MUHAMMAD SADIQ LEGHARI, J.---By these two applications under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. Sikandar Ali Shaikh has approached this Court to order the sentences awarded to him in four different cases to run concurrently. The particulars of the cases and the sentences awarded to him are given below:-
(1) Crime No, 86 of 1990, P. S. Aziz Bhatti, Karachi under section 365-A/34, P.P.C. For kidnapping Muhammad Sadiq for ransom on 19-6-1990. He was convicted by the Special Judge, STA, Karachi on 21-12-1992 and awarded sentence of imprisonment for life with fine of Rs,20,000. In default of payment of fine to undergo two years' R.I. Further.
(2) Crime No, 24 of 1992, P. S. Landhi (sic) Karachi under section 365-A/34, P.P.C. For kidnapping Mehboob-ur-Rehman on 6-2-1992. He was convicted by the Special Judge, S.T.A., Karachi on 21-12- 1992 and awarded death penalty. The sentence was modified from death to imprisonment for life in appeal decided by the High Court.
(3) Crime No,51 of 1992 P.S. New Karachi under section 365-A/34, P.P.C. For kidnapping minor Taher on 16-2-1992. He was convicted on 27-8-2001 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and Special Judge, STA, Karachi. The sentence of nine years' R.I. Was awarded to him.
(4) In Crime No,24 of 1992 P.S. Saeed Abad. He was convicted for offence under section 13-D of Arms Ordinance on 13-10-1993 by Special Judge, STA. Karachi and _awarded him sentence of five years'
R.I. With fine of Rs,5,000 in default.
2. The learned Advocate appearing for the applicant has contended that no doubt the applicant was convicted for four offences committed on different dates and at 'different places but allowing the sentences to run consecutively will be against the scheme of sections 35 and 397, Cr.P.C, the requirement whereof is that normally all the sentences are to be ordered to run concurrently. In support of his arguments he referred to the unreported judgments passed by Division Benches of this Court in (1) C.P. No,D-1305 of 1992 (Muhammad Paryal v. The State) (2) Cr.M.A. No,344 of 1998 (Nazir Ahmed Solangi v. The State) and judicial pronouncements by Lahore High Court in Ali Muhammad and others v. The State (1981 PCr.LJ 470) and of Calcutta High Court in Jainta Kumar Banerjee v. The State (AIR 1955 Calcutta 632).
3. The learned A.A.-G took pains to express simply his no objection to acceptance of the prayer made by the applicant/convict Sikandar Ali alias Sikoo Shaikh.
4. The applicant has been convicted in four cases out. Of which three are of kidnapping for ransom, and the fourth is for keeping unlicensed weapon.. All the four offences were committed at different times and at different places and the convictions and sentences were awarded in the result of separate trials.
5. Section 35, Cr.P.C. Deals with the conviction and sentences awarded for several offences at one trial. It reads as under:-- "35. Sentence in cases of conviction of several offences at one trial.--(1) When a person is convicted at one trial of two or more offences, the Court may, subject to the provisions of section 71 of the Pakistan Penal Code, sentence him, for such offences, to the several punishments prescribed therefore, which such Court is competent to inflict; such punishment when consisting of imprisonment to commence the one after the expiration of the other in such order as the Court may direct, unless the Court directs that such punishment shall run concurrently.
(2) (a) & (b). . .... . .. . .. ..... A bare look at the section would show that it is applicable where a person is convicted and awarded sentences for more, than one offences at one trial. Its subsection (1) isof general application and provides expressly the mode of implementation of the punishment specially consisting of imprisonment. Its scheme is that all the sentences of imprisonment to commence one after the expiration of the other unless the Court directs such punishment to run concurrently.
Thus the scheme of the section is that the sentences of imprisonment are to run consecutively. The running of the punishment consisting of imprisonment concurrently is an exception. The remaining provisions of section 35 fix the aggregate punishment for the several offences, which the Courts, can inflict at one trial.
