' MOAZZAM HAYAT (MEMBER).---Shahid Mahmood Nadeem was employed as Producer in the year 1973 by Pakistan Television Corporation, hereinafter called the respondent. His services were terminated vide order, dated 26-8-1998. Through the present appeal filed: under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, he has challenged the validity and legality of the said termination orders. According to the appellant he had filed a departmental appeal on 24-9-1998 but it was not responded.
2. The first charge-sheet was issued to the appellant on 28-5-1998. It was stated in the charge- sheet that the appellant had given/made false statements, oral or in writing against the respondent and had falsely mentioned that the respondent had sustained a loss of Rs,21 crores, which was subsequently raised to Rs,40 crores in the year 1996-97, that in his interview dated 13-1- 1998 he made comments tarnishing the image and performance of the respondent in the eyes of public in the country and abroad and that he gave an authorized interview to panel of daily 'Jang' which appeared in that paper on 3-1-1998. The respondent appointed Mr. Mumtaz Hameed Rao, Director Educational Television as Inquiry Officer to determine whether the appellant was guilty of the charges of misconduct alleged against him in the charge-sheet referred to above. The appellant submitted in the reply to the charge-sheet on 8-7-1998. It was submitted in the reply by the appellant that he had given comments in good faith with an intention to make the new management of the respondent aware of the nature of the crises prevailing in PTV. However, an effort was made by the appellant to dilute the charges levelled against him by mentioning in his reply that his interview was edited in such a way that certain comments appeared out of context and gave wrong impression of what he had actually intended. On 21-7-1998 another charge-sheet was issued to the appellant. Through this charge-sheet the appellant was charged with misconduct on account of his habitual absence without leave. Appellant did not submit his reply to the charge-sheet. On 17-8-1998 the respondent ordered an Inquiry against the appellant on the basis of the second charge and appointed Akhtar Mahmood Dad as Inquiry Officer. It has transpired from the perusal of the record that the appellant joined the first inquiry ordered on 15-6- 1998 conducted by Mr. Mumtaz Hussain Rao. He, however, did not join the subsequent inquiry conducted by Akhtar Mahmood Dad. On 26-8-1998 the respondent passed the impugned order, terminating the service of the appellant. It was mentioned in the order that as the charges of misconduct levelled against the appellant had been proved and there were no mitigating circumstances, therefore, the Competent Authority had ordered for termination of the service of Shahid Mahmood Nadeem, Producer (Group-IV) of Television, Quetta.
3. The appeal has been resisted by the respondent. It is stated that the impugned order of termination was communicated to the appellant at PTV Centre, Quetta where he was posted at the time, therefore, the Tribunal at Lahore did not have territorial jurisdiction to decide the appeal.
Another preliminary objection has been taken that the appeal was time-barred. On merits it is maintained that the proper procedure had been followed for completing the disciplinary proceedings against the appellant and for that reason the appeal merits rejection.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record.
5. The first objection of the respondent is that since the impugned order had been passed and communicated to the appellant while posted at Quetta, therefore, this Tribunal at Lahore does not have jurisdiction to decide this appeal. The objection is not valid. Section 3 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 relates to the establishment of one or more Service Tribunals by the President. It says that when more than one Tribunal is established the President shall specify in the notification the class or classes of Civil Servants in respect of whom or the territorial limits within which, or the class or classes of cases in respect of which, each such tribunal shall exercise jurisdiction under this Act.
The President has not issued any notification specifying the territorial limits of the Tribunals constituted by him. The territorial limits of this Tribunal working at Lahore has thus not been specified. In the absence of that notification this Tribunal shall exercise its authority to decide the appeal of the appellant notwithstanding the fact that the disciplinary proceedings which culminated into his termination had been initiated and finalized during his stay at Quetta as Program Producer.
6. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that his objection is based on sub-rule (2) of rule 3 of the Service Tribunals (Procedure) Rules, 1974. This sub-rule reads as under:-- "(2) A Tribunal shall ordinarily hold its sittings at its permanent seat but 'it may hold its sitting at any other place within its jurisdiction if in its opinion the holding of sitting at such other place will be convenient to the parties to the proceedings before it."
' It is vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that while assuming jurisdiction the tribunal is to see the convenience of the parties and not only the convenience of the appellant.
