' JUSTICE (RTD.) ABDUL GHANI SHAIKH (CHAIRMAN).---This appeal is directed against the original impugned order dated 6-11-1999 passed by the Deputy Director (Agricultural Supplies), Sindh Agricultural Supply Organization, Larkana Division, Larkana dismissing appellant from service.
2.The facts relevant for the purpose of disposal of the appeal are that appellant Attaullah Brohi, Sales Inspector during his posting as Incharge Sub-Bulk Depots Shandadkot and Qubo Saeed Khan, allegedly misappropriated/defalcated huge S.A.S.O. Stocks worth Rs,14,91,613 at Sub Bulk Depot, Shandadkot and Rs,7,56,375 at Sub-Bulk Depot, Qubo Saeed Khan, totalling Rs,22,47,988. A show-cause notice followed by final show-cause notice was issued which as alleged by the appellant were not served upon him. He was however, service with another show-cause notice on account of remaining absent from duties, which he replied and explained h s position. By an order dated 6-11-1999 he was awarded major penalty of 'Dismissal from Service' and 'Recovery of losses' sustained by the S.A.S.O. Feeling dissatisfied, appellant preferred numerous appeals, firstly to the Managing Director S.A.S.O. On 4-12-1999 and 6-12-1999, secondary to the Core Commander Sindh, Karachi on 23-12-1999, thirdly to the Governor of Sindh on 20-1-2000 and lastly to the Minister of Agriculture, Government of Sindh, Karachi on 8-5-2000. On getting no response from any quarter, appellant filed the instant appeal befdre this Tribunal on 9-12-2000.
3.The office raised objection that appeal is hopelessly time-barred. While fixing the matter for preliminary hearing on the point of limitation, the Respondents were directed to submit their parawise comments. In response thereof, Respondent No,1 filed written statement/ comments/legal objections, challenging the maintainability of appeal and prayed for dismissal of the same. The appellant also at his own accord filed preliminary objections to the written statement filed by the Respondent No,1.
4.In reply to the office objections and in support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant inter alia contended that the allegations of misappropriation of amount and defalcation of S.A.S.O.
Stocks levelled against the appellant were false, fabricated and manipulated and levelled by and at the instance of those who themselves were involved in such act of misappropriation/defalcation and that before' awarding major penalty no show-cause notice of final show-cause notice was served upon the appellant. He alleged that Respondent No,3 at the instance of Respondent No,2 removed fertilizer from Shandadkot Depot by breaking open the locks, appellant made such complaints to the higher-ups and also the Anti-Corruption authorities, but instead of taking action against the delinquents by probing the matter through regular enquiry appellant himself was made target and was awarded major penalty of dismissal from service. He also submitted that criminal case was also registered against the appellant qua the same incident which is pending adjudication in the Court of learned Special Judge, Anti-Corruption Larkana and the trial thereof has not yet commenced, therefore during the pendency of the trial the departmental action of the respondents against the appellant is not sustainable in the eye of law. So far delay in filling the instant appeal, learned counsel contended that impugned order was issued on 6-11-1999, which was never served upon the appellant, however, departmental appeal was filed on 4-12-1999 i,e, well within time. He sated that impugned order is illegal, ab initio null and void and in view of the settled law on time limit runs against the void and illegal order. He suggested that he will not press the appeal if the matter is disposed off with a direction to the departmental appellate authority to decide appellant's departmental appeal. In the end, he questioned the authority of Mr. Moula Bux Khoso, Advocate appearing on behalf of S.A.S.O. On the ground that S.A.S.O. Has been dissolved.
5. In rebuttal Mr. Moula Bux Khoso, learned counsel appearing on behalf of S.A.S.O. Contended that admittedly the S.A.S.O. Has been dissolved but its affairs are being looked after by the Agricultural Deptt. Government of Sindh and one Director has been nominated as Incharge S.A.S.O. To manage and supervise the affairs of defunct S.A.S.O. Who engaged him to appear before this Tribunal and defend the matter. Next, he submitted that impugned original order dismissing appellant from service was passed/issued on 6-11-1999 against which appellant filed departmental appeal on 4- 12-1999 and 6-12-1999 and also approached other authorities unnecessarily. The departmental appeal/representation remained undecided for more than 90 days period and appellant under the law was required to file appeal before this Tribunal within next 30 days but he filed the instant appeal before this Tribunal on 9-12-2000 i,e, after more than a year. Therefore, appeal being hopelessly time-barred is liable to be dismissed on this score alone. On merits of the case, learned counsel for the Respondent/S.A.S.O. Submitted that appellant after misappropriating huge stock of fertilizer from Bulk of Depots of Shandakot and Qubo Saeed Khan valuing Rs,22,47,988 absconded from duties and in order to cover his own misdeeds levelled false allegations against his higher- ups and that the department after observing all the requisite codal formalities rightly awarded the.
Appellant major penalty of dismissal from service and recovery of losses sustained by S.A.S.O.
