' SARDAR SAID MUHMMAD KHAN, C.J.---This appeal, with leave of the Court, has been filed against the judgment of the Service Tribunal dated 17-1-1998, whereby the appeal filed by respondent No,1 was accepted.
2. The brief facts of the case are that Sabir Hussain, respondent No,1, was appointed as Section Clerk in the Civil Secretariat on 31-3-1971. Subsequently, he was promoted and posted as Assistant in Azad Jammu and Kashmir Public Service Commission; he was temporarily, promoted as Superintendent in B-13 in the office of the Public Service Commission on 29-7-1979; he was transferred and posted as Assistant Manager, Khad, in B-16 in the Agriculture Department on 5-1- 1981; and thereafter he was promoted as District Manager, Khad, in B-17 on the recommendation of respective Selection Board in 1991. On 21-5-1996, respondent No,1 was again transferred as Section Officer in the Secretariat for a period of three years with the condition that his appointment as Section Officer in the Civil Secretariat would be temporary in nature and would not create any right in his favor in the Secretariat. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, he first approached the departmental authority and thereafter to the Service Tribunal contending that his transfer out of the Civil Secretarial was temporary in nature and he had lien in the Civil Secretariat. His appeal was accepted by the Service Tribunal holding that his transfer out of the Civil Secretariat did not adversely affect his lien in the Civil Secretariat service and thus, it was ordered that he was entitled to all the benefits including his seniority etc., in Secretariat Service.
3. The appellants, herein, who were appointed as Section Officers in the Civil Secretariat, were not impleaded as a party before the Service Tribunal. However, they filed a petition for leave to appeal against the said judgment alleging that they got the knowledge of the aforesaid judgment of the Service Tribunal only when notification dated 19-5-1999 was issued and thus they prayed for the condonation of delay in filing the petition. The petition for leave to appeal was granted subject to the condition that the question of the condonation of delay in filing the petition after 488 days would be considered at the time of the arguments in the regular appeal. Hence, the arguments were heard on the question of limitation as well as the merits of the case of the appellants. We first propose to deal with the question as to whether the delay in filing the petition for leave to appeal can be condoned in the instant case.
4. Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Mughal, the learned counsel for the appellants, has referred to the joint affidavit filed on behalf of the appellants wherein it had been deposed by them that they got the knowledge of the judgment of the Service Tribunal dated 17-1-1998 a week ago' meaning thereby that they got the/knowledge of the impugned judgment somewhere on 13-7-1999; because the petition for leave to appeal was filed on 20-7-1999. It has been also half-heartedly argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the petition for leave to appeal was within time if the period is reckoned from the notification dated 19-5-1999 whereby respondent No,1 was given grades 16 and 17 in view of the judgment of the Service Tribunal. The learned counsel has cited the following authorities in support of his contention that the appellants were entitled to the condonation of delay in the instant case : ' In an unreported case titled Tariq Bin Saeed v. Raja Muhammad Razzaq and others (Civil Appeal No,64 of 1999 decided on 7-10-1999), the facts were that an amendment in memorandum of appeal was allowed without any written application. Subsequently, an amendment application was submitted when the memorandum of appeal had already been amended on the oral request made by the counsel for the concerned appellant. It was contended that as the amended copy of memorandum of appeal was given to the counsel for the opposite party, it would be presumed that he had the knowledge of the amendment and thus, delay in filing the petition for leave to appeal could not be condoned. The contention was repelled observing that the mere fact that amended copy was given to the concerned counsel would not justify the inference that he had the knowledge of the amendment made specially so when the amendment was made without any notice to the concerned party and without any written application in that regard.
' In a case reported as Sardar Aftab Ahmed and 5 others v. Maj. (Retd.) Muhammad Aftab Ahmed and 3 others 1999 MLD 187, it was observed that point which is purely legal in nature can be raised at any time before this Court and that an illegal order could not be enforced by invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court.
' In a case reported as Dr. Muhammad Sarwar v. Dr. Muhammad Sharif Chatter and others 1998 PLC (C.S.) 127, it was observed that when an order is patently illegal, it can be recalled even if the same has been acted upon because in such cases the principle of 'audi alterm partem' cannot be pressed into service.
' In a case reported as Umar Hayat v. Azad Govt. Of the State of J&K and others 1999 PLC (C.S.) 93, it was held that as the basic order passed by the Public Service Commission was illegal and inconsistent with the mandatory provisions regarding the quota system, the subsequent steps taken by the High Court would automatically be rendered illegal without specifically challenging the same.
5. In reply Sardar Rafique Mahmood Khan, the learned counsel for respondent No,1, has controverted the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants. He has argued that in fact the appellants were fully aware of the judgment of the Service Tribunal dated 17-1-1998 much earlier than what they alleged. The learned counsel has submitted that the petition for leave to appeal was filed against the judgment of the Service Tribunal dated 17-1-1998 and not the notification dated 19-5-1999 which was one of the notifications issued in pursuance of the aforesaid judgment of the Service Tribunal whereby, grades 16 and 17 were given to respondent No,1 as an employee of the Civil Secretariate. The learned counsel has argued that a basic notification which was issued in pursuance of the judgment of the Service Tribunal on 20-6-1998, was circulated amongst the departments wherein the appellants were serving as Section Officers; according to said notification the claim of respondent No,1 that he had lien in the Secretariat and thus he would be deemed to be an employee of the Secretariat was accepted. Subsequently, another notification was issued on 16-1-1999, whereby respondent No,1 was given grade 15 in the Secretariat. The learned counsel has also referred to a letter written by Abdul Aziz, one of the appellants, herein, who was serving as Section Officer in the Department of Services and General Administration to respondent No, 1 that as the Service Tribunal had announced the judgment in his appeal, whether any appeal was preferred to the Supreme Court or not. According to the learned counsel, this clearly shows that so far as Abdul Aziz appellant is concerned, he had the knowledge of the judgment of the Service Tribunal dated 17-1-1998 at least on 15-4-1998 or earlier. Similarly, Abdul Khaleel Ganaie, appellant, obtained I copy of the judgment of the Service Tribunal dated 17-1-1998 on 17-4-1998 as is evident from his application which forms Annex. 'RAA' to the present appeal and the attestation of the Registrar of the Service Tribunal which is annexed as 'RAC'. Thus, Abdul Khaleel Ganaie appellant, had the knowledge of the judgment of the Service Tribunal at least L-17- 4-1998 or earlier. Therefore, the learned counsel for respondent No,1 has contended that so far as the aforesaid two appellants are concerned, it is evident that they filed an incorrect affidavit in this Cour that they came to know about the impugned judgment of the Service Tribunal only who notification dated 19-5-1999 whereby grades 16 and 17 were g Anted to respondent No,1 was issued.
He has argued that as all the fifteen appellants, herein, have filed a joint affidavit claiming their knowledge one week prior to 20-7-1999 when the petition for leave to appeal was filed, the affidavit was incorrect and unreliable, specially so when the source of the knowledge of the appellants is not specifically stated the learned counsel has maintained that when the affidavit regardin the date of knowledge of the impugned judgment of the Service Tribunal in ease of Abdul Azi7 and Abdul Khaleel Ganaie is established to be I correct, the deposition of the other appellants cannot be read upon in the circumstances indicated above. The learned counsel has stressed that it cannot be conceived that the notification dated 20-6-1998 and 16 1-1999 issued in pursuance of the judgment of the Service Tribunal which were also circulated in the departments wherein the appellants were serving did not furnish them the knowledge of the impugned judgment . Thus, he maintained that it cannot be said that the appellant, remained unaware of the judgment of the Service Tribunal for about one and a half years. The learned counsel has also referred to the counter-affidavit on behalf of the respondents deposing that an incorrect affidavit was filed by the appellants only to overcome the hurdle of limitation.
' We have given due consideration to the question of condonation of limitation in the instant case.
So far as Addul Khaleel Ganaie and Abdul Aziz appellants are concerned, it is clearly proved that they had filed an incorrect affidavit that they got the knowledge of the impugned judgment of the Service Tribunal only a week prior to 20-7-1999. This fact is clearly proved by the copy of the letter which is Annex 'RA' to the appeal and Annex. 'RAA' the copy of the application submitted by Abdul Khaleel Ganaie for obtaining the copy of the judgment of the Service Tribunal dated 15-4-1998.
Besides, in the notification dated 20-6-1998 which was circulated among all the departments, it is clearly stated that in pursuance of the judgment of the Service Tribunal dated 17-1-1998 the respondent would be deemed to be a permanent employee of the Civil Secretariat and he was appointed as Assistant therein. It may also be observed here that it is fallacious to argue that appellants were adversely affected only by the notification dated 19-5-1999 whereby grades 16 and 17 were sanctioned in favor of respondent No,1 because when the contention of respondent No 1 was upheld and he was declared as an employee of the Civil Secretariat, the appellants herein, would be junior to him as is evident from the seniority list issued in the year 1983. Even otherwise, if the basic notifications dated 20-6-1998 and 16-1-1999 remained intact, the notification dated 19-5- 1999 cannot be assailed because that is an automatic consequence of the earlier two notifications whereby respondent No,1 was declared as an employee of the Secretariat and also given grade 15.
Thus, we are of the considered opinion that contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that they came to know about the impugned judgment of the Service Tribunal only one week prior to filing of the petition for leave to appeal is incorrect and is belied by the circumstances indicated above. As the petition for leave to appeal was time-barred by 488 days, we hold that the petition for leave to appeal or for that matter the appeal filed by the appellants, herein, is hopelessly time- barred and no `sufficient cause', has been shown for the condonation of delay . Hence, the appeal is hereby dismissed as being time-barred. In view of the bar of limitation, we need not to deal with merits of the appeal. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to the costs.