' The propriety of the order of the Civil Judge, Sargodha dated 15-111-1973 and the judgment dated 7-5-1976 passed in appeal by the learned Additional District Judge, Sargodha, is called in question in the present revision petition.
2. The facts as stated are that the petitioner, in his suit for a declaration, challenged the legality of a demand of taccavi loan from him stating that it was made without a show-cause notice and without first determining what the sum due was. According to him there was no debt outstanding against him, therefore the recovery proceedings against him as arrears of land revenue were without jurisdiction, illegal, mala fide, arbitrary and void. He also prayed for a perpetual injunction restraining the respondents from collecting the amount through coercive measures.
3. The trial Court found that the petitioner had failed to disclose in his plaint what amount was being realized from him and for that reason his suit was vague. It was held that the plaintiff should have first deposited the amount in dispute before he could file the suit. On this ground not only the application for temporary injunction was dismissed but the plaint was also rejected under rule 11 of Order VII, Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908). The appeal filed before the learned Additional District Judge also did not succeed, therefore this revision petition.
4. The learned Additional District Judge took the same view that the plaint was vague and pointed out that there was no mention of a specific amount which the respondents were determined to realize from the petitioner. According to him the issuance of an injunction was not possible in cases where damages could be calculated in terms of money. Having placed reliance probably on the provisions of section 91 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act (Act XVII of 1967), the Court observed that no suit was maintainable unless first the amount in depute was deposited.
5. At the outset an objection was raised by the learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner had even previously instituted a suit on the same cause of action but the plaint was rejected on 12-12-1972 under rule 11 of Order VII, C. P. C. I do not give much importance to this argument for the reason that in view of rule 13 of Order VII, C. P. C. The rejection of the plaint on any of the grounds mentioned in rule 11 of Order VII, C. P. C. Shall' not of its own force preclude the plaintiff from presenting a fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action.
6. It was contended further by the learned counsel that the petitioner in fact contested his liability for the arrear of land revenue, therefore under section 91 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967 it was required of him to have paid the same under protest and then filed the suit for the recovery of the amount so paid. Both the lower Courts have also made it a ground to reject the plaint but they have not adverted to the provisions of section 79 of the Act which lays down that a statement of account certified by a Revenue Officer shall be conclusive proof of the existence of an arrear of land-revenue, of its amount and of the person who is the defaulter. But the right construction of this provision can only be attained if its scope and subject, together with an analysis of its wording and the circumstances in which it is enacted are taken into consideration.
From an examination of the Act it is apparent that it provides first a procedure for determination of land revenue and then comes the machinery for realisation of such revenue. In Abdul Hamid Khan v. Government of West Pakistan and others (1) it is held that it is therefore manifest that before the operation of the machinery section for realisation of the arrears, the authority concerned must decide whether there is an arrear due or not. The petitioner in his plaint had categorically stated that he was not heard before the demand was directed against him. There is no procedure prescribed as to how the accounting party has to be heard in connection with the allegations made against him. The question for consideration is whether the authority to whom the function of determining the liability is entrusted has conducted the proceedings in accordance with the requirements of "substantial justice". In the circumstances, before rejection of the plaint, it was necessary for the trial Court to have seen whether the authority in the present case had done such substantial justice for determination of sum due before demanding it and directing coercive measures against the petitioner.
7. The learned Courts below were not justified in throwing out the plaint simply because the petitioner had not disclosed in his plaint the actual sum being demanded against him. In Seven Stars Goods Transport Company v. Administrator, Karachi Municipal Corporation (2) it is laid down that it is an axiomatic principle of law that while considering the question of cause of action the Court should apply its mind to the facts given in the plaint, and not to any other matter and it has to presume that every allegation made in the plaint, was true. It could therefore reject the plaint if it came to the conclusion that if all the allegations are proved the plaintiff would not be entitled to any relief whatsoever. Further, if there is any vagueness about the pleadings, the proper course is to order the party to remove the vagueness, and not to reject the plaint.
8. For the reasons aforementioned the revision petition is accepted, the decrees of the trial Court and the learned Additional District Judge are set aside. The case is remanded to the trial Court with a direction that before dealing with the suit it would first allow the plaintiff-petitioner to amend his plaint accordingly and then see whether the authority had determined the sum due. The parties are left to bear their own costs. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.