A suit for possession and compensation for the use and occupation of the suit property was instituted by the respondent/plaintiff, which was contested by the petitioner/defendant. It was decreed by the trial Court vide judgment dated 22-4-1985 to the extent of possession only. The said judgment was appealed against by the petitioner, which was accepted by the learned Additional District Judge, Kasur on 31-10-1987 and the case was remanded to the trial Court to determine the area transferred to the respondents/plaintiff. On remand an additional Issue No,6-A i,e, "Which property with that area was transferred to the plaintiff vide transfer order dated 10-8-1977 ?OPP" was framed by the trial Court whereafter on conclusion of the trial the suit was decreed by the trial Court on 4-4-1990. It was found that the plaintiff/respondent had been transferred the whole of the suit house. He was thus granted decree for possession, but suit to the extent of claim for compensation was dismissed as not pressed. An appeal was preferred thereagainst by the petitioner which was accepted partially by the learned Additional District Judge, Kasur on 25-7- 1992 modifying the decree to the extent that the respondent/plaintiff was entitled to the property consisting of one room with an area of 5 Marlas and dismissed the suit to the extent of remaining property. C.R. No,1289 of 1992 was filed by the respondent/plaintiff before this Court, which was accepted by this Court on 22-5-2003 observing that the Appellate Court had proceeded to decide the appeal on the basis of extraneous material which did not form part of the judicial record. It was thus directed that the appeal should be heard and decided afresh in accordance with law. It is in this background that the learned Additional District Judge, Kasur has now decided the appeal vide judgment dated 23-12-2003 and dismissed the same which has been assailed through this revision petition.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner has been heard whose grievance is that the reports of the Settlement Authorities as to the existence of Imam Bargah and the extent of the property transferred to the respondent/plaintiff have not been kept in view by the Courts below. It is further contended that the evidence on the record has been either misread or overlooked by the learned Appellate Court.
3. The case of the respondent/plaintiff was that the suit property had been disposed of in his favour in the year 1960 through auction for which he paid the price and Transfer Order was eventually issued on 10-8-1977. It was the case of the respondent/plaintiff that the petitioner/defendant had been issued notices about the said transfer and was fully aware of the same. There are concurrent findings by all the Courts insofar as the factum of transfer in favour of the respondent/plaintiff is concerned. Such a conclusion, therefore, is not open to challenge nor can be agitated by the petitioner. In the written statement filed by him, however, it was pleased that the property was Imam Bargah, which could not be transferred to the respondent/plaintiff. It may be observed that it was after the filing of the suit by the respondent/plaintiff that some steps were taken by the petitioner through miscellaneous applications before the Settlement Authorities, to dispute and assail the transfer of the property. Suffice it to observe that it was such a belated move made in the year 1983, after the repeal of the settlement law, as could hardly yield any positive results. It was clearly a counter blast, aimed at to countermand the transfer order, which had become final under the law. Even the extent and quantum of the area could not be assailed successfully as the Transfer Order dated 10-8-1977 gives full description of the suit property as "No,I11-23 (house)
Khudian", which had been transferred through auction dated 27-5-1960. Any attempt made after the transfer had become final in favour of the respondent/plaintiff and the reports secured from the defunct Settlement Authorities after the repeal of the laws were also of no effect nor could impair the rights so accrued in favour of the respondent/plaintiff. Reference in this context may be made to Ali Muhammad v. Haji Hussain and 2 others (PLD 1975 Karachi 971) and Dost Muhammad v.
Member, Board of Revenue (Settlement and Rehabilitation Wing) and others (1991 SCM R 84). The view thus formed by the Appellate Court in dismissing the appeal of the petitioner is unexceptionable and warrants no interference.
' In view of this, the revision petition is without merit and is dismissed accordingly.