. Insofar as issue as to whether respondent No.3 was a bona fide purchaser is concerned, it has also been found and decided in his favour. As a vigilant purchaser, respondent No.3, could possibly inspect the Revenue Record and entries existing therein. There is a finding that Irshad Baig vendor was shown as owner of the suit property in the Revenue Record and on satisfaction after making enquiry from the Patwari Halqa, respondent No.3 went ahead with the transactions. In Muhammad Din and another v. Mst. Sardar Bibi and others AIR 1927 Lahore 666 it was held that where the Revenue entries show a per: on as a sole proprietor of certain land and there are no other circumstances leading the purchasers of such land from the proprietor to go behind the Revenue Records and make any further enquiry the vendees are fully protected by the principle underlying section 41 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882. In Dost Muhammad through Legal Heirs v. Jahangir Khan and another 2000 CLC 1745, I had the occasion to consider few judgments on the subject and it was observed that "the principle contained in section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act is one of equity aimed at to protect an innocent, person." In that case as well the purchaser was found to have acted in good faith in purchasing the property and was entitled to protection under the law.
In the instant case as well findings in favour of respondent No.3 are concurrent which are duly supported by the evidence on the record and justify no interference by this Court. The precedents cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners, arose in cases having peculiar background that do not advance the case of the petitioners. I am therefore, unable to countenance his contentions. It was the grievance of the petitioners as spelt out in the plaint that Irshad Baig had misused his position and authority and deprived them of their due. Their grievance before this Court as well is also that they were not paid anything by said Irshad Bag from the sale proceeds of the land. Suffice it to observe that in such an eventuality the remedy of the petitioners lay against Irshad Baig for the redressed of their grievance but, an innocent purchaser cannot be made to suffer in the facts and circumstances of the case.
7. Since the judgment of dismissal of suit has been maintained on grounds other than that the suit was not maintainable, amendment sought for by the petitioners/plaintiffs through Civil Miscellaneous No.1-C of 2003 will be merely inconsequential, no useful purpose would be served thereby. The application therefore, is dismissed as being infructuous. Likewise application for additional evidence (Civil Miscellaneous No.415-C of 2003) filed on behalf of respondent No.3 is also redundant and is dismissed accordingly.
' As a result of the above, this revision petition is devoid of merit which is dismissed accordingly. No order as to costs.