' MUSHTAQ HUSSAIN, ACTG. C' 1.-This is an application for the cancellation of bail granted to the respondent who was arrested on the 3rd of September 1977, for allegedly abetting the murder of Nawab Muhammad= mad Ahmed Khan, father of Ahmed Reza Kasurl, Ex-M. N. A., and was released on bail by K. M. A. Samadani, J. On the 13th of September 1977, with the following observations: "In these circumstances I am of the opinion that at least -for the time being the petitioner is entitled to bail. However, if any other piece of evidence comes to light, which warrants cancellation of bail, it shall be open to the prosecution to move this Court in that behalf."
' Criminal Misc. No, 3854-B/1977 was submitted on the 19th of September 1977, on behalf the State alleging that not only the statement of Masood Mahmud who had been tendered pardon under section 337, Cr. P. C. Had been recorded under section 164, Cr. P. C. As a witness by a Magistrate after the grant of ball, but the prosecution had also discovered documentary evidence from the Prime Minister's Secretariat which establishes "the respondent's interest in misdirecting the investigation so as to absolve himself".
2. K. M. A. Samadani, J. Had taken cognizance of the bail matter during the vacations when he was the Senior Vacation Judge. A complaint regarding the same incident filed by Ahmed Raza Kasuri son of the deceased was pending before a Division Bench of this Court consisting of K. M. A.
Samadani, J. And Mazharul Haq, J. The learned Single Judge treated the bail application arising as it did out of another case initiated by the State, as pertaining to an absolutely distinct matter, he, therefore, did not refer it to the above-mentioned Division Bench.
3. The police submitted a report under section 173 of the Cr. P. C. In the shape of an incomplete challan against the respondent and his other co-accused on the 11th of September 1977. Thereafter an application was moved in the High Court for transfer of the challan case before this Court. The Acting Chief Justice passed an order on the 13th of September 1977, transferring the case for trial to this Court and directed that it shall be heard by the present Full Bench. It was in these circumstances that the cognizance of the above petition for cancellation of bail was taken by this Bench.
4. Learned counsel for the State invited our attention to the facts that follow Ahmad Raza Kasuri was elected on the Peoples Party Ticket as a Member of the National Assembly in the election held in 1970, but he soon became an outspoken critic of the respondent who was holding the office of Prime Minister of Pakistan. According to the prosecution case the respondent did not make any secret of his extreme displeasure and resentment in the Assembly and announced that ho was fed up with Ahmad Ran Kasuri. In the meeting dated 3rd of June 1974 the respondent had addressed Ahmad Razi Kasuri in the following language to "You keep quiet. I have had enough of you, absolute poison. I will not tolerate your nuisance."
' A privilege motion was moved by Ahmad Raza Kasuri on the 4th of June 1974, against these threats. On the 24th of August 1974, a murderous attack is said to have been made on Ahmad Raza Kasuri in Islamabad, but he escaped. F. I. R. No, 346 was recorded in Police Station, Islamabad about this incident the same day, but after investigation, which according to the prosecution was extremely flimsy and unsatisfactory, this case was consigned as untraced.
5. During the night between 10th and 11th of November 1974, Ahmad Ran Kasuri with his parents had gone to the house of Syed Bashir Hussain Shah in Shadmen Colony, Lahore, to participate in a marriage party. He left from there for his own house in his Car No, LEJ 9495 with his father, mother and mother's sister at about 12-30 p.m. When he reached near Shah Jamal Chowk, some persons started firing at the car, as a result of which Nawab Muhammad Ahmad Khan received fatal injuries. He was taken to the U. C. Hospital, where he succumbed to these injuries. Ahmad Rua Kasuri gave a report of the occurrence in wain to the Station House Officer, Gulberg, Lahore, who had arrived at the Hospital during the course of his patrol duty. In this statement the complainant mentioned the name of the respondent. This written report was sent to Police Station Ichhra, Lahore, where a First Information Report was recorded on its basis on the 11th of November 1974, at 3.45 a.m. The case remained under investigation for some time, but ultimately it was filed as untraced on the 1st of October 1975.
6. It has been further stated by learned counsel that the respondent was annoyed on being named in the F. I. R. And agreed with the view that if the police had recorded the First Information Report on its own observation rather than the report of Ahmad Reza Kasuri, the written statement of the occurrence given by the latter would have had the force of only a statement under section 161, Cr.
