1. DORAB PATEL, J.-The six petitioners in this petition for leave are tenants of the respondent in a building in Rawalpindi which is owned by the respondent. On 12-2-1976, the respondent filed a joint eviction application against the petitioners in the Court of the Rent Controller for the eviction of the petitioners on the two grounds. The first was that the petitioners had committed default in the payment of rent, and the second was that he required the vacant possession of the demised premises, because he wanted to reconstruct his property. The petitioners contested the eviction application and the learned Rent Controller accepted their plea that they had not committed any default in the payment of rent. However, on the evidence produced before him he accepted the claim of the respondent that he required the demised premises in good faith, because he wanted to reconstruct his property. But as the respondent had not filed separate eviction applications against the petitioners, the petitioners had contested the eviction application on the further ground that this application was bad "for mis-joinder of causes for action". The Rent Controller repelled this plea with the observation that the Civil Procedure Code "is not applicable in strict sense in rent matters". Accordingly, by his order, dated 16-5-1977, he decreed the respondent's claim and directed the petitioners to hand over the demised premises within three months.
2. The petitioners contested the Rent Controller's order in an appeal in the District Court, Rawalpindi, in which they relied on the pleas advanced by them before the Rent Controller. But, as their appeal was dismissed by an Additional District Judge on 4-2-1979, they filed a second appeal in the Lahore High Court. The learned Judge, who heard the appeal agreed with the concurrent findings of the lower Courts that the respondent had proved the bona fides of his requirement for the reconstruction of his property, and he also rejected the plea of the petitioners that the proceedings against them were bad for mis-joinder of parties, therefore, by his order dated 4-2-1979, he dismissed the appeal .Of the petitioners. Hence this petition for leave.
3. Learned counsel attempted to challenge the findings of the three Courts that the respondent had proved that he required the demised premises in good faith for the reconstruction of his property.
4. As the depositions which impressed the Courts below have not been filed, we observed that the Courts had also placed great reliance on the fact that the property in dispute was very old and that the local authorities had sanctioned the respondent's plan for the reconstruction of his property. Learned counsel admitted that these findings by the three Courts were correct.
5. Necessarily this means, that the concurrent findings against the petitioners are amply supported by evidence and in these circumstances, no case has been made out for re-examining the findings of the three Courts that the respondent hall proved his requirement for the reconstruction of his property.
6. Learned counsel then submitted that the eviction application filed by the respondent was bad for mis-joinder of parties and this was the main ground on which he pressed his petition. In support of this plea, learned counsel informed us that the respondent had leased this shop to the six petitioners on different dates many years ago, therefore, on the assumption that the respondent was entitled to evict the petitioners, learned counsel's submission was that the respondent's cause of action against each petitioner was a separate and distinct cause of action, for which he should have filed separate eviction applications against each petitioner.
7. The submission that the respondent had a separate cause of action against each petitioner is correct, but how does this lead to the conclusion that the respondent should be non-suited merely because he had filed a joint eviction application against the petitioner? Learned counsel was not able to explain how the respondent's eviction application was bad because he had filed a joint eviction application against all the petitioners instead of filing separate eviction applications against them. But, learned counsel appeared to think that his arguments were supported by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code about the manner in. Which suits had to be filed. However, even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the 6 provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are applicable to proceedings under" the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (hereinafter called the said Ordinance); learned counsel's submission would be hit by sec--petition 99 of the Civil Procedure Code, which reads "99. No decree to be reversed or modified for error or irregularity not affecting merits or jurisdiction.-No decree shall be reversed or substantially varied, nor shall any case be remanded, in appeal on account of any mis-joinder of parties or causes of action or any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court."
8. As the eviction of the petitioners has been decreed, it is clear from the plain language of the section that the order of eviction against them can be' set aside only if they can show that the failure of the respondent to file separate eviction applications against them had prejudiced their case. But, as learned counsel was not able to show how the merits of the case against the petitioners had been affected, much less affected adversely, by the fact that the respondent had filed a joint eviction, application, the submission of learned counsel is utterly devoid of merit.
9. Additionally, the plea of learned counsel that the Civil Procedure Code was applicable to rent cases, is itself misconceived. And, it is sur--prising that this plea continues to be raised, despite this Court's judgment in Khadim Mohyuddfn and another v. Ch. Rahmat A.I Nagra an another (PLD 1965 5 C 459) because the Court held in this case that a Rent Controller, whilst performing his functions under the said Ordinance, does not act as a Court, therefore, it is clear that the technicalities of the Civil Procedure Code are not applicable to proceed in rent cases as the plea of the petitioners turns entirely on technicalities about the joinder of parties, it must be rejected on this ground also.
