1. ' Petitions Nos.368, 369 and 370 of 2001 involve common points of facts and law and are proposed to be disposed through common order.
2. ' Petitioners in all the three petitions are tenants of respondents Nos.1 to 4 and have approached this Court after dismissal of their rent appeal by the learned IV-Additional District Judge, Hyderabad vide order,. Dated 22-11-2001 in F.R.As. Nos.148, 147 and 146 of 2001 respectively upholding the orders of ejection of the petitioners passed by the learned 1st Senior Civil Judge/Rent Controller, Hyderabad.
3. ' Mr. Faiz Muhammad Qureshi, learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that the property comprises of several tenants owned by ten co-sharers, who are landlords. The present applications for ejectment were moved by the three of the landlords for their individual personal requirement at the same time, which does not stand to reason and reflects mala fide, therefore, both the Courts below erred in arriving at the conclusion of bona fide personal need. He also referred to the provisions of section 21 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance as amended by Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (No,XIV of 2001) of section 21(1-C) requiring the Appellate Court to make an attempt to effect the compromise between the parties and as such the impugned orders were bad in law and liable to be set aside being passed in violation of the aforesaid provisions. Referring to the preamble of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 learned counsel stated that the object of the law is not to protect the interests of the landlords only but to regulate the relations between the landlord and tenants and to protect the interest of both the parties within the urban areas and this objective would be frustrated if the impugned order passed in violation of the provisions of section 21(1-C) ignoring the rights of the tenant for an attempt to compromise is not set aside.
4. ' Mr. Hakim Ali Siddiqui learned counsel for the respondents Nos.1 to 4 in rebuttal argued that neither any objection was raised before the Rent Controller regarding filing of three applications nor any violation of law has taken place as each of the application is decided on its own merits after proof of the bona fide personal requirement of the landlord. The points of issue have been adjudicated on the strength of the pleadings and evidence adduced and the concurrent findings are based on evidence which are not to be disturbed as no illegality has been pointed out from the record calling for exercise of jurisdiction on the Constitutional side under Article 199. In support of his contentions he has placed reliance on the case of Niaz Muhammad v. Fazal Raqib PLD 1974 SC 134, the case of Muhammad Shareef v. Muhammad Afzal Suhail PLD 1981 SC 246, and the case of Abdul Waheed v. Settlement Department 1999 CLC 470. His next contention was that the grounds agitated by the petitioners in the present petitions have already been considered and dealt with according to law by the learned Appellate Court and no fresh ground is taken before this Court, the same do not call for an action by invoking Article 199 of the Constitution. Reliance was placed on the case of Mrs. Anees Manzar Kazmi v. Mst. Amir Jehan Begum 1989 SCM R 235. Replying to the objections pertaining to efforts for compromise under section 21(1-C) learned counsel for the respondents stated that the provisions of this section are directory in nature and not mandatory.
5. Their compliance or non-compliance as such does not result in a material illegality and does not constitute a ground for setting aside the impugned order. In support of his contentions he placed reliance on the case of Muhammad Ismail v. Haji Muhammad & Sons PLD 1978 Kar. 926, the case of Niaz Muhammad Khan v. Mian Fazal Raqib PLD 1974 SC 134, the case of Syed Iftikhar Hussain Gilani v. Anwar Kamal Khan 1997 CLC 1724, and the case of Muhammad Sarwar v. Judge, Family Court No,11, Sadiqabad 1999 CLC 1578.
6. ' The concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the two Courts below in rent cases and challenged in the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court came under examination before the Honourable Supreme Court and it has been observed that "the jurisdiction of High Court to interfere in matters of the kind involved in the present case is very limited one and confined only to ascertaining whether the District Judge has not flouted the provisions of the relevant statute or has failed to follow the law relating thereto as laid down by the superior Courts."
7. ' In response to the objection as to an effort of compromise the parties were also summoned before the Court in presence of the learned counsel and afforded an opportunity of compromise, however, statement was made that no compromise could be worked out. The section 21(1-C) is reproduced as follows:-- "(1-A) .....................
8. (1-B)
9. (1-C) The Appellate Authority, May, at any stage of appeal attempt to effect a compromise between the parties."
10. ' No penalty, adverse conclusion, inference or action has been provided against any party or regarding the conduct of the proceedings for non-compliance of the above provision of law. Albeit, the provisions of law are required to be complied with in letter and spirit and the Appellate Courts are expected to make an endeavour to effect a compromise' between the parties, however, the mere fact of not settling the dispute by the litigants or the conduct of the parties in not arriving at a compromise could not render an order of the Appellate Court illegal. The instances of such cases can be found in matters falling under the Family Laws Ordinance providing for pre-trial and post- trial and the effect of failure thereof as to the validity of the decision in such cases. Regarding the directory nature of the provisions, no penalty, adverse conclusion, inference or action has been provided against any party. It has been held by the superior Courts that provisions of such type are directory in nature as held in the case of Muhammad Ismail (supra) where the directions of Rent Controller in the rent order for deposit of rent were held to be directory and not mandatory as the statute did not provide for consequences of failure to comply with the directions contained in it, such directions, it was observed by the learned Single Judge, are to be interpreted as directory and not mandatory in pursuance to the normal rules of construction of statutes.
11. ' The matter also came under examination before the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Niaz Muhammad Khan (supra) and it was observed:-- "As a general rule, however, a statute is understood to be directory when it contains matter merely of direction, but not when those directions are followed up by an express provision that, in default of following them, the facts shall be null and void. To put it differently, if the Act is directory, its disobedience does not entail any invalidity if the Act is mandatory disobedience entails serious legal consequences amounting to the invalidity of the act done in disobedience to the provision."
12. ' In Farid-un-Nissa v. Chairman, Federal Land Commission, Rawalpindi PLD 1984 Kar. 499 the same view for arriving at a decision as to the mandatory nature of a statute has been upheld and subsequently relied upon in the case of Iftikhar Hussain Gilani v. Anwar Kamal Khan 1997 CLC 1724.
13. ' Similar provisions to resort to conciliation of proceedings as envisaged by Family Courts Act have repeatedly been held to be of directory nature as observed in the case of Muhammad Sarwar (supra). This view is also supported by the cases of Muhammad Sadiq Hussain v. Mst.Khursheed Fatima and another 1978 SCM R 130 and Bharoo v. Civil Judge/Family Judge and another 1985 CLC 806.
14. ' In view of the above discussion there is no option but to hold that the validity of legal orders cannot be examined on the touchstone of the conduct of the parties to the rent proceedings if they are not inclined to settle the matter by way of compromise and the provisions of section 21(1-C) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance are directory in nature and not mandatory. Having come to the above conclusion and in view of the observations made in Muhammad Sharif's case (supra) no ground is made out for interfering with the impugned orders passed by the two Courts below.
15. 'Accordingly these petitions have no merits as no ground for their maintainability is made out, hence the same are dismissed with no order as to costs.