P. C., which could not have received any publicity. Thereafter, he misdirected the coarse of the investigation by suggesting that some relations of Ahmed Reza Kasuri who were on inimical terms with him on account of family disputes about landed property may have committed the murder. It was found on investigation that the empties recovered from the spot were of the ammunition which was with the Federal Security Force and the same could have been fired only from the weapons in possession of that Force. The respondent suggested that efforts should be made to prove that these weapons which were of Chinese origin were available even in Bare Market. Saeed Ahmed Khan and Abdul Hamid Bajwa who are said to be confidants of the respondent at the relevant time, received instructions to this effect from the respondent and proceeded to implement them.
7. According to the prosecution the Investigatirg Officer did not investigate the case in the light of the recommendations made by Shafiur Rehman, J. Who conducted a judicial enquiry into the case and it was filed as untraced on account of intermeddling by the Federal Government Agencies which had no concern with the investigation.
8. During the course of investigation of a bomb blast case, Ghulam Mustafa, Inspector, F. S. F. Was found to be involved in the murder of Nawab Muhammad Ahmad Khan. Disclosures made by him and consequential investigation revealed the involvement of Arshad Iqbal, Sub-Inspector F. S. F., Iftikhar Ahmad A. S. I., F. S. F., Ghulam Hussain Inspector F. S. F Mian Muhammad Abbas, Director F. S. F. And Masood Mahmud Director-General, F. S. F. All these officers had made their confessional statements under section 164, Cr. P. C. Recorded,
9. During this investigation the respondent was found to be an abettor of the offence of murder. He was, therefore, arrested on the 3rd of September 1977.
10. Having given the above narrative of the prosecution case, learned counsel proceeded to submit that on the basis of this material K. M. A. Samadani, J. Reached the following conclusion "From the material placed before me it appears that there is considerable circumstantial evidence indicating possible involvement of the petitioner in this case. But it is to be noted that most of the evidence so far quoted is only circumstantial. As to the direct evidence of abetment, it consists of the statement of Masood Mahmood, co-accused, supported to a certain extent by the statements of Saeed Ahmed Khan a witness and Mien Abbas, another co-accused."
' He proceeded to say that,- "Mr. M. Anwar, learned Special Public Prosecutor had stated today that Masood Mahmud, co accused has been made an approver in this case and he is going to appear as a witness against the petitioner and the other accused. But again it should be borne in mind that the testimony of an accomplice has a week probative value in law, although it is not illegal to base a conviction solely on such testimony. The Court his also been informed that further evidence is being collected presumably documentary in nature."
11. Mr. M. Anwar Special Public Prosecutor referred to several authorities of the Supreme Court of Pakistan for projecting the unanimous view that while considering a case of bail of a person accused of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, and while making up its mind whether there appear reasonable grounds for believing as required by section 497, Cr. P. C.
That he has been guilty of such an offence, the Court cannot evaluate the evidence and its function is limited to finding out where there is material tending to connect the accused with the commission of the offence.
12. He also referred to the statement mace by Masood Mahmood under section 164, Cr. P. C. As a witness after the tender of pardon and urged that this statement was sufficient to prove the abetment of the offence by the respondent. He made copious references from the files alleged to have been recovered from the Prime Minister's Secretariat in which there are also documents bearing the signature of respondent. He argued that these documents clearly make out a case of misdirection of the investigation at the speciao instance of the respondent, so as to make it impossible for the investigating agency to arrive at the truth about his own involvement in this conspiracy. For this purpose he deployed his men not only to put the investigation on a wrong track, but to brush aside the guidelines given by Shafiur Rahman, J.
13. According to Mr. Anwar, the respondent completely failed in his efforts to lay the blame of this murder on the relations of Nawab Muhammad Ahmad Khan since there is no dispute pertaining to landed property between the deceased and any of his relatives as was sought to be made out.
Similarly he could not prove that the weapon and ammunition came from "Bara". Mr. Anwar laid particular emphasis on the opening of a file on Ahmed Raza Kasuri in the Prime Minister's Secretariat in which, Inter alia, the movements of the staff of the Federal Security Force appointed to keep a watchful eye on even the gunman of Ahmad Raza Khan Kasuri are noted. The learned counsel argued that the movements of the gunman were watched in order to make an attack on Ahmed Rua Kasuri the moment he was found unguarded since he was a "marked person".
