Muhammad Khalid Aliy, J.--Brief facts of the case are that petitioner was tried by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Lodhran vide order dated 2.8.1997 in Case FIR. No, 82/1994 U/Ss. 302, 324, 148, 149 PPC. He was convicted under Section 302 PPC and sentenced to death and a compensation of Rs, 50,000/- to be paid to the legal heirs of the deceased. In case of default in the payment of compensation, he was also directed to undergo S.I. for six months. He was also convicted under Section 324 PPC for causing injuries to Umerwada PW and sentenced to seven years R.I. He was also directed to pay Daman Rs, 5,000/- to the injured and in case of default, he shall suffer one month S.I. He filed Criminal Appeal No, 295 of 1997, which was heard alongwith the Murder Reference No, 202 of 1997 by this Court and vide Judgment dated 27.9.1999, while replying to the Murder Reference in the negative, his death sentence was not confirmed. It was observed by this Court that since this is a case of family honour, therefore, the petitioner deserved leniency and his sentence was converted from death to life imprisonment. He was also extended the benefit of Section 382-B Cr.P.C.
2. Through the instant constitutional petition, petitioner prays that the sentence awarded to him under various sections of the PPC may be directed to run concurrently as the learned Bench hearing the appeal had omitted to make any observation with respect to the nature of sentence i,e, whether the same shall run consecutively or concurrently as required under Section 35 Cr.P.C.
3. It is argued by learned counsel for the petitioner with reference to 2002 M LD 1435 that in constitutional jurisdiction this Court has the jurisdiction to convert the nature of sentence. It is further argued that the learned Bench hearing the appeal and murder reference had consciously given all possible benefits to the petitioner keeping in view the circumstances of the case. However, neither the petitioner could point out at the relevant time nor the Court itself attended this aspect of the case, therefore, it appears that the same had escaped sight of the Court which deserves to be attended now.
4. On the other hand, learned AAG has opposed this petition by maintaining that the exercise being sought to be taken up by this Court amounts to review of judgment, which according to him is not permissible under Section 369 Cr.P.C.
5. We have considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties.
6. The relevant part of the judgment, whereby the learned Bench hearing the murder reference and the 'petitioner's appeal had converted his sentence observed as follows:-- "This is a case of family honour, therefore, he deserves leniency and his sentence is converted from death to imprisonment for life. He is also allowed the benefit of Section 382-B Cr.P.C."
7. The above para indicates that keeping in view the circumstances of the case the Bench was all out to maintain the sentence but at the same time also wanted to extend all possible benefits under the law to the petitioner. Section 35 is the relevant provision to determine the said question, which is reproduced as follows:-- Sentence in case of conviction of several offences at one trial.--(1) When a person is convicted at one trial of two or more offences, the Court may, subject to be provisions of Section 71 of the Pakistan Penal Code sentence him, for such offences, to the several punishments prescribed therefor which such Court is competent to inflict, such punishment, when consisting of imprisonment to commence the one after the expiration of the other in such order as the Court may direct, unless the Court directs that such punishments shall run concurrently.
(2) -----------------
(3) ----------------- According to sub-section (1) if the Court intends that the sentences should run consecutively, it is required from the Court who has tried the accused for several offences to specify in the judgment as to which of the sentences would start running first and which sentence will start after the completion of the first sentence thereafter, so on and so forth. In the instant case the Bench did not make any such observation, meaning thereby that the Court never intended to hold the sentences to be consecutive, which further strengthens the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the bench hearing the appeal was extending all benefits to the petitioner except maintaining his conviction of life sentence. However, at the same time under Section 35 it is also required that if the Court intends that the sentences should run concurrently, a specific order should be passed in that regard. In the instant case, there is no such order as well. Meaning thereby that the bench hearing the appeal was neither apprised by the petitioner or his counsel nor it could be taken note of by the bench itself as to how the sentences will run. Therefore, it appears that it was a bona-fide omission which requires to be taken note of to meet the ends of justice for which this Court has the inherent power under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. Resultantly, while exercising the same we are inclined to allow this petition and direct that the sentence awarded to the petitioner shall run concurrently.