6. Mrs. Tabassum Ghazanfar, learned Asstt. A.G. Adopted the arguments advanced by Mr. Khoso and supported the impugned order.
7. We have carefully considered the above submissions and have minutely gone through the material placed on the record. Admittedly, the present appeal was filed much beyond the prescribed period of A limitation. Under section 4 of the Sindh Service Tribunals Act, 1973, period available to a civil servant to challenge the original adverse order is 120 days from the date of filing appeal before the departmental appellate authority. In the instant case the departmental appeal was filed by the appellant on 4-12-1999, thus the period of 120 days available to appellant commenced form 4-12-1999 and ended on 3-4-2000, but the appellant filed the present appeal before this Tribunal on 9-12-2000 i,e, miAch beyond the prescribed period of limitation, the appeal is thus hopelessly time-barred. The reasons assigned for such inordinate delay in filing,-the appeal by learned counsel for the appellant is that original impugned order dated 6-11-1999 was never communicated to the appellant despite repeated verbal and written requests so also legal notice.
This contention is devoid of force. In his first departmental appeal dated 4-12-1999 addressed to the Managing Director, S.A.S.O, appellant stated that he received the copy of his dismissed order on 3-12-1999 from District Agricultural Supply Office, S.A.S.O. Larkana. Likewise in his another departmental appeal addressed to the Minister of Agriculture, Government of Sindh, Karachi, he had enclosed the photostat copy of his dismissal order. This plea of non-receipt of original adverse order being fallacious is no ground to condone delay in filing of the instant appeal. Limitation is most important crucial point in the judiciar system against which no compromise is legally possible and ordinarily law takes its smooth course. In a case of WAPDA v. Aurangzeb, 1988 SCMR 1354 followed in a cause of Nazir Ahmed Abbasi v. WAPDA 1998 PLC (C.S.) 1007, it has been held that after lapse of the prescribed period of limitation, the doors of justice are closed and no plea of injustice, hardship or ignorance can be of any avail to an appellant unless the delay in filling an appeal was justified/legal accounted for an the appellant is legally bound to justify reasons for each day's delay. Reliance is also placed on the following authorities:--
(1) PLD 1988 SC 144 (N.-W.F.P. v. Mst. Hussan Pari).
(2) 1990 SCMR 1519 (Sher Bahadur v. Government of N.-W.F.P.) (In this case even one day's delay was not condoned).
(3) PLD 1995 SC 396 (Government of the Punjab v. Muhammad Saleem);
(4) 1998 SCMR 785 (Mst. Sirajun Muneer v. Pakistan through Asstt. Deputy Director-General (Admn.)
Islamabad.
(5) 1998 PLC (C.S) 517 (Mst. Sirajun Muneer v. Pakistan through Asstt. Dy. Director-General (Admn)
Islamabad.
(6) 1998 SCMR 307 (Central Board of Revenue v. Raja Industries).
(7) 1999 MLD 330 (Haji Muhammad Ashraf v. The State and others).
' Moreover, it is a fundamental principle of law that limitation when once starts, in no case, it can be stopped. Delay cannot be condoned even if it is due to wrong advice tendered by an Advocate for the obvious reason that the Courts have to maintain the rule of law in the ends of justice. Besides, there are certain other well-known legal maxims which usually hurdle a litigant in a Court of Law and they are:--
(a) ignorance of law is no excuse;
(b) delay defeats equity
(c) time and tide wait for none;
(d) law helps the vigilant and not the indolent.
' It may be stated that in the instant case no application for condonation of delay has been moved on behalf of the appellant. It is a settled proposition of law that condonation of delay is not suo motu process. It has to be proved by the party concerned as required under the law. Reliance in this respect is placed on the case of Muhammad Remzan v. Government of the Punjab 1999 PLC (C.S.) 801, which is a well-reasoned and elaborate judgment.
8. So far imitation of criminal proceedings against the appellant, it is settled proposition of law that departmental and criminal proceedings can go side by side and are not dependent upon each other. Reference is invited to the cases of:--
(i) Muhammad Tufail v. Asstt. Commissioner/Collector 1989 SCMR 316.
(ii) Amir Abdullah v. Supdt. Of Police and others, 1989 SCMR 333.
(iii) Talib Hussain v. Anar Gul Khan and others, 1993 SCMR 2177, and
(iv) Dy. Inspector-General of Police v. Anisur Rehman PLD 1985 SC 134.
9. The appellant has alleged general allegation of mala fide against the respondents. It is well- established principle of law that general allegation of mala fide is not sustainable in the eye of law.
Reference is invited to Saeed Ahmed Khan's case PLD 1974 SC 151 and Amandullah Khan's case, PLD 1990 SC 1992.
10. Pursuant to the above discussion, this appeal fails on the point of limitation and is hereby dismissed in limine. Since the appeal is dismissed on the point of limitation, therefore, the merits of the appeal as per the decision in the case of Khan Sahib Sher Muhammad v. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1987 SCMR 92 need not be discussed. There shall be no order as to costs.