' KHALIL-UR-REHMAN RAMDAY; J.---This petition is directed against an order dated 14-2-2002 passed by the Lahore High Court in Civil Miscellaneous Nos.66-C and 67-C of 2000 filed in Civil Revision No,255 of 1981.
2. The predecessor-in-interest of the present petitioners namely, Kareem Bukhsh had filed the above mentioned civil revision in the Lahore High Court questioning a judgment and decree dated 28-1-1979 passed against him by the learned trial Court which judgment and decree was confirmed by a learned Additional District Judge through his judgment dated 14-7-1981. The said revision petition came up for hearing before the Lahore High Court on 30-9-1999 when no one appeared to prosecute the same which was consequently dismissed for non-prosecution. It was almost four months after the dismissal of the said revision petition that the present petitioners submitted the abovementioned applications on 25-1-2000 seeking restoration of the revision petition in question and also praying for condonation of the delay caused in the filing of the said application under section 151 of the C.P.C. Requesting for restoration of the said revision petition.
Both these applications were dismissed through the above mentioned impugned order dated 14- 2-2002. Hence this petition.
3. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners that since Article 181 of the Limitation Act was applicable to the application filed for the restoration of the civil revision under section 115 of the C.P.C. Therefore, the High Court was not right in holding that the said application was barred by time. It was next argued that the learned counsel for the revision petitioner was present in the High Court on 30-9-1999 when the revision petition in question was to be heard and that since he was to appear before another Bench of the High Court, therefore, he left the Court room for some time and it was on his return to the Bench where the said revision petition was fixed that he came to know that the same had been dismissed for non-prosecution and further that a sufficient cause had been shown for the restoration of Civil Revision No,255 of 1981.
4. We have gone through Article 181 of the Limitation Act with the assistance of the learned counsel for the petitioners. Column 3 of the said Article, would indicate that the same is applicable where a right exists to make an application and the three years' period prescribed for making such an application commences from the time when such right to make an application had accrued. When asked about the provision under which a person had a right to make an application seeking restoration of a revision petition which had been dismissed for non-prosecution, the learned counsel could not refer us to any such provision. He could only rely upon section 151 of the C.P.C. But the same does not confer any right on any person to make an application of any sort including an application for restoration of revision petition dismissed for non-prosecution. To elaborate this situation reference may be made to the provisions of Order IX, rule 9, Order IX, rule 13 and Order XLI, rule 19 of the C.P.C. Which confer a right on an aggrieved person to pray for restoration of the suit or to pray for setting aside an ex pane decree or to pray for readmission of an appeal dismissed in default but no such provision has been made vis'-a-vis revision petition filed under section 115, C.P.C. We, therefore, find that Article 181 of the Limitation Act was not attracted to the application in question filed by the petitioners before the Lahore High Court.
5. It was the case of the petitioners before the High Court that their learned counsel was present before the Bench on 30-9-1999 and that the said learned counsel left the Court-room to appear before another learned Bench and it was on his return that he found that the said revision petition had been dismissed for non-prosecution. If this was so, then there is no explanation as to what had taken the petitioner almost four months to make an application for restoration of the said revision petition. In these circumstances we find no reason to interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court in passing the impugned order.
6. This petition is, therefore, dismissed. .