1. MIR HAZAR KHAN KHOSO, J.-The petitioner Seth Pehlaj R.I has assailed, under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the decision dated 25th November, 1975, of the Member, Board of Revenue Baluchistan, whereby he had declared, one Mst. Bhoji having died heirless in India and her property situated in Sibi Town, which is alleged to have been mortgaged to the petitioner under mortgage deed after Partition of the sub-continent, to escheat to the State.
2. The necessary facts leading to this petition are that there is Property Bearing Nos.4-2/91, 4-2/91-2, 4-2/91-3, 4-2/91-4, 4-2/74 and 4-2/78 situated on Masjid Road, Sibi, which was owned in equal shares by joint Hindu family of Tejumal and Wheramal. Tejumal died before birth of Pakistan, whereas Wehramal migrated to India and his property was treated as evacuee property. The other half of the property devolved upon Mst. Bhoji widow of Tejumal with limited interest as Hindu widow's Estate. Under legal necessity Mst. Bhoji mortgaged her property with constructive possession to the petitioner on 4th August 1969 through a written deed with the condition, if the mortgage was not redeemed within a year, the mortgage shall be considered as a sale. The respondents Nos. 2 to 6 were the tenants in possession of the premises except House No. 4-2/91-1.
3. They questioned the alienation before the concerned authority. However the petitioner on basis of the written deed requested the Tehsildar-Sub-Registrar, Sibi for its registration. The alienation being disputed one the sub-Registrar solicited instructions from the Deputy Commissioner, Sibi, who advised him to restrain from registering the document, except on decision from a competent Court of law. Despite that the Sub-Registrar registered the document on 20th November 1969. After getting the document registered, the petitioner Pehlaj brought ejectment proceedings under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance against some of `the tenants.
4. Those tenants resisted the proceedings and challenged the ownership of Pehlaj R.I on the ground that the mortgage deed was a forged and fictitious one. However, the Rent Controller, Sibi vide his order dated 31st January, 1975 ordered ejectment of the tenants. The same ejectment orders were upheld in first and second appeals before District Court and High Court of Baluchistan, in favour of the petitioner. Thereafter, the respondents Nos. 2 to 6 challenged the validity of alleged mortgage deed in the Court of Civil Judge, Sibi. Before any decision could be arrived at by the Court, the respondents Nos. 2 to 6 moved a Miscellaneous Application before the respondent No. 1, the Member, Board of Revenue, and prayed that property in dispute be resumed as escheat to the State. The Member, Board of Revenue acceded to their request and passed the impugned order on 25th November 1975. He held :- ---
(i) that Mst. Bhoji could not have mortgaged the property as she had limited right and interest therein;
(ii) that the mortgage deed was a disputed document, which did not confer any right upon the petitioner;
(iii) that Mst. Bhoji died heirless in India, and the property automatically escheated to the State.
5. At the outset, it was vehemently contended by Mr. Burney the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Member, Board of Revenue had no authority under any law for having passed the impugned order. The learned counsel argued that such adjudication could have been sought by a regular suit in a civil Court of law, but not from the Member, Board of Revenue. He maintained that the respondents Nos. 2 to 6 had already instituted a suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Sibi whereby they had impeached the mortgage deed. According to the learned counsel, the alienation was already a sub judice matter, the Member, Board of Revenue had to wait for its adjudication. The learned counsel further argued that a tenant under section 116 of the Evidence Act was stopped from challenging title of a landlord.
6. Mr. Burney invited our attention to sections 43(4), 59, 61(A), 64, 175, 176 and 190 to 210 of Hindu Law by Mulla. He in support of his contentions, relied on citations of Privy Council in cases of The Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavaly Vencate Narrainaph (8 Moore's Ind. App. 500) and Gridhari Lall Roy v. The Bengal Govern--ment (12 Moore's Ind. App. 448).
7. The contentions of Mr. Burney were vehemently repudiated by Mr. Hanafi, Mr. Munawar Ahmed Mirza, the learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 2 to 6 and Mr. S. H. Jafary, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1. They contended that----
(i) the impugned order 'of the Member, Board of Revenue was a legal order; .
(ii) the process of escheat to State is an automatic process which needed no order from any authority. The disputed property automatically vested in the State;
(iii) the petitioner had no locus standi to bring the constitutional petition;
(iv) the document was ab initio, illegal, void and had no legal value at all, hence did not need any such adjudication from a Court;
(v) disputed questions of facts were involved in the matter as such the petitioner had to get relief by a suit but not in a writ petition;
(vi) the relief under writ petition being the discretional one could not be allowed to aid retention of ill-gotten wealth by the petitioner.
