1. M. R. KHAN, J.--.These two petitions for special leave involve a common question of law, and this order will dispose of both of them.
2. The point involved is whether Rashid Ahmad, the petitioner of Petition No. 190 of 1969 and Ghulam Hassan and Muhammad Asadullah, the petitioners of Petition No. 191 of 1969 were duly declared to be touts under -section 36 of the Legal Prac--titioners Act.
3. The High Court Bar Association, Lahore, at a special general meeting convened on the 9th September 1967, passed a unanimous resolution stating that as many as 20 persons named therein, including the present petitioners, habitually act as touts. These 20 persons also included two Advocates, namely, Raja Maula Dad and Raja Muhammad Ayub. It was further resolved to send the names of those 20 persons to the High Court of West Pakistan for placing their names on the list of touts. A learned Single Judge of the High Court proceeded against those persons other than the two Advocates against whom disciplinary action was being taken under the provisions of the Bar Council Act. The learned Judge gave the petitioners and others an opportunity of defending themselves and took down evidence and thereafter declared the 18 persons including the present petitioners to be touts. The persons who had been declared as touts took Letters Patent Appeals against the decision of the learned Single Judge. A Division Bench of the High Court held that the appeals are not competent under clause 10 of the Letters Patent as the order made by the learned Single Judge under section 36 of the Legal Practitioners Act, in their opinion, is not a `judgment', but is merely an admi--nistrative or disciplinary order regulating the functioning of the Courts. The learned Judges found no merits either in any of the appeals. Accordingly, all the appeals including the appeals preferred by the present petitioners were dismissed by the Letters Patent Bench. The special leave petitions are directed against the orders of the Letters Patent Bench dismissing the appeals of the petitioners.
4. According to the Explanation to section 36 (1) of the Legal Practitioners Act, the resolution of the High Court Bar Associa--tion was itself an evidence of the general repute of the persons proceeded against. The validity of this resolution was attacked before the Letters Patent Bench on the ground that the resolution was not passed at a meeting of the High Court Bar Association duly called for the purpose. The learned Judges of the Letters Patent Bench repelled this contention with reasons. The validity of the resolution of the High Court Bar Asso--ciation which mainly formed the foundation of the order declaring the petitioners to be touts has been challenged in these petitions also. It appears that Bashir Ahmad, one of the 18 persons declared as touts, sought special leave to appeal against the same judgment of the Letters Patent Bench, but this Court, by its order, dated the 10th June 1969, in Civil Petition No. 143 of 1969, considered the question whether the meeting of the High Court Bar Association was duly con--vened and, after taking into consideration the various facts and the relevant rules of the High Court Bar Association, rejected the plea that the meeting of the High Court Bar Association was not duly convened. In fact, Bashir Ahmad an outsider was found to have no locus standi to impugn the proceedings of the meeting at which the resolution in question was passed. The order of this Court in Civil Petition No. 143 of 1969 has been reported in 1969 SCMR 746. The conten--tion raised in the present petitions with regard to the validity of the resolution of the High Court Bar Association is covered by the order of this Court in Civil Petition No. 143 of 1969, and we do not see any warrant for taking a different view.
5. Mr. M. Anwar Buttar, learned counsel for the petitioner No. 2 in Petition No. 191 of 1969 additionally submits that the petitioner No. 2 of that petition being a son of the Advocate, Raja Maula Dad cannot be held to be a tout. This contention has no logic behind it and must be rejected as untenable.
6. Both the petitions are dismissed.