According to the learned counsel the appellant may feel convenient in filing his appeal in this Tribunal but a great deal of determining jurisdiction the Tribunal must take into account the inconvenience of the respondent. A reference has been made to section 20 of Code of Civil Procedure. This section of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction a cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. There is no cavil with the proposition that a Civil Appeal is a continuation of a suit and this Tribunal, for the purposes of deciding appeal filed under section 4, is deemed to be a Civil Court and shall have the same powers as are vested in such Courts under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. We find that section 20 is not very helpful to the respondent so far as the present appeal is concerned, as the territorial jurisdiction of the Tribunal has not been specified by a Presidential Notification. It is the convenience of the parties which is of prime importance while entertaining and deciding appeal under section 4 of Service Tribunals Act, 1973. Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall come into picture only when it is found that the rule of convenience is not applicable. In the present case we are not considering the argument advanced by the learned counsel in the light of section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure because we find that no inconvenience has been caused to the respondent by the present appeal in this Tribunal at Lahore. The respondent has engaged a counsel to defend the appeal. Objections to the appeal have also been filed. The relevant record has also been submitted. We find in the circumstances that the respondent has not been put to any inconvenience. As such we are constrained to hold that the present appeal is competent in this Tribunal as neither of the party has been put to inconvenience. The argument of the respondents with regard to jurisdiction of this Tribunal is repelled.
7. It is submitted that the present appeal is time-barred. According to the respondent the decision dated 1-10-1998 rejecting the departmental appeal of the appellant was communicated to the appellant under covering letter dated 14-10-1998 and since this appeal was filed beyond 30 days from 14-10-1998, therefore, it was barred by time. The appellant has denied having-received the order of rejection of this appeal. He communicated to the appellant but the appellant denies having received it. We are not going to enter into this controversy but we find that this appeal is well within time as it was filed within 120 days starting from the date when the departmental appeal was filed. In 1982 SCM R 582 a Full Bench of the Honourable Supreme Court had clearly held that limitation time of 120 days for filing an appeal in this Tribunal commenced from the date of filing of departmental appeal. Following this authority we hold that the appeal is within time. The departmental appeal was filed on 24-9-1998. This appeal was filed on 1-11-1999 well within 120 days.
In these circumstances, in the light of the law laid down by the apex Court, we hold that the appeal is within time. The objection is overruled.
8. On merits we find that the appellant was charge-sheeted strictly in accordance with prescribed rules and procedure. The appellant replied to the first charge dated 28-5-1995 but did not submit his reply to the second charge-sheet dated 21-8-1998 although he was given an opportunity to do so. Mr. Mumtaz Hameed Rao was appointed as Inquiry Officer to inquire into the charges contained in the first charge-sheet. An inquiry was conducted by him in which the appellant had participated.
We find that Mr. Mumtaz Hameed Rao was an independent officer as the appellant had not attributed any bias or malice to him. We do not find any irregularity or illegality in the inquiry conducted by him, nor any irregularity or illegality has been pointed out by the appellant. It is argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Inquiry Officer had not recorded the statements of the witnesses who had allegedly been influenced by the comments made by the appellant in his interviews and press statements. We are not impressed by this argument because we find that the appellant has not denied having made statements and interviews which were definitely unauthorized. An employee is not only prohibited by the service rules to make adverse remarks against his employer, but the rules of ethics and good governance also require an employee not to make derogatory statements against his department from where he is earning his bread and butter. The appellant cannot take shelter by pleading that he had made bona fide statements to inform the new management of the respondent about the existing crises. It is not for a subordinate employee to make crises public, if there are any. The image of the institution is definitely damaged when such remarks affecting the financial and other affairs of the institution are made by its employee/employees. A domestic matter may be brought to the notice of the seniors but it is not the function of an employee to make them public. Mr. Mumtaz Hameed Rao had thus not committed any illegality or irregularity when he found that the appellant had absolutely no authority and justification to make comments attributed to him in the charge-sheet.
9. It is a case in which no inquiry was required. The appellant had admitted having made statements and interviews affecting the working of the respondents. In his reply dated 8-7-1998 to the charge-sheet dated 28-5-1998 he stated that he was not aware of the instructions mentioned in HPP/101/5313 dated 25-7-1991 regarding the interviews in the press as he was on ex-Pakistan leave at the time and was not able to get a copy of the instructions. Ignorance of law and rules is never an excuse. We cannot permit the appellant to justify his action by stating that he was not aware of the instructions on the subject. If this argument is allowed, there would be a total chaos in the country because every employee would take up this plea. This practice cannot be allowed. The appellant was a senior employee. He had put in a long service with the respondent. We are not prepared to believe that he was not aware of the departmental instructions by which the interviews to the press were not permitted. But notwithstanding the instructions there are always implied instructions for Civil Servants not to speak against the integrity of the institution in which he is employed. The Inquiry Officer had based his conclusion on the statements made by the appellant for which he had no right or legal obligation.