14. Mr. Anwar referred to section 133 of the Evidence Act which provides that "an accomplice is a competent witness against an accused person and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice". He submitted that even if the rule of prudence is applied that the conviction should not be based upon the evidence of an approver unless there is evidence of corroboration not only about the commission of offence but also as to the identity of the accused there will be found to be sufficient evidence on record furnishing necessary corroboration. This evidence will prove the motive, misdirection of the investigation by the respondent in his capacity as the then Prime Minister and the confessional statements of his co-accused.
15. When the challan ease came up for hearing before this Bench on 24th of September 1977, information in writing was laid on behalf of Mien Muhammad Abbas that he had retracted his confession. Mr. M. Anwar argued that even a retracted confession can corrobdoate the evidence of the approver if it is proved in Court that there was no legal ground for such retraction. He submitted that in Rafiq Ahmad v. State (1) the retracted confession of a co-accuses was considered sufficient to provide corroboration of the statement of the approver. Mr. M. Anwar further argued that the degree of corroboration depends upon the degree of weakness of the approver's evidence. If an approver bears any malice towards the accused involved by him, his testimony will be regarded with much more suspicion and corroborative evidence of a higher degree shall be insisted upon but in the ease of an approver who is a man of education and a man of unblemished character, who has no malice against the accused, and has no reason to involve him in a false case, but who is forced by abnormal circamatances to commit the offences, either the principle of section 133 of the Evidence Act can be applied or very little corroborative evidence can be treated sufficient for convicting the accused. This was not a case of a sordid criminal committing the offence but of a victim forced to implement the orders of his superior who had the power to wreck his career and to destroy him.
16. Mr. Hayat Muhammad Junejo appearing for the respondent raised objections against the hearing of this petition by this Bench. He relied upon Ch. Muhammad Khan v. Sanaultah (2) in which it was held that a second application in a matter of bail should be heard by the same learned Judge who had disposed of the first application. The learned counsel took strong exception to the general trend of the petition for cancellation of bail as well as the arguments of Mr. M. Anwar criticising the judgment of K. M. A. Samadani, J. He argued that the incorrectness of the order of bail could be canvassed by the petitioner only before the Supreme Court of Pakistan by a petition for Special Leave to Appeal.
17. He submitted that the statement of Masood Mahmud recorded after the grant of pardon cannot be treated as additional evidence since K. M. A. Samadani, J. Had already made observations about the probative value of the statement of an approver. Regarding the record discovered from the Prime Minister's Secretariat he argued that it could not establish a case of abetment against the respondent since it was susceptible of an innocent explanation.
18. According to his arguments, respondent might have interfered or taken interest in the investigation since he was being involved in the offence of which he believed himself to be innocent. Rest of his arguments were upon the necessity of corroboration of the evidence of an accomplice. In this connection he first argued that not only an approver or an accused person making a confession is an accomplice but even an accessory before the fact or after the fact even though never accused of the offence is an accomplice. He disputed the correctness of the arguments about categories of an accomplice and urged that the rule of prudence by the superior Courts of the country that no conviction should be based on an uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, is a uniform and universal rule.
19. He also disputed the argument that motive alone may form a corroboration. In this connection he relied upon Abdul Qadir v. The State (3) in which there is an observation that ''motive is a factor which is peculiarly {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 317 (2) PLD 1971 SC 324
(3) PLD 1956 SC (Pak.) 407 {{FOOT NOTE}} within the knowledge of the actor and a man's motive in doing a thing may not be known to his most intimate friends juot as the prosecution may not know the accused's motive for a crime. Re submitted that corroboration of tainted evidence could not be sought from another piece of tainted evidence for example testimony of another approver or confession of a coaccused.
20. With a view to negate the corroborative value of a retracted confession he referred to Stare v.
Mlnhun (1). With a view to explaining the dictum of Raflq Ahmad'., case, the learned counsel referred to Waztr and others v. The State (2) in which that case was commented upon by a Division Bench of the High Court of West Pakistan and it was held that one piece of weak evidence cannot be used as corroboration of another similar piece of weak evidence. It was further held that it is highly dangerous to pass a conviction on an aggregation of such weak evidence. The learned counsel explained that there was always a possibility that the subordinates In their keenness to be more loyal than the king, may have committed the crime without any abetment by the respondent.
He submitted that if it had been a case of closed circuit conspiracy, the number of persons involved in it would not have been ae large. He also argued that the Federal Security Force ammunition was not kept ander lock and key by the Prime Minister and as such the case was based on mere surmises and conjectures.
21. We are not acting as a Court of Review or Appeal against the order of our learned brother K. M. A.
Samadani, J. We shall, therefore, confine ourselves to the consideration of the question whether this fresh evidence tends to connect the respondent with the commission of the offence and as required by section 4V, Cr. P. C., whether there are rearonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of the offence of which he is accused and which is punishable with death or imprisonment for life.
