DECISION This is an appeal against the order of the Labour Court dismissing the application of the appellant made under section 25-A, Industrial Relations Ordinance on the ground of non-maintainability.
2. The appellant was in the permanent employment of the Military Dairy Farm, Malir-Cants., Karachi and was working as Store Keeper. He was charge-sheeted as he had left his duty one hour earlier than the scheduled time. He submitted an explanation but he was removed from service. His representation to the higher authorities proved futile. He, therefore, approached the Junior Labour Court after serving the grievance notice. An objection was taken on behalf of the respondent that Labour Laws were not applicable to the Military Dairy, Farm and the matter was still pending before the Military Officers for adjudication. The learned Presiding Officer of the Junior Labour Court rejected the contention raised on behalf of the respondent and ordered re-instatement of the appellant. That order was passed on 14-7-1973. An appeal was preferred against the order before the Labour Court and it was dismissed on 29-8-1973.
3. In pursuance of the aforesaid orders the appellant was re-instated and he continued to serve till 4-7-1976 When he was not permitted to resume his duties but he was removed from service without any charge-sheet or inquiry. After serving the grievance petition an application under section 25-A, Industrial Relations Ordinance was made.
4. The application was resisted on various grounds. One of the objections which was taken was that the Military Farm being one of the establishment under the defence services of Pakistan as defined in the army regulations. It Volume, (Instructions) Chapter I and thereby part of the forces of Pakistan, provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance were not applicable and thus by virtue of section 1(3) of the said Ordinance the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was barred to entertain any such com--plaint.
5. The learned Presiding Officer on consideration of the argument advanced before him upheld the objection raised on behalf of the respondent that the Industrial Relations Ordinance was not applicable to the Military Dairy Farm, and, therefore, dismissed the application. Aggrieved by this the present appeal had been filed.
6. In this case two questions arise for consideration. The first is whether the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is barred by virtue of section 3 of the industrial Relations Ordinance. This question has been fully dealt with by me in another Appeal No. KAR-25 of 1977 Re : M. Ali Zaman v. Muhammad Shafi Bhatti, Manager, Military Dairy Farm, Malir Cantt., Karachi and I came to the conclusion that the establishment of Mali Dairy Farm is connected with the Defence Services of Pakistan and, therefore, the Industrial Relations Ordinance is not applicable and the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is barred. The reasons given by me in that case should be treated to form as part of this order. The second question which arise for consideration is whether the previous decision by the Junior Labour Court and upheld in the Labour Court in appeal operates as res judicata in the present case. Before dealing with the question it may be recalled that the parties in that case were same as in the present case. The appellant was removed from service and he approached the Labour Court. The dismissal order was set aside and his re-instatement was ordered. The appeal against that order was dismissed. Consequently, he was re-instated and continued to work till the present dismissal.
7. It was urged on behalf of the appellant that since that decision was between by the same parties and the same question was involved; it operated as res judicata in the present case. On the other hand, it was argued that it was a question of jurisdiction and since the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was ousted by virtue of section 3 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, the decision was without jurisdiction and nullity. Consequently the question of the bar to be imposed by the principle of yes judicata wag not applicable.
8. On consideration of the arguments advanced before me I uphold the contention raised on behalf of the respondent that the bar imposed by the principle of yes judicata is not available in the present case for the reason that according to my view the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to e deal with a case of person connected with the Defence Forces of Pakistan and, therefore, order being without jurisdiction was nullity and can be ignored. It is not merely a question of decision being wrong to bind the parties but it is a question relating to the very jurisdiction. It needs no authority to state that the judgment of Special Tribunal operates as res judicata in respect of matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of such Tribunal and this principle has no application with regard to the decisions on matters not within that special jurisdiction. When the statute bars jurisdiction it cannot be acquired by entertaining a wrong view. Section 3 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance is very clear and there can be no estoppel against the pro--vision of a statute.
Consequently, the point can be re-agitated despite the fact that it was disposed of by the previous Junior Labour Court and confirmed by the Labour Court in appeal. In this connection reference may be made to an Indian Authority in the case of Krishnan Nair v. Ramchandra Vithal Sanghavi (AIR 1956 Bom. 268), wherein it was held that a decree which was passed without jurisdiction was a nullity, and the question as to the absence of jurisdiction could be raised even in execution proceedings or in collateral proceedings. It was further held that a Court cannot by an erroneous decision as to its jurisdiction, clothe itself with the powers to adjudicate upon matters which it cannot on a true interpretation of its jurisdiction, and the adjudication can not be regarded as binding upon the parties in other proceedings.
9. Lastly, it may be noted that the learned Junior Labour Court had reached the conclusion that the Management had not proved by evidence or their rules of the farm that the Court could not hold jurisdiction. Such an observation was commented upon by Dacca High Court in the case of Muhammad Jamiruddin Ahmed and others v. Muhammad Nurul Islam and another (PLD 1967 Dacca 441), wherein it was observed that the finding in the previous suit that plaintiff had failed to prove defendant was sub-lessee could be interpreted to mean that the defendant was sub-lessee, and, therefore, plaintiff ill subsequent suit was not debarred from proving defendant to be sub- lessee.
10. In result I maintain the order passed by the Labour Court and dismiss the appeal.