1. The petitioner No. 1, i.e., the Road Transport Corporation Labour Union (Regd.), Lahore and the petitioner No. 2 Muhammad Israr (Mate) the son of Muhammad Ikram, a former employee of the Body Building Workshop, Lahore, have jointly tiled this application in this Labour Court under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. It has been stated by the petitioners that the petitioner-Union is a registered Trade Union and is the Representative and the collective bargaining agent of the employees of the Body Building Workshop. Lahore, the Central Stores, Lahore, the Anjuman Rebuild Shop, Lahore, and the Road Transport Training School, Lahore, under section 22(1) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. It has also been mentioned in the application that the said employees of the respon--dent (i.e., the Road Transport Corporation, Lahore) do not have any other registered Trade Union. The petitioner Union claims to have instituted Industrial Dispute No. 8/1968 in the present Labour Court, which is said to be still pending.
2. This industrial dispute embodies of demands of the employees of the Body Building Work--shop, with which the petitioner No. 2 Muhammad Israr claims to be directly connected. According to the petitioners, the petitioner No. l served a notice of strike on the respondent corporation on the 25th of February 1969, in which the demands of the employees of all the above-mentioned subsidiary bodies of the respondent Company were set-forth. Conciliation proceedings relating to those demands are said to be still in progress and the petitioner No. 2 Muhammad Israr has avowed his direct connection with those proceedings. Furthermore, the petitioner Union has remarked that on the date 12-1-1970 a list of demands was sent by it under section 26 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, to the respondent on behalf of the employees of the above-mentioned bodies. It has also been asserted in the application that the petitioner No. 2, Muhammad Israr, was first employed during the month of February 1968, in the Body Building Workshop and on the date 24-11- 1969 at the time of hi3 dismissal he was working as a Mate and was a member of the Road Transport Corpora--tion Labour Union (Regd.), Lahore. On the 2-11-69 the Works Manager of the Body Building Workshop, Lahore, is said to have communicated a charge-sheet to the petitioner- Muhammad Israr, which contained certain charges against the petitioner No. 2, who, in his reply to the charge-sheet, sought to refute these charges and requested an impartial enquiry into them, alleging that this disciplinary proceeding had been maliciously initiated against him by one Sultan Sikander the Works Manager, under whom the said petitioner was serving. Nevertheless, according to the petitioners, on the date 24-11-1969 the employment of the petitioner Muhammad Israr was terminated by the said Works Manager without holding an impartial enquiry into the matters in issue and without affording the petitioner No. 2 a reasonable opportunity of rebutting the charges levelled against him. On the date 1 15-11-69, the petitioner No. 2 Muhammad Israr instituted an appeal against the order of termination of his employment, which was addressed to the Director (Technical) Road Transport Corporation and which has not yet been decided. In the concluding portion of the application under consideration it has been declared that the termination of the employment of Muhammad Israr is unjust, illegal and contrary to the require--ments of natural justice on the below-stated grounds: -
(i) The petitioner Muhammad Israr was handed down a charge-sheet by Sultan Sikander, Works Manager, Body Building, Workshop, Lahore, who did not have any authority for communicating a charge-sheet to the said petitioner.
(ii) A copy of the complainant's report against the petitioner No. 2 Muhammad Israr and copies of the documents relating to the preliminary enquiry held against him by the respondent were not attached to the charge-sheet that was delivered to Muhammad Israr and it was, therefore, not possible for the said petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses against him without referring to those documents.
(iii) The petitioner Muhammad Israr was not allowed to produce any evidence in his defence.
(iv) The Enquiry Officer in this case war not unbiased but was person who could not act against the wishes of the Works Manager to whom he was subordinate.
(v) A copy of the report of the departmental Enquiry Officer, was not supplied to the petitioner Muhammad Israr along wish the show-cause notice. On all the above-mentioned grounds the petitioners have prayed that this application might be, accepted by this present Court and the respondent might be ordered to re-instate the petitioner Muhammad Israr in service with benefits inasmuch as, according to the petitioner No. 2, the termination of his employment is illegal under section 37 (of the unspecified West Pakistan Industrial Dispute- Ordinance, 1968, which was repealed and replaced by the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 during the month of November 1969).
