' MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J.---Instant first appeal, filed by Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan, under section 9 of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 (since repealed), proceeds against judgment and decree dated 13-8-1996, whereby the then Banking Tribunal, after finding that the respondent has deposited an amount of Rs.2,63,256 against the payable amount of Rs.2,52,366, directed the appellant to refund a sum of Rs.10,090 to the respondent.
2. Briefly stated the facts relevant for the decision of the present appeal are that the appellant/plaintiff filed a. Suit for the recovery of Rs.1,89,098, against the respondent, before the then Banking Tribunal (since defunct). In response to the notice under section 6(2) of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, the respondent filed the reply to the show-cause notice, thereby admitting the availing of the loan facility, however, pleading that nothing is outstanding against him as he has deposited an excess amount with the appellant-Bank.
3. After hearing the parties, the learned Banking Tribunal, after taking into consideration the payments made by the respondent, came to the conclusion that the respondent has deposited an amount of Rs.2,63,256 against the payable amount of Rs.2,52,366 and thus the excess amount of Rs.10,090 shall be refunded to the respondent and in these terms, disposed of the suit, vide judgment and decree dated 13-8-1996.
4. This is a represented case. Name of the learned counsel for the respondent has duly been published in today's daily cause list, but nobody has come forward on behalf of the respondent, thus, he is proceeded ex parte.
5. The learned counsel for the appellant, while relying upon Messrs Chenab Cement Product Private Limited and others v. Banking Tribunal Lahore and others PLD 1996 Lahore 672, submits that the impugned judgment and decree was passed after the pronouncement of the aforesaid judgment, therefore, the impugned judgment is without jurisdiction, thus according to the learned counsel, the same is liable to be set aside.
6. We have examined the aforenoted judgment of Messrs Chenab Cement Product and find that the full Bench of this Court, while disposing of various Constitutional petitions, wherein the decrees passed by the learned Banking Tribunals were challenged, declared certain provisions of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 as unconstitutional and the notifications, appointing Presiding Officers of the learned Banking Tribunals, issued under the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, were also declared unconstitutional and were thus quashed. It would be relevant to reproduce para.11 of the judgment, which reads as follows:-- "11. For the above reasons, section 4, section 6(6) as amended by Act VII of 1990 (as it presently stands), first proviso to section 9 of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 are hereby declared unconstitutional as these erode the independence of judiciary and are hit by Article 175 read with Articles 2-A, 4, 8 and Article 25 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the notifications appointing Presiding Officers of the Banking Tribunals issued under the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 are equally unconstitutional without lawful authority and are hereby quashed."
7. We find from the impugned judgment that the same was passed on 13-8-1996, whereas the judgment in the case of Messrs Chenab Cement Product (ibid), was rendered by this Court on 21- 7-1996. It flows from the above that the impugned judgment was passed by the learned Banking Tribunal after the A pronouncement of judgment in Messrs Chenab Cement Product's case (supra).
As the judgment was passed by the learned Banking Tribunal, when the notifications, appointing the Presiding Officers of the Banking Tribunals, were declared, unconstitutional and without lawful authority and were quashed, therefore, at the relevant time, the learned Banking Tribunal had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the suit or to pass any judgment thereupon.
8. As per Article 201 of ,the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, any decision of a High Court, to the extent that it decides a question of law or based on enunciates a principle of law, shall be binding on all the Courts subordinate to it. The then learned Banking Tribunal was bound by the law declared by this Court, wherein even the notifications appointing the Presiding Officers of the learned Banking Tribunal, were declared to be unconstitutional and without lawful authority. We are of the firm view that at the relevant time the Banking Tribunal had no jurisdiction to decide appellant's suit and thus, the judgment and decree is without jurisdiction and deserves to be set aside on this ground alone.
9. In view of the above, the present appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree dated 13-8- 1996 is set aside with no order as to costs. Result would be that the suit for recovery of Rs.1,89,098 titled A.D.B.P. v. Muhammad Afzal (Suit No,550 of 1996) shall be deemed to be pending before the newly constituted Banking Courts, Sargodha, established under section 5 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 and the said Banking Court shall now decide the suit afresh, after hearing the parties and in accordance with the provisions of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. Office is directed to immediately transmit the record of the case to the Administrative Judge Banking Court, Sargodha, who may entrust the case to any other Banking Court according to its arrangements.