22. The principle canvassed by the learned counsel for the respondent that this application should also be heard by K. M. A. Samadani, J. Is not applicable to the present case. The learned oonnsel has relied upon as stated above on Ch. Muhammad Khan v. Sanaullah. This rule was, however, laid down by the Supreme Court first in Farid v. Ghulam Hussain and others (3).
' It was observed in that case "It should also have been a matter of some concern to the learned Judge that one of his brother Judges had already dealt with the case and expressed himself strongly against the grant of bail by the Additional Sessions Judge. Not only the long established practice of this Court, but also the rule of propriety required that he should have transferred the application for bail to the first Judge for disposal. Such a course would have had the merit of avoiding the possibility of two contradictory orders being passed in the same case by the High Court."
23. This was therefore a case in which the orders of the two Judges of the same Court were contradictory and although the first Judge had taken a strong view against the grant of bail, the other Judge had granted it on consideration of question of alibi. The other case of Ch. Muhammad Khan v. Sanaullah was also similar. In that case too, one Judge of the same Court {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1964 SC 813 (2) PLD 1960 Kar. 674
(3) 1968 SCMR 924 {{FOOT NOTE}} had refused bail. The accused made another application but the first Judge being not available another Judge granted interim bail. The omission to follow the rule laid down in the earlier case was noticed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. Incidentally, it may be stated that in that case too the bail was granted on consideration, Inter olio of the plea of alibi.
24. The facts of the present case are different. In this case, K. M. A. Samadani, J. Had first taken exception to the petition for bail being moved directly in this Court without invoking the jurisdiction of the trial Court. It was later that the learned Judge agreed to consider the case. While disposing of the bail application he was acting as a Court superior to the trial Court. He was not acting as a trial Court. By tbat time the challan had beer 4 produced before the trial Court. The challan case was then transferred to the High Court and was directed to be tried by this Bench on its original side. In these circumstances, once a particular Bench is seised of the main case on its original side, the rule of propriety laid down in the above two cases will not apply, since all the matters ancillary to the trial should be disposed of as a matter of propriety and also as a matter of law by this trial Bench. Moreover, the rule of propriety was laid down to avoid the possibility of contradictory judgments being rendered. In the present case this possibility is ruled out since we have already stated that we are not acting as a Court of Appeal or Review against the order of bail and that we are considering the application in the light of new material. In fact, our learned brother K. M. A.
Sarnadani, J. Granted bail temporarily till further evidence is discovered. We have to consider this additional evidence only. Even if we come to the conclusion that the bail must be cancelled in view of the new evidence, we would only be implementing the earlier order and not giving a contradictory judgment. In Gustasab Khan v. The Crown (1) interim bail was granted by Z. H. Lari, J.
Application of co-accused for bail came up for consideration before Muhammad Baths!' Memon, I.
Who dismissedlQ it and suo mote issued notice to Gushtasab Khan to show cause why bail granted to him should not be cancelled. The learned Judge cancelled the bail later. Gushtasab Khan moved a revision on the High Court side of the same Court. The Chief Justice made an order declining to release Gustasab Khan on bail but stated that if within three months the commit- ment proceedings were not completed, it would be open to Gustasab Khan to file a fresh application for bail to the Committing Magistrate who may, if he finds sufficient reasons. Release the accused on bail. The order of Muhammad Bakhsh Menton, J. Cancelling the bail was held by Federal Court to be proper and legal and the petition of Gushtasab Khan was dismissed by the Federal Court. This objection is, therefore, overruled.
2f. We do not agree with Mr. Junejo that bail is generally cancelled only on grounds that the accused is suborning the evidence or tampering with it and that the cancellation of bail on discovery of fresh evidence it unprecedented. The discovery of new material on further investigation connecting the accused with a crime and cancellation of bail on this ground is implicit in section 497 (2) read with section 497 (5), Cr. P. C.
26. We also do not agree that the grant of temporary bail or grant of bail with such observations as were made in the precedent judgment is in any way unprecedented. We have already referred to the case of Gushtasab Khan v. The Crown in which after grant of bail by one Judge of the Sind Chief Court, the same was cancelled by another Judge, but on {{FOOT NOTE}}
(I) PLD 1956 FC 117 {{FOOT NOTE}} review the Chief Judge left it open to the Committing Magistrate to release the accused on bail "if he finds sufficient reasons". The Supreme Court did not comment against such an observation.
