' Brief facts out of which present writ petition arises are that respondent No,3 filed a petition under section 54 of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 before respondent No,2. The arguments were heard and order was reserved by respondent No,2 on 8-9-2001. Parties were informed on telephone by the office of respondent No,2 on 11-9-2001 that the decision would be announced on 13-9-2001. Muhammad Ibrar, representative of petitioner-Society/Court Clerk himself visited the office of respondent No,2 on 16-1-2002 to inquire, whether judgment has been passed or not. Office of respondent No,2 informed him that the judgment had been announced on, 13-9-2001. The representative of the petitioner-Society filed an application to secure the certified copy of the impugned order dated 13-9-2001 on 16-1-2002 which was supplied by the office of respondent No,2 to the representative of the petitioner-Society on 17-1-2002. The petitioner filed an appeal on 22-2- 2002 before respondent No,1 under section 64 of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 against the order, dated 13-9-2001 of respondent No,2 alongwith an application for condonation of delay and also alongwith affidavit of Muhammad Ibrar, Court Clerk/representative of the petitioner-Society.
Respondent No,1 dismissed the appeal of the petitioner as time-barred vide impugned ' order, dated 30-9-2002. Hence, the present writ petition.
2. The learned counsel of the petitioner submits that the petitioner filed an appeal before respondent No,1 within prescribed period under section 64 of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 as the impugned order passed by the Deputy Registrar was reserved on 9-8-2001 and thereafter respondent No,2 did not communicate the same to the petitioner in terms of provision of Cooperative Societies Act. The representative of the petitioner visited the office of the aforesaid Authority on 16-1-2002 and came to know that the order was announced on 13-9-2001. The petitioner submitted an application for securing the certified copy of the impugned order in the office of respondent No,2, which was supplied to the petitioner on 17-1-2002. The petitioner filed an appeal before the respondent No,1 on 22-2-2002. The period for filing of appeal is prescribed as 2 months in section 64 of the Cooperative Societies Act. He further submits that the actual facts were not considered by respondent No,1 at the time of deciding the appeal of the petitioner.
3. The learned counsel for the respondents submits that respondent No,1 communicated the order to the petitioner on telephone on 11-9-2001 qua the announcement of decision. He further submits that the petitioner did not file the appeal well within time. He further submits that the petitioner came to know about the dismissal of its appeal on 16-2-2002 and did not file the appeal immediately and thereafter the petitioner had filed the appeal after 34 days. He further submits that it is the duty and obligation of the petitioner to explain delay of each day.
4. Mr. Muhammad Hanif Khatana, Additional Advocate-General submits that the impugned order is valid in the eyes of law, therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable.
5. I have given my anxious consideration to the contentions of the learned counsel of the parties and perused the record myself.
6. It is better and appropriate to reproduce the basic facts in chronological order to resolve the controversy between the parties:--
(i) Respondent No,2 reserved the order on 8-9-2001.
(ii) Office of respondent No,2 intimated the parties on 11-9-2001 on telephone that the order would be announced on 13-9-2001.
(iii) The petitioner's representative visited the office of respondent No,2 on 16-1-2001.
(iv) The petitioner came to know that the matter was finally decided by respondent No,2 on 13-9- 2001.
(v) The petitioner submitted an application for securing the certified copy of the impugned order, dated 30-9-2001 before respondent No,2 on 16-1-2002.
(vi) Respondent No,2 supplied the copy of the impugned order to the petitioner on 17-1-2002.
(vii) The noting of respondent No,rs office reveals that the announcement of the impugned order was communicated to the petitioner through telephone on 11-9-2001.
(viii)The appeal of the appellant was dismissed as time-barred on 30-9-2002.
' In case, the aforesaid facts are put in juxta position, then it is crystal clear that respondent No,2 intimated the petitioner on 11-9-2001; whereas the order was announced on 13-9-2001. The office noting does not reveal that who has received the telephone message on 11-9-2001 qua announcement of impugned order, dated 13-9-2001 of respondent No,2. This fact clearly shows that the impugned order was not communicated to the petitioner, even otherwise does not fall within the parameter of section 64 of the Cooperative Society Act. The word "communication" means communicated to the petitioner through written letter and not on telephone.
7 .It is better and appropriate to reproduce section 64 of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 to resolve the controversy between the parties:-- "64. Appeal.--- An appeal against an order or decision of or sanctioned by the Registrar under sections 10, 16, 45, 47, 50, 50-A, 54 subsection (3) of section 54-A may be made by any party aggrieved or affected by the order or decision to the Provincial Government within 2 months of the date of communication of the order.' underline is mine.
' The word "communicate has defined by this Court in Nawab Begum's case PLD 1974 Lah. 344 in the following terms:-- "I may, however, observe that the word 'communicate' is quite comprehensive. It carries with it the meanings of imparting news or information. It also means intercourse which word would indicate impartation of information etc. On one side and reception and understanding on the other. The burden is on the State to show that grounds were communicated to the detenu. This burden has not been discharged. The detention becomes illegal as held in Ghazi Masud Gil, Government of West Pakistan referred to above.
' The word `communicate' means to transmit the information or uttex as defined in Black's Law Dictionary 6th Edition.
' The word `utter' means to put or send into circulation; to publish or put forth; to offer, to utter and publish an instrument' as defined in- Blacks' Law Dictionary 6th Edition.
' The word 'communicate' has also been considered in 'Shanti Parsad v. Competent Authority 1965 Punjab 315. The relevant observation is as follows- `In view of subsection (4) of section 19 and rule 8, it is only when the Competent Authority, on refusal of an application under section 19, furnishes a copy of its order to the applicant that there is communication of its order to the applicant and it is from the date of such communication of the older of the Competent Authority that 30 days must be reckoned under rule 8, Slum Area (Improvement and Clearance) Rules, (1957), Ruie and Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance)
Act, 1956, section 19(4)."
In case, the contention of the learned counsel of the respondents be accepted even then the communication through telephone is not proved on record. As mentioned above, the office noting does not reveal that who has received the telephone message. After addition of Article 2A in the Constitution , the superior Courts insisted that the cases must be decided on merits instead of technicalities, as per principle laid down by the Honorable Supreme Court in Said Muhammad's case PLD 1989 SC 532. It is pertinent to mention here that in the present case, the petitioner has filed the appeal within 2 months from date of knowledge/communication, therefore, the appeal of the petitioner was not time-barred before respondent No,1 .
' In view of what has been discussed above, the impugned order, dated 30-9-2002 passed by respondent No, 1 is set aside, meaning thereby the appeal filed by the petitioner shall be deemed to be pending adjudication before respondent No,
1. Parties are directed to appear before respondent No,1 who is directed to decide the appeal of the petitioner on merits in accordance with law within reasonable time after providing proper hearing to all the concerned.