' This revision arises from the judgment and decree dated 1-4-1975, of the learned District Judge, Mianwali who accepted the appeal of the respondents and setting aside the judgment and decree of the learned Additional Civil Judge, Second Class, Bhakkar, decreed the suit of the respondents.
2. The facts of the case are that Dost Muhammad was the owner of the property in dispute, who sold it to the respondents, but since mutations were not sanctioned, they could not take possession. Therefore, they brought a suit for possession, which was decreed, and on the basis of the decree, Mutations Nos. 1496 and 1486 were sanctioned on 21-8-55 and 13-5-55 respectively.
During the pendency of the suit, the Thal Development Authority, Bhakkar acquired other property alongwith 67 kanals and 9 marlas purchased by the respondents from Dost Muhammad. The Thal Development Authority, however, was not impleaded as a party to the suit after the acquisition of the land. Since the respondents were not given any land in lieu of the land acquired, nor any compensation, they made an application to the Colonization Officer, who decided in their favour directing that re-distribution of the property be made. When the petitioner tried to interfere in the possession of the respondents, the latter on the basis of the order of the Colonization Officer brought a suit for perpetual injunction for restraining the petitioner from interfering in their possession. From the decision of the said suit, this revision arises.
3. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned trial Judge found issue No, 4 against the respondents, but the learned District Judge, while setting aside the finding of the learned trial Judge in said issue decreed the suit. Of the respondents which could not be done. Issue No, 4 is to the effect "whether the Thal Development Authority is not bound by the decree, dated 6-10-54? If so, what is its effect?" This is that decree which was obtained by the respondents against Dost Muhammad on the strength of registered sale-deed.
4. The Thai Development Authority is not interested as to who is the owner of the property, and it can acquire any property which is required by it for development. The payment of compensation is to be made to the owner. If there is any decree in favour of a person about the ownership of a land, the Thal Development Authority is not interested to refuse compensation to him. Thus it cannot be said that the Thal Development Authority is not bound by the decree. The Thal Development Authority is not a necessary party in this case. Obviously, the Thai Development Authority cannot come forward with a plea that the land belongs to it. This is not the case of the petitioner that he recognised Dost Muhammad as the owner and had paid or wanted to pay compensation to him in cash or in the shape of land. Only the decree-holder can claim the property. In the present case, only the respondents were entitled to get compensation m cash or in the shape of land particularly when this is not the case of any party that Dost Muhammad had come forward to claim compensation. Since an objection was raised that is why the issue was framed, otherwise the point is not very material.
5. The ground for which the decree of the District Judge is liable to be set aside and the suit liable to ask for perpetual injunction. According to section 36 of the Thal Development Act, the owner of the property, which has been acquired, is to be given possession by the Collector for the implementation of the scheme. Even the Land Acquisition Act, under which the acquisition is made, authorises the Collector to take possession of the land even before payment of the compensation.
Since admittedly the property in dispute was acquired and given to the petitioner for development, the petitioner was entitled to be put in possession under the Land Acquisition Act as well as under section 36 of the Thal Development Act, and the respondents could, after delivering possession claim either compensation or some portion of the same land, or some, by return after the expiry of time, other land in lieu of acquisition. The question of returning of land arises only after the land is relinquished on the expiry of five years under subsections (4) and (5) of section 36, but in the present case, since the respondents did not deliver possession, no question of returning the property arises. The respondents could ask for the allotment of some other land in lieu of the land acquired, or for redistribution of the property as ordered by the Colonization Officer, but could not ask for perpetual injunction because as observed supra, the petitioner was entitled to be put in possession under section 36 of the Thal Development Act. The order of the Colonization Officer is not to the effect that till some other land is allotted to the respondents, they shall not be dispossessed of the land in dispute. So the said order of the Colonization Officer did not entitle the respondents to ask for perpetual injunction. If there had been any such direction in the said order, the same, being against the Land Acquisition Act and section 36 of the Thal Development Act, could not have helped the respondents.
6. As a result of the observations made above, the revision is accepted and setting aside the judgment and decree of the learned first appellate Court, the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court is restored. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs.