' This judgment shall decide Civil Revisions Nos.428 of 1996 and 429 of 1996 as common questions are involved. Before proceeding further I may give a short statement of facts pertaining to each of these cases.
(i) Civil Revision No,428 of 1996 The respondents purchased the land measuring 3 Marlas comprising Khasra No,598, located in Ward No,2, Gujar Khan vide a sale-deed dated 3-11-1993 for a consideration of Rs,15,000. On 3-3- 1994 the petitioners filed a suit for possession by pre-emption claiming to be a co-sharer in the suit property, owners of adjacent land and sharer of amenities.
(ii) Civil Revision No,429 of 1996 The respondents purchased 8 Marlas of land located in Ward No,2, Gujar Khan vide sale-deed dated 21-9-1993 for consideration of Rs,80,000. On 20-1-1994 the petitioners filed a suit for possession by pre-emption claiming the aforesaid rights.
2. The defence taken by the respondents in both the cases was that the subject-matter of the sale is immovable property located within Gujar Khan Urban Area in Ward No,2 and as such the suit is not competent. They also filed an application under Order VII, rule 11, C.P.C. In both the cases. Vide order and decree, dated 20-9-1994 plaints in both the cases were rejected by learned trial Court.
First appeals filed by the petitioners were dismissed by learned Additional District Judge, Gujar Khan on 10-4-1996.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that learned trial Court ought to have framed the issues and could not have decided the matter summarily. He further argues that since there is a prohibition in the Constitution that no law shall be enacted which is against the Injunctions of Islam, the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 (section 2(a)) is repugnant to the said Injunctions, and the said provision was void ab into and plaints could not have been rejected. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand contends that the said provision of law was declared to be repugnant in the case of Rana Ghulam Shabbir PLD 1994 SC 1, which judgment took effect from 30- 12-1993 and as such the plaints were correctly rejected.
4. I have gone through the record. I find no denial at any stage that the subject-matter of the sales in question was not urban immovable property located within the Gujar Khan urban area. Even learned counsel for the petitioners has not so averred before me. In support of the said second contention learned counsel has drawn my attention to the judgments in the case of Haji Muhammad Shabbir Ahmed Khan v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2001 SC 18 and Faqir Muhammad v.
Government of Punjab PLD 1988 Federal Shariat Court 35. So far as the later judgment is concerned it declares the provisions of Punjab Preemption Act, 1913 regarding exclusion of certain building to be fepugnant to the Injunctions of Islam. In the said case of Haji Shabbir Ahmed Khan their Lordships had observed that where existing laws or any provision thereof, on examination by the Federation Shariat Court are declared repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam, such laws or provisions thereof cease to have effect on the day on which the decision of the Court takes effect.
5. Now there is no cavil by any one present that the said provision i,e, section 2-A of the Punjab Pre- emption Act, 1991 was declared to be repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam by the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan, in the said case of Haji Muhammad Shabbir Ahmed Khan PLD 1994 SC 1. The date stated by their Lordships in terms of Article 203(D) of the Constitution on which the judgment was to take effect is 31-12-1993. Thus, the provision of law ceased to have effect on 31-12-1993. Now the sales in these cases took place on 7-11-1993 and 21-9- 1993 respectively. On both the said dates the petitioners herein had no right of pre-emption as the said property stood exempted from the exercise of right of pre-emption. Needless to state that it is by now settled that a pre-emptor has to have vested with a superior right of pre-emption on the date of sale, the day of institution of the suit and the day of decree. In the present case, the petitioners were not vested with the said right on the said crucial date ice, when the sale took place. Needless to state that there being no right there was no question of performance of Talbs.
This being so, no case stands made out for interference with the impugned judgments and decrees of the learned Court below under section 115, C.P.C. Both the civil revisions are dismissed.
Leaving the parties left to bear their own costs.