8. The learned counsel fortified their contentions by relying on case-law reported id Kundan and others v. Secretary of State for India and others (AIR 1926 Lah. 673), Secretary of State v. Firm Girdhari Lal Nath (AIR 1932 All. 220), Noor Mahomed v. Mst. Sardar Khatun and others (PLD 1951 Sind 1), The Municipal Committee, Sargodha v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1957 Lah. 752) and Wall Muhammad and others v. Sakhi Muhammad and others (PLD1974SC.106).
9. The quintessence of the dispute before us was--
(i) whether the respondent No. 1 had the jurisdiction to pass the impugned order or (ii) the dispute had to be adjudicated by a civil Court.
10. To appreciate the complexity involved in the matter, it would be pertinent to look into the relevant provisions of Hindu Law governing the facts of this case, before going further into the discussions.
11. The relevant sections of Hindu Law are reproduced here for convenience :- Section 6. Persons governed by Hindu Law.--The Hindu Law applies-
(i) not only to Hindus by birth, but also the Hindus by religion, i.e. Converts to Hinduism.
12. Section 22. Two systems of inheritance.---There are two systems of inheritance amongst the Hindus in British India, namely the Mitakshara system and the Dayabhaga system. The Dayabhaga system prevails in Bengal ; the Mitakshara system in other parts of British India.
13. Section 25. Female heirs.---According to the Bengal, Banares and Mithila schools, there are only five females who can succeed as heirs to a male, namely, the widow, Section 26. Limited estate of females--
(2) Females succeeding as heirs, whether to a male or to a female, take a limited estate in the property inherited by them.
14. Section 43(4).----Where a Hindu dies leaving only one widow, she can alien--ate her life-interest in the property inherited by her from her husband, but slice cannot alienate the corpus of the property except for legal necessity.
15. Section 59. Escheat.----(1) On failure of all the heirs mentioned above, the Crown takes by escheat.
(2) An estate taken by escheat is subject to the trusts and charges, if any, previously affecting the estate, e.g., maintenance of widows, and mortagages created by a widow for legal necessity, but not to un--authorised alienations by widows.
16. Section 175. Reversioners.----(1) The heirs of the last full owner, who would be entitled to succeed to the estate of such owner on the death of a widow or other limited heirs, if they be then living, are called "reversioners". A reversioner may be a male or a female.
(2) Interest 'of reversioners.-The interest of a reversioner is an interest expectant on the death of a limited heir.
(3) ----------------------------------------- Section 176. Widow's estate.---A widow or other limited heir is not a tenant-for-life, but is owner of the property inherited by her, subject to certain restrictions on alienation, and subject to its devolving upon the next heir of the last full owner upon her death. The whole estate is for the time vetted in her, and she represents it completely.
17. Section 185-A: Persons entitled to impeach unauthorized alienations. --The persons entitled to impeach unauthorized alienations by a widow or other limited heir are obviously the next reversioners.
18. Section 190. Election by reversioner.-(1) An alienation by a widow of her husband's estate without legal necessity is not altogether void, but only voidable by the next reversioner. He may affirm it, or he may treat it as a nullity. If he elects to affirm it, he will be precluded from exercising his right to avoid it and from questioning the transaction. The election may be made after the reversion has fallen into possession or even before.
(2) The above rule applied not only to male but also to female reversioners.
19. Section 205. Declaratory suit in cases of unauthorised alienations.--(1)--- Where a widow or other limited heir alienates property inherited by her in contravention of the provisions of section 178, the next reversioner, though he has no interest higher than a chance of succession, may institute a suit in her lifetime for a declaration that the alienation is not binding on the reversioner, and if the facts are proved the Court may pass a decree declaring that the alienation is not valid beyond the lifetime of the limited heir, sections 175, 202. As to limitation see section 208.
(2) The reversioners, however, are not bound to institute a declaratory suit. They are not obliged to take any action in the lefetime of the limited heir. They may wait until the estate vests in them on her death, and then sue the alienee for possession of the property.
