' MUHAMMAD NAWAZ ABBASI, J.--- This petition for special leave to appeal, under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, has been directed against the judgment, dated 26- 5-2003 passed by a learned Single Judge of Peshawar High Court, Peshawar, in a civil revision arising out of a suit for possession.
2. The essential facts giving rise to this petition are that Muhammad Khan, respondent No,1 in the present petition, filed a suit for possession through redemption of the suit property under PATA Regulations. Pending adjudication of the suit, the forum for trial of suit filed under PATA Regulations was changed and the suit was sent to the civil Court for trial. The present petitioners contested the suit in which an amended plaint was filed in the Civil Court. The learned Civil Judge/Illaqa Qazi, Dir, in the light of pleadings in the suit, having framed the issues and recording the evidence produced by the parties in support of their respective claims, decreed the suit vide judgment, dated 28-5- 2000. The appeal preferred by the petitioners against the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court was dismissed by an Additional District Judge/Illaqa Azafi Qazi, vide judgment, dated 2-11- 2000. The petitioners then invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court in the matter and a learned Single Judge in the High Court having discussed the controversial question, in the light of the evidence of the parties, dismissed the revision petition with the observation that the concurrent findings of fact of the two Courts being well founded, would not call for any interference in the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.
3. The main issue between the parties was whether there was sale ofsuit property in favour of father of petitioners and the sale-deed produced in the Court was a genuine document. The Courts below, after examining the relevant evidence, found the sale-deed not a genuine document and observed that the right of ownership in the property on the basis of such document could not be claimed. The learned Judge in the High Court, having discussed the controversial question regarding ownership of property observed as under in para.7 of the impugned judgment: --- "Admittedly the claim of the petitioners as to the ownership of the land in dispute based on the sale-deed, dated 20 Rabiul Awal, 1350 Hijri. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the plaintiff/respondent No,1 was required to establish his case independently on his own evidence and even if the petitioners failed to substantiate the factum of sale, it does not defeat their case, is misconceived and against the record. The very claim of ownership of the land in question by the petitioners was through the sale deed and they had denied the ownership of the plaintiff/respondent No,1 on the strength of alleged sale-deed in their possession. It is settled that when one deny the right of opposite party he had to shatter and damage the case with solid proof.
When the petitioners had produced the sale-deed for negation of the suit of the plaintiff/respondent No,1 they were under obligation to discharge their burden satisfactorily. Simple denial is no denial. Non-production of sale-deed without proof means that the suit went un- rebutted."
4. Mr. Muhammad Munir Peracha, learned counsel for the petitioners in the present petition when confronted that the sale-deed on the basis of which the petitioners were claiming right of ownership in the property was found not genuine document and in absence of any other proof of title what was the status of their possession and on what basis they asserted their claim in the property, the learned counsel has candidly conceded that the claim of petitioners was based only on the sale-deed in question and with the exclusion of this sale-deed from consideration, there would be no other proof of ownership and right of possession. Learned.Counsel, however, attempted to contend that the respondents having filed suit for possession on the basis of oral assertion that their forefathers mortgaged the property, were under heavy burden to establish their right in the property and without discharging this burden, they could not challenge the title of the petitioners and the genuineness of sale-deed. The learned counsel emphasized that all the three Courts failed to attend the real question that the respondents were not able to discharge the basic onus of establishing their right in the property and insteadwrongly shifted the onus to the petitioner to prove the genuineness of sale-deed which has caused serious miscarriage of justice, therefore, the matter would essentially need examination by this Court.
5. We having 'heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and perused the record with his assistance, do not find any substance in the contentions raised in support of -this petition. The learned Judge in the High Court, having discussed the pivotal issue in the light of evidence of the parties, held that the concurrent findings of the two Courts on the question of fact, were well founded and we fully share this opinion. Notwithstanding the objection raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners regarding burden of proof, the fundamental question for decision between the parties would relate to the question of title and the learned Judge in the High Court having dealt with the said question in detail, dismissed the revision petition. The learned counsel has not been able to convince us that either the findings of fact arrived at by the Court of first instance and the Appellate Court, were result of misreading or non-reading of evidence or that the High Court while affirming the decree concurrently passed by two Courts, committed any illegality calling for interference of this Court. It is well established principle of law that even if the findings of Courts below on a question of fact are erroneous, the same cannot be interfered with by the High Court in the revisional jurisdiction. The learned counsel has neither made any other submission in support of the petition nor has raised any substantial question of law.
6. In the light of foregoing discussion, we while taking no exception to the view of the High Court in the matter, dismiss this petition and accordingly leave is refused.