' MUHAMMAD NAWAZ ABBASI, J.--- This petition for leave to appeal under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, has been preferred against the judgment dated 27-10- 2003 passed by a learned Single Judge of Lahore High Court, Lahore in a civil revision arising out of a suit for possession of land filed by the respondents against the petitioner in the Civil Court at Chiniot.
2. The suit was decreed by the learned trial Judge vide judgment, dated 25-9-1991 but in appeal, the decree was reversed by a learned Additional District Judge, Chiniot vide judgment, dated 5-6- 1994. The respondents being aggrieved of dismissal of their suit in appeal, invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Lahore High Court in the matter and a learned Single Judge of the High Court in the light of the law laid down by this Court, in Maqbool Ahmad v. Hakoomat-e-Pakistan 1991 SCM R 2063 wherein section 28 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was declared repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam and it was held that the plea of adverse possession to set up title in the property against the interest of true owner would no more be available, allowed the revision petition filed by the respondents and restored the decree passed by the trial Court.
' Operative part of the judgment of this Court reads as under:--- "section 28 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (Act No,IX of 1908) is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam insofar as it provides for extinguishment of the right in the property at the determination of the period prescribed for instituting a suit for possession of the said property. It is further held that this decision shall takeeffect from 31st of August, 1991 and on this date section 28 aforesaid shall also cease to have effect."
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner while placing reliance on the principle of law laid down in the above judgment, contended that the suit in the present case was filed much before the declaring of section 28 of the Limitation Act, 1908 by this Court repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam and the judgment having no retrospective effect, would not revive the right of ownership of the respondents in the land which stood extinguished prior to the filing of suit. The learned counsel added that the finding of the Appellate Court on the question of fact relating to the uninterrupted and continuous possession of the land by the petitioner for the last more than 25 years is based on cogent evidence which has been interfered by the learned Judge in Chambers in the High Court, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction by misreading and re-appraisal of evidence and taking wrong view of the law on the subject.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at length and perused the record with his assistance. The sole question requiring determination in the present case would relate to the nature of possession of the petitioner of the suit-land. The claim of hostile title through adverse possession has been set up by the petitioner on the basis of continuous possession of land and in rebuttal, the respondents having brought on record oral as well as documentary evidence, pleaded that the petitioner unauthorizedly retained the possession of land on one or other pretext for a period more than two decades and ultimately denied their title. The oral evidence produced by the parties would establish only the factum of continuous possession of the petitioner which by itself would not be hostile to the interest of original owner. The entries in the Jamabandi and Khasra Girdawari for the years 1985-86 clearly show that prior to Khareef 1986, the respondents were in cultivating possession of the land. The presumption of truth is attached with these unchallenged entries in the Jamabandi which would be considered very strong evidence to negate the claim of petitioner of adverse possession. There is no cavil to the proposition that after the expiry of period of limitation, the cause of action is not revived afresh on the basis of a subsequent judgment and the right of a person in the property already extinguished would not survive as was observed in Maqbool Ahmed v. Hakoomat-e-Pakistan 1991 SCM R 2063, supra, but this principle would not attract in the present case in which decree was passed after the judgment in the case cited above had taken effect on 31-8-1991. The crucial date for availing the benefit of section 28 of the Limitation Act, 1908 in the light of dictum laid down in the above judgment, would be the date of decree and not the date of filing the suit.
Be that as it may, the question of adverse possession is a pure question of fact which must be proved through the cogent and convincing evidence and in absence of such an evidence, the mere continuous and un-interrupted possession for any length of time, would not be sufficient to set up title adverse to the interest of true owner. There would be no need to go into the question of limitation and extinguishment of right of original owner in the property without dilating upon the fundamental question relating to the adverse possession which must be continued, exclusive, un- interrupted and hostile with visible denial of the title of the true owner. The heavy onus would lie on the petitioner to prove uninterrupted possession and hostile title through strong and convincing evidence but we find that the petitioner has not been able to discharge the basic onus of proving the adverse possession vesting title of the land to the satisfaction of law. The examination of evidence brought by the parties on record, would bring us to the irresistible conclusion that the learned Judge in the High Court has committed no jurisdictional error by upholding the decree passed by the trial Court in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C. And we taking no exception to the view of the. High Court regarding the application of section 28 of the Limitation Act, 1908, uphold the impugned judgment.
5. In the light of foregoing discussion, we having found no merit in this petition, dismiss the same accordingly. Leave is refused.