I. MAHMUD, J.-Constitutional Petitions Nos. 444, 694, 807, 810, 813 and 814 of 1974, No. 1229/1975 and No. 913/1977 raise a common question of law relating to the territorial jurisdiction of the Pakistan Coast Guards. The short question is whether the several places in` the City of Karachi from where the petitioners were either arrested or where their houses or shops were searched and goods seized, are within the "limits of the port" of Karachi or whether they are comprised in the "costal area", as defined in the Pakistan Coast Guards Act, 1973. These petitions have been heard together and will be disposed of by this judgment.
2. In Constitutional Petitions Nos. 444, 810, 813 and 814 of 1974, the places in question are the Jamia Cloth Market and the Noor Cloth Market, Karachi in which petitioners had their shops. The shops were raided by the Coast Guards on 30th March and 2nd May, 1974 and some alleged smuggled foreign cloth was recovered and seized. After arresting the petitioners, the Officer of the Coast Guards lodged first information reports at his Headquarters for offences under section 156(8) and
(89) of the Customs Act, 1969. After completing the investigations, he submitted charge-sheets against the petitioners in the Court of the Special Judge (Customs and Texation), Karachi. At the same time, upon his reports the respondent, Deputy Collector of Customs, Karachi, initiated adjudication proceedings, as a result of which, orders were passed for confiscating the seized foreign cloth and imposing penalties on the respective petitioners. The main contention of these petitioners is that the Pakistan Coast Guards had no authority or jurisdiction to exercise functions and powers of officers of customs under section 14 of the Pakistan Coast Guards Act, 1973 in the places in question in the city of Karachi which, according to them, were within "the limits of the port" of Karachi and as such, excepted from "coastal area" as defined in the First Schedule to the said Coast Guards Act. These petitioners have, therefore, challenged the actions of the Coast Guards in the matter of search, seizure and their arrest as being illegal and without lawful authority and they further pray that the criminal proceedings pending before the Special Judge, may be quashed and the adjudication proceedings taken before the Customs authorities may be declared illegal and set aside.
3. The petitioner in Constitutional Petition No. 694/1974, was residing in a house in the Pakistan Employees Cooperative Housing Society Area, Karachi. His house was searched by an officer of the Pakistan Coast. Guards on 29th November, 1973 and 46 diamonds said to be smuggled, of the value of Rs. 31,000, were recovered and seized. After lodging first information report with his Headquarters for offences under section 156 (8) and (89) of the Customs Act, 1969, the officer submitted a charge-sheet in the Court of the Special Judge (Customs and Taxation), Karachi. The petitioner thereupon moved an application before the Special Judge praying that the proceedings be dropped against him on the ground that the Coast Guards had no jurisdiction in the area of the P. E. C. H. Society, Karachi, which was within "the limits of the port" of Karachi and as such excepted from the "coastal area" and therefore cognizance taken by the Special Judge on the final report of the Coast Guards was without jurisdiction. The contention of the petitioner was not accepted by the Special Judge with the result that the application of the petitioner was rejected. At the same time, adjudication proceedings were taken by the respondent Deputy Collector of Customs, who after hearing the petitioner passed an order holding that the petitioner had failed to prove lawful import of the diamonds. Accordingly, he ordered their confiscation and imposed a penalty. The petitioner has challenged the validity of the order of the Special Judge taking cognizance of the case, as also the order passed by the respondent Deputy Collector of Customs, as being without lawful authority and void.
4. In Constitutional Petitions Nos. 807/1974 and 1229/1975 the places in dispute were situate in the Garden East and the Fish Harbour areas of Karachi. In Constitution Petition No. 807/1974 the petitioner had purchased a "Mercedez Benz" car bearing registration No. S. R. 578 from one Muhammad Afzal who had registered it in his name at Sanghar. On receiving information that the car was allegedly smuggled, the Coast Guards seized it from the house of the petitioner in Garden East, Karachi on 25th June, 1974. On the matter being reported to the Customs authorities, the respondent Deputy Collector of Customs initiated adjudication proceedings against the petitioner with a show-cause notice addressed to him as also to Muhammad Afzal, which resulted in the passing of the impugned order ordering confiscation of the car under section 156 (89) of the Customs Act on the ground that the petitioner, as also Muhammad Afzal, who remained absent, had failed to establish that the car was lawfully imported. A penalty was also imposed in lieu of confiscation in addition to the duty leviable thereon.