27. In Fazal Din v, All Muhammad (1), the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the order of bail since the Additional Sessions Judge had left it to the discretion of the Committing Magistrate to cancel the bail of the respondent if he ultimately committed him for trial to the Court of Session.
There are cases in which the commitment order has been held to be prima fade evidence of reasonable ground within the meaning of section 497 (1) for cancellaion of bail e.g. Rafat All v. The Slate (2) and Abdul Rehman v. Fazal Qadim Khan (3). In the latter case bail before arrest was granted by the High Court, The Supreme Court refused to interfere with this order and observed that the Committing Magistrate and if a trial follows, the Sessions Court will in due course be in a position to determine the question of bail on this basis, and the High Court's order directing bail before arrest will then not stand in the way. The same view was taken in Abdul Saitar v. Muhammad Yaqub and another (4). This objection is, therefore, wit out merit.
28. While considering the question whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the respondent is guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, it is not open to this Court to evaluate evidence. In Muhammad Aslam and another v. The Slate (5) the examination of merits of the prosecution case or the plea of defence for finding whether such reasonable grounds appear, was deprecated. In this connection analogy was drawn from the principle underlying section 210, Cr. P. C. And it was held that in either case whether while acting under section 210, Cr. P. C. Or deciding the question of reasonable grounds under section 497 (I), C. P. C., it ii not within the domain of the relevant Court to make assessment of the evidence, that being the function of the trial Court to determine the innocence or guilt of the accused person.
29. This principle was repeated in Farid v. Ghulam Hassan (6). It was held that the learned Judge.
Was not properly advised in summoning the records from the Civil Secretariat to ascertain the truth of the plea of alibi set up by the respondent as it would have tantamount to pronouncing on the merits of the prosecution case before the trial opened. This question was considered in Ch. Abdul Malik v. The State (7) and it was observed that the Court is not called upon at the stage of bail to conduct anything in the nature of a preliminary trial to consider the probability of the accused's guilt or innocence. It was observed that "it was nevertheless as a necessary part of its functions namely to ascertain as to whether there exist any reasonable grounds upon which its belief can be founded to look on the material placed before it by the Investigating Agency and be prima faclr satisfied that some tangible evidence can be offered which if left unrebutted may lead to the inference of guilt.. . ." In Ntsar Ahmad v. The State (8) it was held that the Courts have only to look at the material placed before them by the prosecution sea whether some tangible evidence is available against {{FOOT NOTE}} 30.
(1) 1968 SC MR 1320 (2) 1971 SCMR -62
(3) PLD 1967 SC 293 (4) 1970 SCM R 786
(5) PLD 1967 SC 539 (6) 1968 SCMR 924
(7) PLD 1968 SC 349 (8) PLD 1971 SC 174 {{FOOT NOTE}} the accused which if left unrebutted may lead to the inference of guilt. Reasonable grounds are not to be confused with mere allegations or suspicions nor with tested and proved evidence which the law requires for a person's conviction for an offence. Same view was taken in Ahmad Bakhsh v. The State (1), Jan Muhammcd v. The State (2) aed Muhammad Shaflq v. Muhammad Hanif and another (3). In the last mentioned case it was pointed out that "grounds aro entirely different from evidence". "Grounds" may or may not constitute evidence but nevertheless they can be taken into consideration. In this case also, reference was made to section 210 of the Cr. P. C.
30. If these principles are applied to the present case it will not be relevant to consider whether it is necessary in all cases to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice or whether there is evidence in the present case furnishing such corroboration. We are also not required to go into the question about the categories of accomplices, or whether Masood Mahmud is an accomplice of that type whcse testimony may be acceptable without any corroboration by the Court at the trial. There are cases which support the contention of Mr. Muhammad Hayat Junejo about the rule of prudence requiring corroboration of the evidence of an accomplice. On the other hand, there is section 133 of the Evidence Act which allows the conviction to be based on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. The rale of prudence may be a general rule, but it is not universal in the sense that it may negate the possibility of any case being tested according to the literal language of section 133 of the Evidence Act. Again, there is a general rule as laid down by the superior Courts, that tainted evidence cannot be corroborated by another piece of tainted evidence or aggregate of tainted evidence, but there are exceptions to this rule also. This case of Rafig Ahmad v. The State furnishes an exception.