10. Learned counsel then submitted that his arguments were supported by a judgment of the Lahore High Court in Malik Aman v. Haji Muhammad Tufail (PLD 1976 Lah. 1446), and as some passages in this judgment appear to lend support to learned counsel's submission by parity of reasoning, it is necessary to examine this judgment in some detail even though it is distinguishable on the facts.
11. The facts in this case were that the appellants were the tenants of the respondent, and the respondent had filed ejectment application against them "on the ground of damage to the property and re-construction of the same after its demolition". But, unlike the instant case, the respondent had filed separate eviction applications against each appellant. However, perhaps because it was obvious that the respondent's evidence in support of his plea of re-construction would be the same in all the eviction applications filed by him, the Rent Controller had recorded the evidence of the respondent as well as some of his witnesses in only one of the eviction applications and then filed carbon copies of this evidence in the other eviction applications.
12. Presumably, because he was impressed by this evidence, the learned Rent Controller allowed all the eviction applications, therefore, appellants filed an appeal in the District Court. But as that appeal too was dismissed, they filed a second appeal in the Lahore High Court which was allowed and the case was remanded to the trial Court "for fresh decision in accordance with the law and in the light of the obser--vations made above".
13. Now according to learned counsel, the High Court had allowed the appeal, because the Rent Controller had not recorded the evidence of the respondent separately in each case, therefore, his submission was that the true ratio of the judgment was that the Rent Controller was bound by the procedure followed by the Courts constituted under the Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes, and, because Rent Controllers were bound by the procedure of the regular Courts, the Rent Controller had in the instant case, erred in law in not dismissing the eviction application of the respondent.
14. The submission is fallacious for. More reasons than one. In the first place, the question, in the case cited, was only of the manner in which evidence had to be recorded, and the proposition that the Rent Controller was bound to record evidence in the manner followed by Courts constituted under the Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes does not by itself lead to the inference that the Rent Controller was bound by the technicalities of the Civil Courts in the matter of the joinder of parties and of causes of action the moreso, in view of section 99 of the Civil Procedure Code. But the view taken by the learned Judge lends support to learned counsel's submission by parity of reasoning, because the learned Judge has expressly relied on judgments Hassan Gul v. The State (1975 P Cr. L J 437), in Muhammad Younis v. The Crown (PLD 1953 Lah. 321) and in The State v. Kalendar Khan (PLD 1971 Pesh. 119) and on an unreported judgment of the Lahore High: Court in a transfer application of which some particulars have been given in paragraph 10 of the judgments.
15. Therefore, we have to point out that the three reported judgments on which the learned Judge relied related to Courts constituted under the Criminal Procedure Code, and as according to the law declared by this Court, a Rent Controller, whilst performing his functions under the said Ordinance, does not act as a Court, with all respect to the learned Judge, these judgments were not relevant to the case before him. However, the learned Judge has also relied on an earlier unreported order of the Lahore High Court. Although the facts about this earlier unreported order are not very clear, as far as we can gather what had happened in that case was that a landlord had filed eviction applications against three of his tenants, and because his cause of action against his three tenants was identical, the Rent Control--ler had, with the consent of parties, treated evidence in one of these cases as evidence in the other two cases. Then having invited the Rent Controller to follow this procedure the tenants had challenged it on the ground that it was illegal and sought the transfer of the cases against them. This applica--petition was allowed by the High Court on the ground that the Rent Controller had acted illegally in not recording evidence separately in each of the three cases before him. Now, as the learned Judge has in Malik Aman's case approved of the view taken in this unreported order, the question is whether this view is correct.
16. This view assumes that a Rent Controller is bound by the procedure followed by the Courts constituted under the Civil Procedure Code. But this assumption is not tenable in view of the law declared by this Court in Khadim Mohyuddid's case. Therefore, when an appellant challenges an order of a Rent Controller on the ground of irregularities of the type alleged in the instant case, or in the cases relied upon by learned counsel, the question is whether the irregularities have caused any prejudice to the aggrieved party, and if they have not, the irregularities would be no ground for setting aside the Rent Controller's order. And in Malik Aman's case, the learned Judge was of the view that the manner, in which evidence had been recorded, had caused "grave prejudice to the case of the appellants". On the finding thus given, the appeal of Malik Aman was rightly allowed, but we would emphasise here that an eviction order passed by a Rent Controller is not bad merely because the Rent Controller has adopted a procedure different from that followed by the Courts constituted under the Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes. And, this is only a corollary of the proposition laid down in Khadim Mohyuddin's case that a Rent Controller is not a Court, therefore, with respect we are unable to agree with the view taken in Malik Aman's case on which the learned Judge erroneously relied.