5. The case of the petitioner in Constitution Petition No. 1229/75 is that he had purchased a "Toyota Corona" car from respondent Haji Zakaria, who had himself purchased it from respondent Hashim under an import permit, but the Pakistan Coast Guards had seized the car while it was in the Fish Harbour, Karachi, alleging that it had been illegally imported on a forged import permit. Thereafter, upon a report by the Pakistan Coast Guards, adjudication proceedings were initiated by the respondent Deputy Collector of Customs with a show-cause notice, issued to the respondents Hashim and Haji Zakaria. But only Haji Zakaria contested the case, which ended in the impugned order ordering confiscation of the car under sec--petition 156(9) of the Customs Act and a fine in lieu of confiscation as well as a penalty on respondent Hashim. The petitioners in these two cases have challenged the orders of adjudication and have raised the same conten--petition that the Coast Guards had no territorial jurisdiction in the places in the Garden East and Fish Harbour areas which are within "the limits of the port of Karachi" and as such, expressly excepted from "coastal areas" as defined in the Coast Guards Act.
6. The place in dispute in Constitutional Petition No. 913/1977 was the Super Highway, Karachi. The petitioner's case is that he owned Truck No. RIB 7294 which was stopped and searched by the field staff of the Pakistan Narcotics Board on the Super Highway on 27th August 1975. As the truck was found to be carrying foreign cloth and betal nuts instead of narcotics, the truck containing the seized goods was handed over to the Coast Guards, who reported the matter to the Customs authorities. Accord--ingly, the respondent Deputy Collector of Customs initiated adjudication proceedings after issuing show-cause notices to the occupant of the truck and the previous owner, and as they failed to prove lawful import of the seized goods, he passed order for confiscation of the goods under section 156 (89) of the Customs Act, and imposed penalty of Rs. 10,000 on each of the occupants of the truck and Rs. 1,000 on the guide. The truck was also ordered to be confiscated and a penalty of Rs. 10,000 was imposed on the petitioner, as its owner. The petitioner filed an appeal, but as he had failed to deposit the penalty amounts, the Collector of Customs rejected his appeal. In this petition, the petitioner has raised several grounds attacking the impugned orders passed by the Deputy Collector and Collector of Customs. But only one ground has been pressed before us, that with regard to the territorial jurisdiction of the Coast Guards to act within the area of the Super Highway, Karachi.
7. The Pakistan Coast Guards has been constituted and maintained as a Force by the Federal Government, under the Pakistan Coast Guards Act, 1973, to effectively check smuggling of any kind across the frontiers of Pakistan in the coastal area in the Arabian Sea. With this object in view, the Act provides that certain functions of officers of customs under the Customs Act, 1969, may be entrusted to the Coast Guards by the Central Board of Revenue under section 6 of the Customs Act, to enable them to function in certain defined coastal area of the Provinces of Sind and Baluchistan.
As, however "the limits of the various ports in those areas" have been expressly excluded from the definition of "coastal area" mentioned in the First Schedule to the Act, the main controversy in these petitions is with regard to the meaning to be assigned to the word "port" and "limits of the port" in section 14(1) of the Pakistan Coast Guards Act, 1973.
8. Section 14 of the Pakistan Coast Guards Act, 1973 and the definition of "coastal area" may now be reproduced. Section 14 reads as follows :--- "14. Powers of the officers of the Force.-(1) The officers and members of the force shall perform such functions of officers of customs as may be entrusted to them and exercise such powers under the Customs Act, 1969 (IV of 1969), as may be delegated to them under section 6 of that Act for the purposes of prevention of smuggling along the coastal areas of the Provinces of Sind and Baluchistan, excepting the limits of the various ports in those areas.
(2) In addition to the powers conferred under subsection (1), the officers and junior commissioned officers of the Force shall exercise all the powers conferred on the officer in charge of a police station under the Police Act, 1861 (V of 1861), and under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898)."
The relevant Notification dated 3rd January, 1973 issued by the Central Board of Revenue under section 6 of the Customs Act, 1969 reads as follows :--- "S. R. O. 30 (1)/73.-In exercise of the powers conferred by section 6 of the Customs Act, 1969 (IV of 19691, the Central Board of Revenue is pleased to entrust the functions of officers of customs under sections 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, sub--sections (1), (3) and (4) of section 168, sections 169 and 171 of the said Act to all officers of the Coast Guards not below the rank of Junior Commissioned Officer within their respective jurisdictions."
"Coastal area" has been defined in the First Schedule to the said Act as follows :---- "FIRST SCHEDULE [See section 2 (i)] Southern strip of the Province of Baluchistan along and astride the existing road emanating from the Pak-Iran border connecting the towns of Man-Turbat-Hoshab-Bazdar-Bela-Uthal, to Hub River (Bundmurad) and also the southern area of the Province of Sind along and astride the line and road from Sub River-(Bundmurad)--Gadap-Sari Sing-Thano Bulakhan-Bano-Mirpur Bataro-Jatti to the Arabian Sea but excluding the limits of any port in those areas."
