Ahmad Din has invoked the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court for challenging a remand order passed by the Settlement Commissioner c 14-10-1976. The challenge to the impugned order is by reference to the provisions of Act XIV of 1975. The background of the case is that the petitioner had earlier filed Constitutional Petition No. 772-R of 1973 challenging various orders passed by the Settlement Authorities. It was dispose of by me on 9-7-1975 and the direction was that "the appeal shall be pending and the question of locus standing and the appeal being within time among other questions shall be decided before interfering with the order of transfer passed as early as 1963 in favour of the petitioner". . The Settlement Commissioner has passed a consequential order on 14-10-1976, whereby t remanded the case to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner with a direction "to visit the spot, look into the registers maintained by him for registration the plot forms and take a fresh decision in the light of the orders of the High Court as well as the facts available from the record and after spot inspection according to law and merits".
2. The specific objection to ouch an order by the Settlement Commissioner is that he had no power under subsection (2) of section 2 of the Evacuee Property Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975, to remit the case to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner for a decision on facts. The points which arose in the case were taken note of in the order passed by m on 19-1-1977 and they are as follows : "The legal question to be examined is whether after Act XI V of 1975 and the notification thereunder the Settlement Commissioner who ha passed the impugned order was the designated authority and if s~ whether he has finally disposed of the matter as required by law and if not whether the Deputy Settlement Commissioner to whom he ha entrusted the matter is the designated authority who has the jurisdiction to decide the matter which has been sent for decision to him and if he is a designated authority whether one designated authority could remand the proceedings to another designated authority."
After repealing by subsection (1) of section 2, the laws in the field including the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act and the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, the law provides as hereunder "(2) Upon the repeal of the aforesaid Acts and Regulations, all proceedings which, immediately before such repeal, may be pending before the authorities appointed thereunder shall stand transferred for final disposal to such officers as may be notified by the Provincial Government in the official Gazette and all cases decided by the Supreme Court or a High Court after such repeal which would have been remanded to any such authority in the absence of such repeal shall be remanded to the officers notified as aforesaid.
(3) Any proceedings transferred or remanded to an officer in pursuance of subsection (2) shall be disposed of by him in accordance with the provisions of the Act or Regulation hereby repealed to which the proceedings relate.
(4) The final orders passed under subsection (3) shall be executed by the Board of Revenue of the Province in accordance with the provisions of the Act or Regulation hereby repealed to which the proceedings . Related."
It appears clearly that the authorities set up by the Displaced Persons Act have been substituted by notified officers. They are persona designate. The power exercised by them is of final disposal. A remand order cannot be said to be final disposal of the case. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner to whom the matter has been remitted is also not the notified officer and in any case he derives no jurisdiction or power from another notified officer for they stand at par and the jurisdiction exercised and the power possessed by each is co-ordinate and distinctly under the law of pending proceedings or in cases received from the High Court. It is, therefore, clear that the Settlement Commissioner who is the designated authority has failed to exercise a juris- A diction possessed by him under the law by` not finally disposing of the case and instead by remitting it to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner for decision.
3. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent is that the power exercised by the notified officer is the same as was exerciseable under the repealed law and as under the repealed law a remand of the proceedings could take place, such a remand would not be wanting in jurisdiction. Subsection (2) and subsection (4) make it clear that the nature of the disposal of the case is final at the hands of the notified officer. The method by which such proceedings are received by one notified officer is one of the two methods, I.e., transfer of pending proceedings or its receipt on remand from the Supreme Court or the High Court, Except for these two sources there is no third found and the impugned order creates a third channel of receipt and disposal of cases.
This is violative of the law. The repealing law is applicable for determining the issues, but, as regards the nature of the order to be passed and the authority by whom it is to be passed, the repealing law taken over. It has to be a final order and it has to be passed by the notified e officer and none else. The impugned order is clearly without jurisdiction and is declared to be so. The notified officer shall finally dispose it of himself.