' JAVED IQBAL, J---The above captioned petitions for leave to appeal are directed against the judgment dated 5-11-2001 passed by the learned Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan, whereby the writ petitions preferred on behalf of petitioners have been dismissed. We intend to dispose of the said petitions by this common order as identical questions of law and facts are involved in all these petitions.
2. Precisely stated the facts of the case as enumerated in the impugned judgment are "that the respondents in the aforementioned writ petitions are labourors in petitioner's Textile Mill. Alleging short payment of salary/dues, they filed application before the Authority established under the afore referred Act. Petitioner filed written reply, the case was set down for recording of evidence when on 23-12-1999, a statement was allegedly made by the respondents/applicants to the effect that they did not want to pursue those applications. In terms of the said statement the applications of the respondents were dismissed. On 4-1-2000, i,e, after about less than two weeks the respondents filed applications contending therein that on 23-12-1999 the case was fixed for recording of evidence but the respondents had some dispute with their counsel with regard to fee; that their counsel refused to pursue their case; that they could not produce their evidence that their cases be restored and they be allowed to lead evidence failing which they would suffer irreparable loss. The Authority after granting opportunity to the petitioner to file reply to the said applications and having heard their counsel allowed respondent's application vide order dated 31- 3-2000." Being aggrieved writ petitions were preferred but dismissed vide judgment impugned, hence these petitions.
3. Heard Mr. Bashir Ahmad Malik, learned Advocate Supreme Court on behalf of petitioners whose prime contention is that the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 could not restore the cases of respondents which were finally decided being withdrawn and thereafter the Authority had become functus officio. It is next contended that the provisions as contained in Order XXIII and rule 1 C.P.C. Have been violated by the learned High Court as the principles enunciated therein are equally applicable to the proceedings under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 by virtue of section 141, C.P.C.
4. We have carefully examined the contentions as agitated on behalf of petitioners in the light of relevant provisions of law and record of the case. The order of Authority under the Payment and Wages Act, 1936 and judgment impugned have been perused thoroughly. A careful perusal of record would reveal that the matter was fixed on 23-12-1999 for the recording of evidence and what happened really has been highlighted by the learned Authority in its order dated 8-4-2000 which is reproduced herein below for ready reference:-- {{URDU TEXT}}
5. No exception can be taken to the said conclusion arrived at by the learned Authority and duly concurred by the learned High Court whereby substantial justice has been done. We have also adverted to the second limb of argument concerning the provisions as contained in Order XXIII, Rule 1 C.P.C. We are of the considered opinion that the provisions as contained in. Order XXIII, rule 1 C.P.C. Cannot be made applicable in view of the peculiar circumstances of the case and furthermore, that the entire Civil Procedure Code has never been made applicable in view of the provisions as contemplated in section 18 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936. The principle as enumerated under the various provisions of C.P.C. May be applied if circumstances so justify which are lacking in this case. It is well-settled by now that the rules framed in the C.P.C. Are for the advancement of justice and should not, as far as possible, be allowed to operate so as to defeat the ends of justice. In this regard we are fortified by the dictum laid down in Salma Begum v.
Sardaran Bibi (PLD 1995 SC 406); Mir Mazar v. Azim (PLD 1993 SC 332); Inamur Rehman Gillani v.
Jalal Din (1992 SCM R 1895); Toor Gul v. Mumtaz Begum (PLD 1972 SC 9): Imtiaz Ahmad v. Ghulam Ali (PLD 1963 SC 382).
6. No prejudice has been caused to the petitioner by whom written statements, controverting the claim of respondents, have already been filed. Let the controversy be resolved in accordance with law, and on merits in the light of evidence to be led by the parties in support of their respective claims.
7. No question of law of public importance is involved on the basis whereof leave to appeal could be granted. The petitions being meritless are dismissed and .