31. Similarly, it cannot be laid down as a rule of law that the motive must in every case be within the knowledge of the accused. There may be cases where direct evidence of motive is available to furnish corroboration. In view of this state of law, the question whether corroboration of the evidence will be absolutely necessary or whether a particular piece of evidence is sufficient corroboration or not, cannot be considered at this stage. It is a matter to be cot sidered at the end of the trial.
32. Now, as pointed out by Mr. M. Anwar, in the present case there is (I) evidence of motive on the part of the respondent who had been threatening Ahmad Reza Khan Kasuri even on the floor of the National Assembly, (B) the evidence of the approver Masood Mahmud connecting him directly with abetment, and (Ill) the evidence of Saeed Ahmad Khan and some other evidences. There is also evidence in the form of files recovered from the Prime Minster's Secretariat.
33. The new documentary evidence on which the State has prayed for cancellation of bail Inter ea, consists of:-
(I) Noting dated 24-11-1974 that a case could have been registered by the police suo motu meaning thereby that the P. I. R. In that cue would have the force of merely a statement under section 161, Cr. P. C. This was agreed to by the respondent.
(II) A note by Mr. Bajwa about the effect of recording the F. I. R. By the police suo menu. {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) 1969 SCM R 266 (2) 1971 SCM R 351
(3) 1973 SC M It 143 {{FOOT NOTE}}
(ill) Noting by Mr. Saeed Ahmad Khan, Chief Security Officer suggesting that certain portions of the report of Shafiur Rehman, J. Be given publicity)
(fr) Letter of Maj. General (Retd.) Fazal Moqeem Khan, Secretary to the Ministry of Defence that the Chinese Small Arms of the calibre used in this matter were there with inter alla the Federal Security Forcer
(r) Source report about the identification of Sherbaa Khan, gunman of Ahmed Raza Khan Kasuri a resident of Kohat including details about his height, eyes, age and dress:
(vi) Report of the Director F. S. F., Quetta dated 14th of September 1974, particularly the portion that "Ahmad Raza Khan Kasuri arrived by P. I. A. On the 13th September. A room has been reserved for Ahmad Rasa Kasuri in Imdad Hotel. He is, however, not residing in the reserved room:
(vii) Intelligence report about the departure of Ahmad Raza Kasuri from Quetta particularly the portion that "throughout their stay at Quetta, the party were protected by ten selected men by Khudai Noor.........The party were exceptionally cautious and persons wishing to tee them were usually searched by the persons detailed for their security"!
(viii)Query by Mian Muhammad Abbas from Mr. Welch that "if Ahmed Reza Khan Kasuri did not stay at the Imdad Hotel which was reserved for him, where else did he stay during his sojourn at Quetta:
(ix) Reply to this query.
34. On the basis of the entire material referred to above which comprises that which was before our learned brother K. M. A, Samadani, J. As well as that which has come to light subsequently there appears reasonable grounds for bellying that the respondent has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life.
35. This evidence along with the evidence considered by our learned brother K. M. A. Samadani, J. Is sufficient for believing that there are reasonable grounds that the respondent has committed the effence punishable with death or imprisonment for life.
36. In passing we may refer to an application submitted on the 1st of October, 1977, by Mr. Irshad Ahmad Qureshi, Advocate, counsel for Arshad Iqbal, Ghulam Mustafa and Rana lftikhar, co- accused of the repondent. He has attached to this petition an application given by Arshad Iqbal, co-accused. This petition is addressed to the Chief Justice. He has alleged that on the 24th of September 1977, Qazi Saleem, Advocate, who was a counsel for Roshan Ali, Driver had contacted him and offered as much money as he could demand. It is further alleged that at that time the resondent also bad said to Qazi Saleem "inquire from him his demand and we shall arrange for a lawyer for him". He has also named some other persons who similarly contacted him so that he might retract his confession. A copy of these applications was given to the respondent who denied all the allegations. Qazi Saleem also submitted a written reply in which he denied the allegations made against him and in addition he stated that be was once engaged for Rana Iftilthar Abmad who wanted to retract his confession but the power of attorney of Iftikhar Ahmad was taken back) from him subsequently because he was pressurised against retracting his confession. We have not based our order upon the allegations in the petition of Arshad Iqbal.
37. We may also state that two applications were submitted on behalf of the respondent -one challenging the constitution of this Court and the other objecting to the hearing of this case by the Acting Chief Justice as a member of this Bench for reason of bias. We have dismissed these applications In limine by a sepaarte order announced today.
38. We allow this petition, cancel the bail granted to the respondent and direct his remand to judicial custody.