10. As regards the inquiry into the second charge of absence the appellant voluntarily refused to join the inquiry. An effort has been made to justify the absence of the appellant on the basis of certain medical certificates showing his illness. We do not find from these medical certificates that the appellant was so seriously ill that he could not join the departmental inquiry. We hold that the appellant had intentionally avoided the inquiry conducted on the second charge of absence. We hold, in the above circumstances, that both the charges were proved against the appellant in the inquiries conducted against him.
11. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued very strenuously that the appellant had not been supplied copies of the inquiry reports, had not been given a final show-cause notice and had not been provided an opportunity of personal hearing, therefore, the impugned order cannot be sustained. To meet this argument of the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the appellant had been terminated from service and in cases involving termination from service the respondent was under no legal obligation to provide copies of inquiry report to the accused employee or to give him a final show-cause notice and to provide him an opportunity of personal hearing.
12. Rule 13.16 of the Employees Service Rules of the respondent is reproduced in verbatim as under;- - "13.16. Employees liable to be dismissed for misconduct will be served a show-cause notice accompanied by a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer/Committee, and will be given a personal hearing by the dismissing authority or any officer duly authorized by him.
' The learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that this rule is not applicable to the facts of the present case as the appellant had not been dismissed from service. According to him the services of the appellant were terminated under rule 14.07, therefore, the appellant could not claim a copy of the inquiry report, show-cause notice and a personal hearing. We are unable to subscribe to the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent. It is correct that in rule 13.16 that words "dismissal for misconduct" have been used but we find that the present case is of dismissal from service and not of termination simpliciter. The appellant was charge-sheeted on the ground of misconduct and proper inquiries were held against him. The charges were proved against him and it was for that reason that his services were dispensed with. It was actually a dismissal order but was given the colour of termination. It is the well-established principle of law that when a penal action is taken against an employee on the ground of misconduct after a regular inquiry the department cannot be allowed to plead that his services have been terminated against which he has no remedy in any Court of law. The termination is in fact dismissal from service. The termination clause is invoked by the employer so as to thwart the provision of law enabling the aggrieved employee to seek remedy which is otherwise available to him when he is dismissed from service. We find that the appellant had been proceeded against on the charges of misconduct. He was thus not terminated from service. A stigma of misconduct was attached to his career. He was dismissed from service and not only terminated from service. Rule 13.16 of the service rules of the respondent shall come to the rescue of the appellant as the impugned order was in fact of dismissal and not of simple termination. This is an admitted position that the appellant had not been given copies of the inquiry reports. He was also not served with a final show-cause notice. He was not given an opportunity of personal hearing. For these reasons we find that the impugned order of termination of the appellant cannot be sustained. It is accordingly set aside.
13. The learned counsel for the appellant has made a categorical statement before us that the appellant had been reinstated into service but the respondent is intentionally concealing the reinstatement order and not implementing it. He has requested that the respondent be directed to implement the said order. The appellant had submitted an application calling for the respondent to produce the relevant record in this regard. The respondent has filed reply to the application and has also categorically denied the existence of any order of the reinstatement of the appellant. An order which is not issued or is not notified is not an order in the eye of law. Since we have not seen that order and the respondent has also not admitted having passed that order, therefore, we are unable to issue a direction that the respondent should implement that order. The said order did not see the light of the day. We are not prepared to pass an order in void. If the appellant still thinks that there is an order in this favour than he should move the appropriate authority for its implementation. We cannot order the implementation of the order which is not before us.
14. We have held above that the appellant had been dismissed from service and the impugned order was not an order of termination simpliciter. Under rule 13.16 of the Service Rules of the employees of the respondent, the appellant is entitled to copies of the inquiry reports, a final show- cause notice and personal hearing. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order and direct the respondent to supply copies of the inquiry reports to the appellant. A final show-cause notice shall also be issued to the appellant and he shall be given an opportunity of personal hearing. The entire process shall be completed within a period of two months. The respondent shall pass fresh order after issuing final show-cause notice and giving opportunity of personal hearing to the appellant.
15.- There shall be no order as to costs. Parties be informed.