9. It is the submission of counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Syed Muzaffar Hussain Shah, whose submissions were adopted by Mr. Mufti Aleemuddin for the other petitioners that Karachi being a port and the disputed places in these petitions being within the limits of the port, they were excluded from the "coastal area". Their submission further is that the word "port" should be given the same meaning as the port declared for customs purposes as a "customs-port" under section 11
(a) of the repealed Sea Customs Act, 1878, which declaration is deemed to continue in force under the corresponding section 9 of the Customs Act, 1969. Counsel referred to the following Central Board of Revenue Notification, which is Annexure 'A' to the additional affidavit of the petitioner dated 22-2-1975 in Constitutional Petition No. 444/1974 :---- "In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of section 11 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 (VIII of 1978), and in supersession of all previous notifications declaring ports in the Federal Capital, Karachi and in Sind under the said clause, the Central Board of Revenue hereby declares the following places to be ports for the shipment and landing of goods, namely :----- Federal Capital----------------------Chief Port, Karachi.
Sind -------------------Ketibandar Shahbandar.
(C. B. R. Notification No. 47, dated the 16th July, 1932, as amended by Notification No. 49, dated the 30th July, 1932)."
It was contented by counsel that by this Notification, the City of Karachi has been declared the Chief Port in the (then) Federal Capital Area, as a Customs-port. With regard to other ports in the coastal area, counsel also referred to section 9(d) of the Customs Act, 1969 under which the Central Board of Revenue may declare the places which alone shall be ports for carrying on coastal trade with any specified customs-ports in Pakistan. According to counsel the various places in the city of Karachi in dispute, where the alleged offences were committed, being within the "limits of the port" of Karachi, were excluded from "coastal area". Therefore the Coast Guards bad no jurisdiction in these places in the city to arrest, investigate, seize and challan the petitioners with the result that all consequential actions initiated by the Coast Guards were also without lawful authority. In these excepted areas, it is contended by counsel, only officers of customs had jurisdiction to act in relation to the offences under the Customs Act, 1969 and to follow the special procedure therein prescribed. Counsel referred to The State v. Hamtho (1971 SCMR 686). In that case, an accused person was challaned before a Magistrate by a Police Officer for an offence under section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 in accordance with the procedure under the Criminal Procedure Code. The conviction was set aside by the Sessions Judge on the ground that the Police Officer had no authority to investigate and challan the accused for the special offence under the Sea Customs Act, under the procedure of the Criminal Procedure Code. The acquittal was upheld on appeal by the Karachi Bench of the erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan. The Supreme Court in refusing leave to appeal to the State, observed that it was well-settled that where a statute has created a special offence and lays down a special procedure for the trial of such offence, it is that procedure that must be followed and not the ordinary procedure.
10. Mr. Shah Jamil Alam, learned Deputy Attorney-General appearing on behalf of the respondent Pakistan Coast Guards and the Collector of Customs, drew our attention to Notification dated 2nd May 1940, issued by the Government of British India under section 5 of the Ports Act, 1908, declaring the limits of the port of Karachi, for purposes of the said Act. These limits appear to be somewhat wider than the limits of the port as understood in its ordinary meaning, as a place for the loading and discharging of goods or for embarkation and disembarkation of passengers. He also referred to a Notification dated 26th August, 1897 issued by the Governor of Bombay, declaring the limits of the port of Karachi under section 11 (b) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 for purposes of shipment and landing of goods. These limits also appear to be somewhat different from the limits declared under the Ports Act and are also different from the limits of the port, as understood in its ordinary sense which will be presently disclosed. The submission of the learned Deputy Attorney-General is that whichever of these statutory limits of the port of Karachi are taken into consideration, the fact is that the places in question fall outside those limits and are within the "Coastal area" as defined in the First Schedule.
11. I have considered the submission of counsel for the Parties. In my opinion, reliance by counsel on the several Notifications abovemen--tioned is misconceived for the following reasons. In the first place, neither the word "port" nor the "limits of the various ports" in the coastal areas have been defined in the Pakistan Coast Guards Act, 1973. Therefore, in the absence of the incorporation by reference to other enactments defining the word "port" for the purpose of those Acts, no reference can be made to them to ascertain the meaning of the word "port" in the Coast Guards Act. It is a well-settled rule of interpretation that it is not permissible to refer to other enactments, which are in pari marteria or which do not deal with the same "sub--ject-matter, nor have the same object and purposes in view. In this connection, Craies, on Statute Law, 7th Edition (1971), page 164, states that in construing a word in an Act, caution is necessary in adopting the meaning ascribed to the word in other Acts. He cites a quotation from the speech of Lord Lorebu L. C. In Macbeth & Co. v. Chislett (1910 A C 229). In that case the respondent a workman sued his employers, who were shipowners, to recover damages under the Employers Liability Act, 1880 for injury suffered in an accident which occurred while he was employed on board a steamship in helping to unmoor and warp her from one berth to another across a large dock in Liverpool, England. The ship was taken across by means of a tug and a rope and was at no moment entirely free from quay and did not use her steam or any motive power of her own. The respondent was not one of the ship's crew and had not been to sea for several years. The Employers Liability Act, 1880, applied to the workmen but excluded "seaman" from the operation of the Apt. It was contended on behalf of the appellant shipowner that the respondent was a "seaman" on the ground that the Court was bound by the interpretation of the word "seaman" given in the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854. The contention was rejected by the House of Lords unanimously on appeal in which Lord Loreburn, Lord Chancellor observed as follows :---- "I see no reason for introducing that Act in the construction of the word "seaman". The statute we are concerned with does not say that you are to apply the Act of 1854; and it would be a new tenor in the construction of Acts of Parliament if we were required to limit a word to an unnatural sense because in some Act, which is not incorporated or referred to such an interpretation is given to it for the purposes of that Act alone."
