' MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J.---Present appeal, filed under section 21 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, is directed against the judgment and decree dated 15-2-2001, passed by the learned Judge Banking Court II, Faisalabad, whereby he passed a decree amounting to Rs,68,59,822.44 with future mark-up at the stipulated rate on the outstanding principal amount of Rs,57,23,397.15 from the date of filing of the suit till the full and final realization of the decretal amount in favour of the respondent-bank and against the appellants.
2. Brief facts culminating to the filing of the present appeal are that the respondent-bank filed a suit for the recovery of Rs,9.02 millions against the appellants before the learned Judge Banking Court II, Faisalabad, wherein appellant No, 1 was arrayed as the principal-debtor, whereas the rest of the defendants were joined as mortgagors/guarantoRs, Pursuant to the service of the summons as contemplated under section 9(3) of Act XV of 1997, the appellants filed an application seeking leave to defend the suit, thereby raising numerous legal and factual questions. The learned Judge Banking Court after hearing the arguments on the said leave application decreed the suit, as mentioned above, vide judgment and decree dated 15-2-2001, hence the present appeal.
3. Learned counsel submits that although numerous legal and factual controversies were raised before the learned Judge through the filing of application for leave to defend the suit, yet none of them have been adhered to by the learned Judge while deciding the said application. It is further argued that the impugned judgment is devoid of reasons and lack of all characteristics of a "judgment" as contemplated under Order XX, rule 5, C.P.C. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the decree has been passed in accordance with law and the learned Judge Banking Court even did not grant the respondent-bank the mark-up for the cushion period and liquidated damages.
4. We have perused the impugned judgment. The argument of the learned counsel is well founded.
The learned Judge while deciding the leave application and adjudicating valuable rights of the parties has, in fact, failed to attend to the controversies between the parties, as raised in the leave application and replied to by the respondent-bank. The learned Judge after narrating the contentions of the parties did not even advert to the same and has, in fact, decided the leave application in complete oblivion of the contents of the same and contentions itself noted down by the learned Judge. As a matter of fact the learned Court failed to give any findings on any of the issue points raised by the parties. We have noticed that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Judge Banking Court is sketchy, slip-shod and devoid of reasons. The said judgment is not at all a speaking judgment and cannot be called a judicial judgment within the parameters set up by law. No point of controversy has been determined and the tenor of the impugned judgment amply manifest non-application of judicial mind. No reasons have been assigned by the learned Judge Banking Court in coming to the conclusion that how the bank is entitled for a decree for such a colossal amount. Even it has been enjoined upon an executive authority, as per section 24(A) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, inserted by General Clauses (Amendment) Act, 1997 (XI of 1997) to give reasons for making the order.
5. Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has time and again disapproved the passing of such perfunctory judgment. It is settled law that judicial order must be a speaking order manifesting by itself that the Court has applied its judicial mind to the issues and points of controversy involved in the causes. Furthermore, when the reasons would not be forthcoming, obviously the Appellate Court would be deprived of the views of the subordinate Court. In any case, the impugned judgment, which is not a speaking judgment and devoid of reasons, is not sustainable in law being in contravention of law declared by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in various cases, like Adamjee Jute Mills Ltd. v. The Province of East Pakistan and others (PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 272), Gouranga Mohan Sikdar v. The Controller, Import and Export and 2 others (PLD 1970 SC 158), Mollah Ejahar Ali v.
Government of East Pakistan and others (PLD 1970 SC 173) and Muhammad Ibrahim Khan v.
Secretary, Ministry of Labour and others (1984 SCM R 1014).
6. The learned counsel for the appellants concedes the liability of his clients to the extent of Rs,4 millions. Regarding the remaining amount being claimed by the respondent-Bank, he seeks leave to defend on the grounds stated in the application. We find that there is a denial of execution of several documents relied upon by the respondent-Bank as also the validity thereof has been objected to by the appellant. However, in view of the admission of the principal liability on behalf of the appellant the said ground would no longer be available to the appellant. We, however, do find the plea as to the over-charging of markup as also of the capitalization of the debit account to be plausible.
7. In view of the above discussion we allow this R.F.A. Inasmuch as now the interim decree for recovery of Rs,4 millions shall stand 'passed in favour of the respondent-Bank and against the defendant/appellant which shall be executable in accordance with the terms of the agreement between the parties. Regarding the remaining amount we grant leave to the appellant to defend the suit to the said extent and in the light of observations made above. The case is accordingly remanded back to the learned trial/executing Court for further proceedings. No orders as to costs. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.