' Respondent No,2 (hereinafter also called the decree-holder) instituted a suit against respondents 3 and 4 (hereinafter also called the judgment-debtors) for recovery of Rs,6,20.884 alongwith the agreed mark-up thereupon, arising out of the loan under the Transport Finance Hyundai Scheme.
This suit was decreed by the learned Judge Banking Court, Multan (hereinafter also called respondent No,1) "to the tune of Rs,5,94,000 with costs and mark-up till the date of realization w,e,f, 20-5-2000, the date of suit" vide judgment and decree, dated 12-9-2000. During the execution proceedings thereof initiated by the decree-holder, learned respondent No,1 vide his order, dated 29-5-2001 issued warrants of attachment regarding property detailed in the execution petition, whereupon present petitioner filed an objection petition on 15-4-2002 (Annexure 'E'). Alongwith it, an application shown to have been moved under Order 39, rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. (Annexure 'F') by the petitioner seeking an injunctive order for staying further execution proceedings. On 22-4-2002, the learned respondent No,1 stayed the execution proceedings subject to depositing decretal amount by way of security and the notices were issued to the decree-holders as well as judgment-debtors for 6-6-2002.
2. The instant Constitutional petition calls in question the aforesaid order of learned respondent No, 1 .
3. It is vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the property under attachment was never mortgaged with the responde, -Bank/decree-holder in any manner, particularly with reverence to the loan in question; that the petitioner also never stood as a surety for the judgment-debtors/respondents Nos,3 and 4. This being so, the petitioner and the property under attachment cannot be held to be involved in any context relating to the loan in question as well as the decree passed with regard thereto against respondents 3 and 4/judgment-debtoRs, On a Court question learned counsel concedes that respondents 3 and 4/judgment-debtors are sons of the petitioner, but it is added with reference to PLD 1997 SC 3 (Abbasla Cooperative Bank (now Punjab Provincial Cooperative Bank Ltd.) through Manager and another v. Hakeem Hafiz Muhammad Ghaus and 5 others) that in the absence of a finding by a competent forum that the petitioner is a real beneficiary of the loan advanced to the loanee/his sons, he cannot be held liable for the repayment of the same. Lastly it is contended that the impugned order is patently without lawful authority and of no legal effect thus the instant Constitution petition merits acceptance with heavy costs.
4. We have considered the submissions, perused the material available on this file and gone through the judgment cited at the bar.
5. Instant petition merits dismissal on the sole ground that the impugned order being interim in nature, cannot be interfered with in Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court. Particularly when the same also relates to an interim matter i,e, temporary injunction which too has not yet been disposed of finally, and the main objection petition is still pending for further adjudication before learned respondent No,
1. Even otherwise granting an injunction subject to some condition lies within the exclusive discretionary jurisdiction of learned respondent No,1, and no exception with regard thereto can be taken in the instant proceedings, with reference to this very case.
6. We are also not satisfied with the bona fide of the petitioner. Admittedly the judgment- debtors/respondents Nos,3 and 4 are his sons, but he -has not stated so in his objection petition filed in the Court of learned respondent No,1, copy of which has been appended herewith as Annexure 'E', rather it is stated in para. 3(c) that they do not in any way relate with him; that it could not be denied that the respondents Nos,3 and 4/judgment-debtors while applying for the loan and receipt thereof had given their address on which the suit was instituted by the respondent-Bank/ decree-holder. It could not be denied that they had not been residing there alongwith their father (petitioner) that the petitioner appears to be equipped with a commanding position in relation to his sons i,e, respondents 3 and 4/judgment-debtors, who appeared in this Court upon his asking.
They also acknowledged the receipt of the loan. They categorically stated on 1-8-2002 in this Court that "they have no, objection to pay the principal amount" 'but also sought remission in , payment of mark-up and that too in instalments. On 18-9-2002 they have .Undertaken, "to make the payment of the defaulted amount till 30-9-2002, provided the mark-up is waived of". At this, ."Mr. Akhtar Hussain, Law Officer present in the Court stated that if respondents 3 and 4 make payment by or before 30-9-2002, the respondent-Bank is ready to waive of their mark-up in view of the incentive scheme presently in vogue". Whereupon the case was adjourned for today. On a Court question it is submitted by the representative of the respondent-Bank/decree-holder that no amount was paid as per the undertaking. Strange enough the attitude of the petitioner as well as his sons i,e, respondents 3 and 4/ judgment-debtors Is, today, somewhat arrogant, with reference to this aspect of the matter.
7. As per learned counsel for the petitioner, a father is not accountable to the acts of his sons. It may be true but it cannot be rightly ignored that if a father sides with his sons in their designs to frustrate the process of law, in a manner not falling within the ambit of "good faith", cannot be allowed to go unchecked. The judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be advantageously used in the present set of circumstances. Presently matter before the learned respondent No,1 relating to grant of temporary injunction is still in the initial stage and he is quite justified to pass an injunctive order subject to the condition of depositing the decretal amount by way of security. In the peculiar circumstances of the instant case, as also observed above that such a condition was attached by the learned respondent No,1 by exercising his jurisdiction judiciously.
' It is also well-settled that awarding a relief under Article 199 of the Constitution is discretionary, and for what has been stated above, we are not inclined to exercise the same in favour of the petitioner. Resultantly instant Constitutional petition stands dismissed in limine.