' Brief facts of the case are that respondents Nos.3 to 8 had filed a declaratory suit against the petitioner and other respondents which was contested by the petitioners (defendants) in the suit.
2. After affirmative evidence of respondents Nos.3 to 8 (plaintiffs) was concluded, the petitioners (defendants) moved an application for seeking permission to produce in evidence some documents comprising of certified copies of judicial record, public record and divorce deed etc. The said application was contested by respondents Nos.3 to 8 (plaintiffs) and was accepted by the learned trial Court on 13-9-1999.
3. Revision filed against that order by respondents Nos.3 to 8 was accepted by the learned District Judge, Multan on 29-9-2000. Resultantly petitioners' application for producing the documents was dismissed.
4. In this Constitutional petition the aforesaid order of District Judge, Multan is assailed as without lawful authority.
5. Petitioner's counsel has been heard. Writ petition and its Annexures perused.
6. A perusal of the order passed by the learned trial Court on 13-9-1999 whereby, the petitioners were allowed to produce documents, shows that the reasons for accepting the application were that many of the documents had come into existence during the proceedings of the suit which were not in existence previously and that the documents were required by the Court for the just decision of the case. The learned trial Court while allowing the application had also held that Plaintiffs would be at liberty to produce evidence in rebuttal of the said documents.
7. The learned District Judge had reversed the aforesaid order on the ground that documents were disputed and application for producing them was made at a belated stage.
8. Both the aforesaid reasons were hardly plausible or sufficient for interference by way of provisional jurisdiction.
9. Improper or wrong exercise of discretion was not open to revision unless the order was contrary to the principles regulating the exercise of such discretion or the Court exercising discretion had acted perversely. The improper exercise of discretion could be corrected in appeal. Delayed production by itself should not have been a ground for refusing to permit production of documents as documents can be produced even at the appellate stage.
10. In this case the evidence of the petitioners (defendants) had not yet commenced hence, the stage could not be deemed as belated.
11. No prejudice was caused to respondents Nos.3 to 8 (plaintiffs) as they were allowed to produce evidence in rebuttal. Apart from that order admitting documents did not amount to "a case decided" and as such it was not amenable to provisional jurisdiction.
12. Impugned order was, therefore, passed in violation of law and in arbitrary exercise of power. It is accordingly declared to have been passed without lawful authority and is of no legal effect. Order of the learned trial Court is restored. Writ .