The meaning of the word "Seaman" was construed in its ordinary signification as in common use, meaning a person who was by vocation a sea-fearing man and who at the time of the accident was employed in the ordinary duties of a seaman. This rule was applied by the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Mohammad Mohyuddin v. Emperor (AIR 1946 Lah. 164), that a word in a later enanctment cannot ordinarily be construed with reference to the meaning given to those or similar words in an earlier statute. It is also an accepted rule of interpretation of a general word used in a statute dealing with matters relating to the general public, that the word is to be interpreted in the B popular sense, as commonly understood. See Maxwell on "Interpretation of Statutes", 12th Edition (1969), page 81, Craies (p. Cit. Page 162 says that "the first rule is that general statutes will prima facie be presumed to use words in their popular sense" and that the obvious popular meaning of the word should, as a general rule, be followed.
12. In its popular meaning, the word "port" has been defined in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 3rd Edition, page 1631 as :--- "the place by the shore where the ships may run in for shelter from storm or a load and unload; a harbour; a haven; a town possessing a har--bour and which vessels resort to load and unload, from which they start or at which they finish their voyage; specifically a place where customs officers are stationed to supervise the entry of goods."
Stroud's "Judicial Dictionary of words and phrases", 4th Edition, 1974, Volume 4, page 2053 gives various meanings of the word port. In its natural meaning, it is a place where ships may conveniently come for safety against storm or a place where ships may load and unload cargo or take passengers. The word also includes something that is artificial such as docks, quays, wharves, warehouses, shades. In the case of Sailing-ship "Garston" Co. v. Hicke & Co. (15 Q B D 580), it was held that the word "port" in a charter-party is to be understood in its popular, or business. Or commercial sense, it does not in such a document necessarily mean the port as defined for revenue or pilotage purposes. I am therefore of the view that the word "port" in section 14(1) of the Coast Guards Act, is to be interpreted in its ordinary popular sense as meaning, the place intended for landing and shipment of goods and passengers. Had the Legislature intended to give a different meaning to the word port in the Coast Guards Act, nothing could have been easier than to define the word port to mean "customs-port" as defined in the Customs Act, 1969 or even a port as defined in the Ports Act, 1908. Similarly, the words "limits of the port" in their ordinary popular or commercial sense mean (apart from waters across the shore or river with which we are not concerned), the land comprised within the boundary of the port area and includes the docks, quays, sheds, open spaces, warehouses, etc., which are usually and customarily used in connection with loading and unloading of goods or passengers or for customs purposes. It would be unresonable to suggest that the places in dispute in these petitions in Karachi such as Garden East, P. E. C. H. S. Area, Jamia Cloth and Noor Market and the Super Highway, -which have no connection with ships and shipment of goods or passengers, are within the limits of the port area. It is not difficult to understand why the port area has been expressly excluded from the Coastal area and from the territorial jurisdiction of the Coast Guards. Perhaps, the reason is that in port areas, officers of customs, as well the port authority normally function, who already have requisite powers to detect cases of smuggling of goods.
13. It was next contended by Mr. Syed Muzaffar Hussain Sbah that the disputed places were outside the coastal area as defined in the First Schedule to the Coast Guards Act. This submission is devoid of any substance. We were shown a Government of Pakistan Survey map of the Province of Sind.
We marked the boundaries of the coastal area thereon as defined in the First Schedule and found that the boundary line from the Province of Baluchistan enters the Karachi Division at Bund Murad on the Hub River and passes through Gadap and then goes up to Sari Singh in Dadu District, cutting across the Karachi Division. The territory of the coastal area thus bounded embraces a large area of the Karachi Division and patently included the disputed places in question in these petitions.
14. In our opinion and for the foregoing reasons we find that these petitions are without merit. They are accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances we make no order as to costs.