' KHALIL-UR-REHMAN RAMDAY, J.---Rustam and his maternal uncle, namely Khushi Muhammad were accused, vide F.I.R. No,49 dated 12-2-1993 of Police Station Abdul Hakeem of District Khanewal, of having murdered Mst. Surraya Bibi who was the wife of Rustam accused. Through his judgment dated 8-11-1994 a learned Additional Sessions Judge at Khanewal found Rustam to be guilty of the offence punishable under section 302(c) of the P.P.C. And consequently punished him with 25 years' R.I. And a "fine" of Rs,10,000 as compensation under section 544-A, Cr.P.C. While his maternal uncle Khushi Muhammad was convicted under section 302(b), P.P.C. And was directed to suffer imprisonment for life and was further ordered to pay a fine of Rs,10,000 as compensation under section 544-A, Cr.P.C. On an appeal bearing Criminal Appeal No,205 of 1994 filed by the said two convicts the Lahore High Court (Multan Bench) acquitted Khushi Muhammad convict of the charge levelled against him and consequently directed his release from custody. The conviction of Rustam Ali convict under section 302(c), P.P.C. Was, however, maintained but the sentence of 25 years' R.I.
Was reduced to punishment of 14 years' R.I. He was allowed the benefit of the provisions of section 382-B, Cr.P.C. The amount of compensation of Rs,10,000 directed to be paid by the said convict was enhanced to Rs20,000 and it was further ordered that in case of non-payment of the said compensation the said convict would suffer six months' S.I.
2. Abdur Razaq complainant moved this Court through Cr.P.C. No,251-L of 1996 questioning the acquittal of Khushi Muhammad accused and praying for his conviction and his consequent punishment with death. He further prayed that the punishment awarded to Rustam convict be also enhanced and he be also punished with death. Through an order dated 28-2-1997 passed in the said crimina petition, it was found that the Acquittal of Khushi Muhammad was not open to any exception and further that the punishment of 14 years' R.I. awarded to Rustam Ali could also not be said to be illegal and leave was. Therefore, granted only to consider the question whether Rustam Ali convict should also have been punished with a direction to him to pay Diyat as envisaged by section 308(2) of the P.P.C. This appeal whicn is being disposed of through this judgment is thus through grant of leave to the petitioner-complainant, by this Court for the above-noted purpose.
3. The learned counsel for the parties have been heard at some length.
4. As has been noticed above, the learned trial Judge had convicted Rustam Ali petitioner under section 302(c) of the P.P.C. And had punished him with 25 years' R.I. Under the said provision of the said Code. Neither the State nor even the complainant questioned the said conviction recorded under section 302(c), P.P.C. The Honourable High Court had reduced the term of imprisonment from 25 years to 14 years. As has also been noted above, leave had not been granted to the complainant-petitioner either for conversion of Rustam's conviction from one under section 302(c), P.P.C. To one under section 302(a), P.P.C. Or 302(b), P.P.C. Which could have warranted the punishment of death nor was the leave allowed to him even for alteration of the said conviction under section 302(c), P.P.C. To one under section 308(2) of the said Code. Thus the conviction recorded against Rustam respondent under section 302(c), P.P.C. Is not under challenge before us and the only point which requires determination is whether the said respondent could, in addition to the punishment of imprisonment, be also directed to pay "Diyat". The answer obviously is in the negative because the provisions of section 302(c), P.P.C. Did not envisage any punishment by way of a direction to pay Diyat and the only sentence which could be imposed on a convict under the said provision of law was a punishment of imprisonment extending up to a term of 25 years.
5. In this view of the matter, we do not find any illegality in the said punishment of imprisonment awarded to Rustam respondent nordoes the judgment of the High Court or even for that matter the judgment of the learned rial Court suffer from any illegality on account of the absence of any direction to the convict to pay the amount of Diyat to the heirs of the deceased.
6. Consequently we find no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.