6. Section 397, Cr.P.C. Deals with the sentences awarded- to an offender already sentenced for other offences. It is the provision, which can be referred to while dealing with the questions like present one. The section reads as under:-- "397. Sentence on offender already sentenced for another offence.- When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment or imprisonment for life is sentenced to imprisonment, or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment, or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment, or imprisonment for life to which he has been previously sentenced, unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence: Provided that where a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment of an order under section 123 in default of furnishing security is, whilst undergoing such sentence, sentenced to imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the making of such order, the latter sentence shall commence immediately." The scheme of the section clear from its wording is that ordinarily the sentences awarded to a person already undergoing a sentence for imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment or imprisonment for life to which he has been previously sentenced. Thus the statute postpones the commencement of subsequent sentence of imprisonment till the expiration of the period of imprisonment which the accused is undergoing at the time of awarding him subsequent sentence of imprisonment. It is the rule and the primary object of the provision. No doubt, the Court can direct that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with the previous sentence but it is exception to the rule. The view gets support from Full Bench decision In re: Muhammad Khan (PLD 1986 Lahore 294), that in the sentences for different offences committed at different times are to be ordered to run consecutively. Same view was taken in the cases of -ijaya Cooperative M.P. Society Ltd. v. Sangat Ram and another reported in (AIR 1965 Himachal Pradesh 21) and N.N. Burjorjee v. Emperor reported in (AIR 1935 Rangoon 456).
7. Although no hard and fast rule can be laid down but the main criteria for identification of such exceptional cases for ordering the sentences to run concurrently can be the close or intimate connection between the previous and the subsequent offences. In the case of Vijaya Cooperative M.P. Society Ltd. v. Sangat Ram and another and N.N. Burjorjee v. Emperor (supra), it has been held that the sentences cannot be ordered to run concurrently when the earlier and subsequent offences are independent and unconnected. The concurrent running of earlier and subsequent sentences can only be ordered in the cases for offences akin or intimately connected with each other.
8. As mentioned above the applicant was convicted for different offences, which were committed at different places and times and were tried separately. All those offences are unconnected and independent of each other. Three of them were of independent operations of kidnapping the citizens for ransom at different times and the fourth was of possessing unlicensed weapon. For such convict it is the rule provided by the statute in section 397, Cr.P.C. Is applicable. These cases are surely not exceptional calling for order making all the sentences to run concurrently.
9. The object of sections 35 and 397, Cr.P.C, is to increase the period of punishment that the Court can inflict. If on recording conviction, the Court does not specify under any of the two sections that the sentences will run concurrently, those are surely to run consecutively. In applicant's case the trial Court did not consider it a fit case where the sentences should be ordered to run concurrently.
It cannot be said that the trial Court were not mindful of that aspect. Not recording any order making the sentences concurrent would mean that the trial Court did not intend to order the sentences to run concurrently in view of the nature of the cases against the applicant. Even the High Court in the appeal filed against conviction and sentence in two cases of kidnapping for ransom (one registered as Crime No,86 of 1990 P.S. Aziz Bhatti and the other registered as Crime No,24 of 1992 P.S. Landhi) only reduced the sentence of death in one case to imprisonment for life which mean that even the Appellate Court did not consider it a fit case for directing the sentences to run concurrently.
10. Even otherwise after dismissal of the appeal in above mentioned two cases with modification of sentences in one judgment, the judgments have attended finality under section 369, Cr.P.C., fresh direction for concurrent running of the sentences in exercise of powers under section 561-A, Cr.P.C, would amount to alteration and review or modification of the appellate judgment of High Court which is not permissible. In the case of Muhammad Khan (supra), the Full Bench of Lahore High Court held that any fresh direction for concurrent running of sentences would amount to alteration and review of the judgment not permissible under section 369, Cr.P.C.
11. The pronouncements referred to by the applicant's learned Advocate are not helpful to him as in those cases the sentences were ordered to run concurrently keeping in view that facts and circumstances of those cases individually.
12. In the result of above discussion, the prayer made by the applicant is not acceptable and is dismissed.