3. According to the respondent's reply the petitioner No. 2 Muhammad Israr wars summoned by the Assistant Traffic Manager in the latter's office and was called upon to submit his written explanation but he refused to do so and also abstained ---from making any statement and uttered abusive language against the Assistant Works Manager. For these acts of insubordination and misconduct he was placed under suspension and was given a charge-sheet. Subsequently a proper departmental enquiry was conducted against the petitioner Muhammad Israr in which lie was given a full opportunity of defending himself. He was found guilty of the charges- and was summoned to appear in person. After he had been heard in person the petitioner Muhammad Israr was dismissed from his employment. According to the respondent's Representative, Sultan Sikander, Works Manager, was fully competent to dismiss the petitioner No. 2. For all these reasons the respondent's Representative prayed that the application of the petitioner might be dismissed by this Court.
4. I have heard the arguments of the petitioner's Representative, Mr. Nj3zir Ahmad Naz, and the counter-arguments of the respondent's Representative, Mr. Amir Hussain Mughal, and have examined the relevant record in their presence. Section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordnance, 1969, contains the following mandatory provisions, "34. Application to Labour Court.-Any party to an industrial dispute relating to a matter arising out of any right guaranteed or secured to an employer or workman by or under ---any for the time being in force or an award or settlement may apply to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute."
5. It is clear from the above-cited provisions of the relevant law that only a party to an industrial dispute relating to a matter arising out of any right that has been guaranteed to either an employer or a workman by or under any law that might be in force can apply to a Labour Court for adjudication of that industrial dispute. In view of these provisions of the law it is essential, in the first place, to determine whether or not the case-of the petitioners, as spelled out in their application, can be regarded as falling within the definition of a industrial dispute. The expression 'industrial dispute' has been defined in section 2 (xii) of the `Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969', which is worded as follows:- "'Industrial dispute' means any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen or between workmen and, workmen which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or the conditions of work of any person."
6. The above-cited definition explicitly indicates that a dispute or difference between an employer and a workman can be deemed to be an industrial dispute only if it is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or the conditions of work of any person: In the present case it cannot reasonably be contended that the dismissal of the petitioner Muhammad Israr under the authority of the respondent and on the strength of the finding of a departmental enquiry officer to the effect that the said petitioner had in fact committed misconduct is a matter that is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or the conditions of work of the petitioner Muhammad Israr. I have questioned the petitioner's Representative, Mr. Nazir Ahmad Naz, as to the grounds on which the term 'non- employment' that occurs in the above-cited provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, can reasonably be considered to include cases of dismissal of employees. Mr. Nazir Ahmad Naz, however, has failed to quote any provisions of the law, or any specific facts, or legal principles from which it could rationally be inferred that the dismissal of an employee by his employer on charges of misconduct is also a form of 'non-employment'. On the other hand, the petitioner's Representative has not mentioned any concrete facts or rules according to which Mr. Sultan Sikander, Works Manager, Body Building Workshops, Lahore cannot be considered to be the competent dismissing authority of petitioner No. 2 Muhammad Israr. The petitioner's representative has also found himself at a loss to draw my attention to any law that might be in force in which an elaborate procedure has been prescribed for the holding of a departmental enquiry into charges of misconduct framed under the authority of the Road Transport Corporation, which procedure could possibly be held by me to have been contravened by the respondent in this case. As a matter of fact the contents of the application under consideration do not refer to any specific terns of employment or conditions of work applicable to the petitioner No. 2 Muhammad Is rar which, according to the petitioners, might have been violated by the respondent in this case. Furthermore, it is common ground between the respective Representatives of the two contending parties that the petitioner, Muhammad Israr is not an officer of any registered Trade Union, as distinguished from an ordinary member.
7. Given all the above-stated facts and circumstances and the above-cited provisions of the law I have no option but to hold that the petitioner's case does not constitute any industrial dispute-that might require adjudication by this Labour Court it I have also arrived at the conclusion that even on its factual merits the application of the petitioners is found to have no force in it when examined in the light of the relevant provisions of the law. Even after the promulgation of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, by the Central Government of Pakistan, the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employ--ment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, continues to be applicable to aid workmen, and it is, therefore, obviously appli--cable to the petitioner No. 2 Muhammad Israr.
8. Standing Order, No. 18 of that Ordinance of 1968 has expressly declared that no complaint can be instituted by an individual workman against the order of termination of his employment unless he is an "officer of a registered Trade Union" whose employment is alleged to have been terminated for his Trade Union activities or unless ho is an individual workman who is alleged to have been deprived of any benefits that have accrued to him under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. It is as clear as day-light that the petitioner Muhammad Israr has not claimed to be an officer of any registered ' Trade Union and has also not complained that he has been deprived of any benefits accruing to him under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968.