' JAVED IQBAL, J.---This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgment dated 7-12- 2000 passed by learned Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal, Lahore, whereby the appeal preferred on behalf of petitioner has been dismissed and order dated 19-8-1987' whereby the services of petitioner were terminated has been kept intact.
2. Precisely stated the facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed as Additional District and Sessions Judge on 10-7-1984, joined services on 26-8-1984 and probation period of petitioner was extended on 9-10-1986 with retrospective effect for one year. The services of petitioner were, however, terminated on 19-8-1987. As a final resort the Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal, Lahore, was approached by means of appeal which was dismissed on 7-12-2000, hence this petition.
3. Heard Mr. Amjad Hussain Syed, learend Advocate Supreme Court on behalf of petitioner who mainly contended that the petitioner was initially appointed as Additional District and Sessions Judge on probation for a period of two years which expired on 22nd August, 1986 and the petitioner was deemed to have been confirmed by process of law as after the expiry of two years no order whatsoever had been passed by the Competent Authority. It is next contended that the services of petitioner could not have been terminated without issuance of show-cause notice under the relevant Efficiency and Disciplinary Rules and on this score alone the order of termination is liable to be set aside. It is urged with vehemence that services of various other Additional District and Sessions Judges were terminated alongwith the petitioner but they were subsequently reinstated and petitioner has been discriminated which is a sheer violation of the provisions as contained in Article 25 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
4. We have carefully examined the contentions as agitated on behalf of the petitioner in the light of relevant provisions of law and record of the case. We are not persuaded to agree with the prime contention of learned Advocate Supreme Court on behalf of petitioner that the period of probation could not have been extended beyond two years and the petitioner stood confirmed on 9-7-1986 after expiry of two years being not in consonance with the provisions as contained in rule 7 of the Punjab Civil Servant (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974 which, inter alia, provides that initially the period of probation would be two years subject to further extension for two years which means that total period of probation would be four years and it cannot be extended beyond that. It further clarifies that if no order is made on completion of two years of probationary period it shall be deemed to have been extended. A further extension in the period of probation for two years can be made irrespective of the fact whether a person is appointed by way of initial recruitment or otherwise. The question of "automatic confirmation" does not arise as pressed time and again by learned counsel on behalf of petitioner because in such an eventuality the period of probation shall be deemed to have been extended. There is no denying the fact that period of probation was extended with effect from 25-8-1986 by means of order dated 9-10-1986 which admittedly was issued during the extended period of probation. It is worth-mentioning that the period of probation was extended vide order dated 9-10-1986 which was never challenged and impliedly the extension in the probation period was accepted and no protest worth the name was made.
5. We have also adverted to the contention of learned Advocate Supreme Court on behalf of petitioner that without issuance of show-cause notice the services of petitioner could not have been terminated. There is no cavil with the proposition that being probationer the services of petitioner could have been terminated during the initial or extended period of probation without any notice pursuant to the provisions as contemplated in section 10(1) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974. It is a case of "termination simpliciter" and no stigma of misconduct which includes inefficiency/corruption has been attached with it, hence the question of any notice prior to termination of service does not arise. "Termination simpliciter" cannot be equated with that of "dismissal" or "removal" where a probationer would be eligible for a show-cause notice. In the present case it was not obligatory for the Competent Authority to have issued a show-cause notice prior to termination of the services of petitioner pursuant to the provisions as contained in section 10(1) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 being probationer. In this regard we are fortified by the dictum as laid down in the following authorities:-- ' Tahir Hussain Shirazi . Governor of the Punjab (1990 SCMR 1510); Muhammad Siddiq Javaid Chaudhry v. Government of West Pakistan (PLD 1974 SC 393); Pakistan Punjab Province v. Riaz Ali Khan (1982 SCMR 770); The Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Peshawar Division and another v. Farman Ali (1991 SCMR 400); Karachi Port Trust through Chairman, Board of Trustee v. Altaf Ahmed and another (1996 SCMR 1205); The Secretary, Government of the Punjab through Secretary, Health Department, Lahore v. Riaz-ul-Haq (1997 SCMR 1552); Iqbal Wasti v. Collector of Customs, Karachi (1987 PLC (C.S.) 758); Federation of Pakistan v. Riaz Ali Khan (PLD 1958 IW.P.] Lah.
22); Riaz Ali Khan v. Pakistan (PLD 1967 Lah. 491); Abdul Karim v. The West Pakistan. Province (PLD 1956 SC (Pak.) 298); The Secretary, East Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, Dacca v. M.D.
Serajul Haque (1970 SCMR 398).
6. We have also attended the question of discrimination as according to learned ASC on behalf of petitioner a few Additional District and Sessions Judges were reinstated in service by the Government. It transpires from scrutiny of record that it was so done by the Government as a concessionary or obliging statement was made by the learned Advocate-General which, however, was not approved by this Court. No such Additional District and Sessions Judge was, however, reinstated in service by the learned High Court. It is worth-mentioning that the learned High Court in no circumstances can be compelled to reinstate or confirm the petitioner as reinstatement and confirmation both depends on the subjective assessment of a particular incumbent which aspect of the matter squarely falls within the jurisdictional domain of the High Court.
7. The conclusion as arrived at by learned Punjab Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal, Lahore, is strictly in accordance with settled norms of justice. No question of law of public importance is involved in the matter on the basis whereof leave to appeal could be granted. The petition being meritless is dismissed and .