' KHALIL-UR-REHMAN RAMDAY, J.---One Ahmad Yar who was the predecessor-in-interest of the present respondents Nos.1 to 1' filed a suit on. 30-7-1963 seeking possession of the suit-land by perempting the sale thereof. This suit was dismissed by the learned trial Judge, through his judgment, dated 27-5-1966 on the ground of deficiency of the court-fee. An appeal filed against the said judgment was allowed the learned First Appellate Court through a judgment, dated 18-2- 1967 as a result whereof the case was remanded back to the learned trial Court for a fresh decision in accordance with law. This appellate decision was impugned before the Lahore High Court through F.A.O. No,60 of 1967 which was decided on 10-5-1973 remanding the case back to the learned Additional District Judge which learned Appellate Judge then decreed the said suit through his judgment, dated 16-10-1975. The vendees impugned the said appellate judgment and decree before the Lahore High Court through a Regular Second Appeal No,11 of 1976 which was dismissed through a judgment, dated 18-11-1989 essentially on the ground that the said appeal was barred by limitation of time.
2. The vendees are now before us impugning the said appellate judgment of the Hon'ble Lahore High Court.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has been heard at some length. We have also heard the learned counsel for the caveator and have also gone through the record in the light of the submissions made by the said learned counsel before us.
4. As has been mentioned above, the First Appellate Court had passed the judgment and decree in question on 16-10-1975. The second appeal before the High Court was filed on 8-1-1976 but the same was not accompanied by the certified copy of the judgment of the Court of first instance as required by rule 2 of Order XLII of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appellants before the High Court however submitted an application bearing C.M. No,88-C of 1976 under Order XLI, rule 1 read with section 151, C.P.C. Submitting therein:- "2. That certified copy of the judgment and decree of the trial Court is not presently available, therefore, uncertified copy of the same is attached. The certified copy will be submitted as soon as available."
' It was consequently prayed that:- ' "The filing of certified copy of the judgment and decree of the trial Court may kindly be dispensed with for the time being."
(Emphasis and underlining is ours).
' This application which should have been submitted under Order XLII, rule 2 and which had been wrongly mentioned as being filed under Order XLI, rule 1, C.P.C. Was filed on 8-1-1976 as it accompanied the memorandum of the appeal filed in the High Court. As per the record no order was passed by the High Court on the said application and thus the filing of a certified copy of the judgment of the Court of first instance alongwith the memorandum of appeal was not dispensed with.
5. The appellants before the High Court i.e, the petitioners before us, took no steps to seek an order on the said application for more than 13 years nor did the said appellants take any steps for all these long years to place the requisite certified copy of the judgment of the learned Trial Court on record. It was on 29-4-1989 i.e, more than 13 years after the filing of the R.S.A. In question that the respondents raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the said R.S.A. On account of the non-compliance of the said mandatory requirement of the said rule 2 of Order XLII of the C.P.C. The learned counsel for the appellants (petitioners before us) was duly notified of this objection and was directed by the High Court to come prepared, on the next date of hearing, to make his submissions on the said question. Even at this stage, it appears from the record, the petitioners-appellants did not wake up and made no efforts for almost five months to procure the required copy of the judgment in question because as per the record it was only on 17-9-1989 that the petitioners-appellants finally took the trouble of making an application for supply of a copy of the said judgment which copy was delivered to them the very next day i.e, on 18-9-1989 whereafter the petitioners-appellants appear again to have gone into a sound slumber for about six months and it was only on 8-3-1990 that an application was finally made to the High Court seeking its permission to place the said copy of the said judgment on the record. Thus it was after more than 14 years of the filing of the R.S.A. That the petitioners-appellants complied with the mandatory requirement of law. Needless to repeat here that this was despite the fact that the High Court had never passed any order dispensing with the legal requirement in question nor was any application made at any stage of these proceedings praying for condonation of the delay in doing the needful.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioners relied very heavily on a judgment delivered by this Court in Muhammad Iqbal and others v. Khan Muhammad and others and reported as PLD 1999 SC 35.
The facts on which this judgment of this Court proceeded were, however, distinguishable from the facts of the present case. In the precedent case the regular second appeal had been filed in the Lahore High Court on 12-5-1977 against the judgment of the First Appellate Court which had been delivered on 19-4-1977. The required copy of the judgment of the learned trial Court had not been filed alongwith this R.S.A. And instead an application had been made seeking exemption from the requirements of the law. On 1-6-1977 this R.S.A. Was admitted to regular hearing and on the said application submitted under Order XLII, rule 2, C.P.C. a notice was issued to the other side but the matter never got posted before the Court for further hearing till 6-6-1982 when an application was filed under section 151, C.P.C. Seeking permission of the Court to place the copy in question on the record. It was through an order, dated 1-11-1982 that the said application was granted and it was in these circumstances that since the High Court had permitted placing of such a copy on record after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation for the filing of the R.S.A. And since no one could be made to suffer on account of an act of a Court of law that the appellant in the said precedent case was found not to deserve the punishment envisaged by law. As would be. Noticed from the facts of the present case narrated above, no order had ever been passed by the High Court, either prior to the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation or even thereafter, allowing the filing of the copy in question. On account of these distinguishable facts the reliance of the learned counsel for the petitioners on the precedent case is misplaced.
7. In addition to the absence of any such order having been passed by the High Court in the present case, the case in hand is one of gross negligence on the part of the petitioners-appellants in the filing and in the prosecution of their appeal before the High Court as would be evident from the relevant facts noticed above. It is appalling to note that the petitioners-appellants had never even cared to file an application for the grant of a certified copy of the trial Court's judgment before the R.S.A. In question was filed in the High Court. In fact, as has been mentioned above, no such application was made for more than 13-1/2 years after the filing of the R.S.A. And about five months even after the objection in question had been raised by the other side. Having secured the said copy, petitioners-appellants again displayed a rather callous conduct in causing a further delay of about six months in praying to the High Court for its permission to place the said copy on record. The judgment of this Court delivered in Jumma and another v. Manzoor reported as 1988 SCM R 1958 relied upon by the learned counsel for the caveator is thus more akin to the facts and circumstances of the present case.
8. In the circumstances, we have not been able to persuade ourselves to hold that the petitioners before us were worthy of any sympathy or leniency. No exception could thus be taken, either in law or on facts, to the discretion exercised by the Hon'ble High Court.
9. This petition is, therefore, dismissed. Leave refused.
10. Before we part with this order, we would like to add that filing of a copy of the judgment of the learned Court of First Instance with a Regular Second Appeal was a mandatory requirements of law in terms of Order XLII, rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Dispensing with the compliance of such a mandatory requirement is only an exception and should never be treated as a mechanical or an automatic result of the mere filing of an application seeking exemption from satisfaction of such a legal requirement. The Courts of law should, therefore, never treat such an application as a routine affair. Such a request must always receive a judicial consideration from the Court on the basis of the reasons offered therefor and the same must be decided, as early as possible, after proper application of mind and after due appreciation of all grounds justifying a deviation from the normal and commanded course of law. A decision on such an application, when it is filed, should not be delayed as such a delay could lead to unnecessary legal complications.