This is a second appeal against an order for the ejectment of the appellant, Abdul Rashid Bhatti from a house owned by the respondents Haji Muhammad Ishaq and another.
2. The impugned order was made on the respondents' application, under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) seeking eviction of the appellant on the grounds of default and personal need. They explained that they - had purchased the house in dispute because the existing accommodation with them was not sufficient to meet their requirements. The appellant resisted the application contending that after the purchase of the house by the respondents they did not serve him with a notice, under section 13-A of the Ordinance and, therefore, the application was not maintainable. He also denied that he had committed default in the payment of rent or that the house in dispute was needed by the respondents for their own occupation.
3. The learned Rent Controller, who heard the application, struck two preliminary issues regarding the service of notice, under; section 13-A of the Ordinance, and the maintainability of the application. After the framing of these issues, it was conceded by one of the respondents, namely, Haji Muhammad Ishaq that on the purchase of the house by them they had not served a notice under section 13-A on the appellant. The learned Rent Controller, therefore, held that the application could not proceed on the ground of default. He then framed an issue regarding the personal need of the respondents and recorded the parties' evidence thereon. In view of the evidence produced before him, he found that the respondents needed the house: in dispute, in good faith, for their own occupation and ordered the ejectment of the appellant. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the learned Rent Controller, the appellant went in appeal before an Additional District Judge but as it was dismissed he has come up in second appeal to this Court.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the relationship of landlords and tenant between the parties had not been established-inasmuch as the, respondents did not produce any documentary evidence showing that they bad purchased the house in dispute. When I asked the learned counsel for the appellant as to whether the appellant had raised- the aforesaid plea while replying to the application for his ejectment he frankly conceded that he had not done so. He, however, urged that the appellant did contend before the learned Rent Controller that the application was not, maintainable. On this, I asked him to read out the relevant portion of the reply submitted by the appellant, which he did. What was stated by the appellant in this behalf was that since the respondents had not served a notice, under section 13-A of the Ordinance, the application was not maintainable. Thus, he questioned the maintainability of the application not on the ground that there was no relationship of landlords and tenant between the parties but on the ground that notice under section 13-A had not been served on him. His plea relating to the notice was taken due care of by the learned Rent Controller. It was held by him that the notice was not served on the appellant and, therefore, the respondents could not pursue the ground of default but could prosecute the application in so far as it related to their plea of personal need. This order of the learned Rent Controller was in consonance with the provisions of section 13-A which lays down that if the notice ,required to he served thereunder is not served, the tenant cannot be ejected on the ground of default. This notice is, however, not necessary for bringing about the relationship of landlord and tenant between a person purchasing any property and the one who is in occupation thereof as tenant before it is purchased by the former. In taking this view I am fortified by the case of Sabu Mal v. Kika Ram alias Heman Das (PLD 1975 Lah) in which it was ruled that a tenancy would "in no way be dependent upon the service of notice under section 13-A of the Ordinance". The result, therefore, is that since the appellant had not denied the relationship of landlords and tenant between the parties and his plea relating to the non-service of notice under section 13 has nothing to do with that relationship, the appellant cannot be permitted to contend, at the stage of second appeal, that there was no relationship of landlords and tenant between the parties which plea, undoubtedly, involves a question of fact.
4-A. It was next contended by the learned counsel that the two tribunals below had misread the evidence in deciding the question of personal need. I am unable to agree with him. The orders of these tribunals would show that the respondents produced four witnesses to establish that they needed the house for their own use and the appellant examined an equal number of witnesses in rebuttal. The evidence of both sides was thoroughly discussed by the two tribunals and nothing material was overlooked. It has also not been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the two tribunals had omitted to consider any evidence or took into account any material which did not form part of the evidence. He simply pointed out a contradiction in the statements of the witnesses examined by the respondents. It relates to the number of the members of their families. One of the respondents, namely, Haji Muhammad Ishaq deposed as P. W. 4 that the members of their families were 15 in-number. Sh. Ahmad Ali (P. W. 1) and Muhammad Yusuf (P. W.
2), who appeared to support him, also made statements to the same effect. Their third witness, Khaera (P. W. 3), however, stated that their families consisted of eight members. In the face of the testimony of three other witnesses the statement of Khaera pales into insignificance. It is also to be noted that the appellant did not produce any evidence in rebuttal of the respondents' evidence. In the circumstances, the aforesaid statement of one witness (Khaera) of the respondents is not enough to discard the overwhelming and unrebutted testimony of their other witnesses. I, therefore, see no good reason to disturb the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the two tribunals that the respondents needed the house in dispute, in good faith, for their own occupation.
5. No other plea was raised by the learned counsel for the appellant and since the contentions put forth by him have been found without substance, the appeal is dismissed in limine. The appellant is. However, allowed one month's time to vacate the premises in dispute. One month's time to vacate the premises in dispute.