20. Section 207. Who may sue for injunction or for declaratory decree.-It is not the law that any one who may have a possibility of succeeding on the death of a widow or other limited heir can maintain a suit for an injunction or for a declaratory decree for otherwise every one in the line of succession, however remote, would have a right to sue. The right to sue rests in the first instance with the next reversioner. The reversioner next after him is not entitled to sue, unless---- (i)----------------------------------------- (ii)----------------------------------------- Section 208. Declaratory suits and limitation.-(1) A suit by a reversioner for a declaration that an alienation made by a widow or other limited heir is void except for her life must be brought within 12 years from the date of the alienation (the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Schedule 'I', Article 125.
(2) -----------------------------------------------.
21. Section 209. Reversioner's suit for possession and limitation.----A suit by reversioners, entitled to succeed to the estate on the death of a widow or other limited heir, for possession of immovable property from an alienee from her must be brought within twelve years from her death (the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Schedule 1, Article 141), and of movable property, within six years from that date.
22. Dealing with the facts of the instant case, it is an admitted position that 4lst. Bhoji is or was a Hindu by her birth and as such her case was to be dealt with under the provisions of Hindu Law. There are two thoughts of Hindu Schools in the sub-continent of Indo-Pakistan:
(1) The Dayabhaga, and
(2) The Mitakshara.
23. The former prevails in Bengal whereas the latter is in vogue in the remaining parts of the sub- continent including this part of the country. Mst. Bhoji being resident of Sibi of Baluchistan is governed by latter school. Evidently, the matter before this Court was to be dealt with by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law. In absence of male successor to Tejumal, Mst. Bhoji inherited his property. Being a female successor to her husband, her husband's property devolved upon her as widow's Estate."
24. "(1) The estate taken by a widow in property inherited by her from her husband may best be described by saying that she is the owner thereof, except that she cannot sell the corpus of the property or mortgage it, or male a gift of it, or grant leases thereof for a long term, or otherwise alienate it, unless it be for legal necessity or for the benefit of the estate or with the consent of the ex-reversioners. When an alienation is made by her for a legal necessity or with the absolute estate to the alienee to the same extent as an alienation made by a full owner.
(2) ----------------------------------------- (3)-------------------------------------
(4) She can sell her life interest in the property or mortgage it or make a gift of it to anyone she likes. She is entitled to the whole income of the property. She may spend the income in any way she likes, she is not bound to pay her husband's debts out of the income, nor is she bound to maintain the members of her husband's family out of the income or to perform their marriage ceremonies out of the income. She can throw the burden of all these charges on the corpus of the property, and sell or mortgage the same to meet those expenses, such expenses being regarded in law as legal necessities.
25. (5)------------------------------------
(6) The limitations imposed upon her estate are not imposed upon her for the benefit of reversioners, they are inseparable from her estate, so that even if there be no reversioners, she cannot alienate the corpus of the property except for a legal necessity. If she does alienate it without legal necessity, then if there be no reversioners, the alienation may be set aside by the Crown taking the property by escheat.
(7) A widow cannot by any act or declaration of her own, while retaining possession of her husband's estate, give her possession or estate a character different from that attaching to the possession or estate of a Hindu widow."
26. Manifestly, a Hindu widow could alienate her "life interest" in a property inherited by her from her husband. But she could not alienate the corpus of the property, except under legal necessity. In case she without legal necessity alienates the corpus of the property then on her death, they reversioners would not be bound down by such alienation as the same having been made without legal necessity. However, such alienation is not alto--gether void but only voidable. It could be affirmed by the next reversioner. He may affirm it or may treat it as nullity. Besides, reversioner could impeach the unauthorized alienation, either during her lifetime or after her death. The provisions of section 185(A) of the Hindu Law enunciate that reversioner alone could impeach such alienation. Besides the law provides that any person having interest in the succession including the State claiming by escheat is entitled to impeach such alienation. It is an admitted position of this case that neither the State nor any other reversioner having interest in the succession has impeached the alienation. Albeit alienation has been challenged by the tenants of the premises by a civil suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Sibi. We would certainly refrain from commenting whether the tenants have the right to impeach the alienation or not. Naturally our comment would prejudice case of parties. Besides it would embarrass or influence the decision of the trial Court.
27. It was alleged by the petitioner that Mst. Bhoji has alienated the premises under legal necessity. If the property was really alienated under legal necessity by her, then the alienation would be valid one and would confer absolute right of ownership on the petitioner Pehlaj R.I. On the other hand, if the alienation was made without legal necessity then the alienation would not bound down the reversioners, and on her death, reversioners would succeed to the estate.
28. The respondents have challenged the alienation as a false and fictitious one. The plain heading of the alleged mortgage deed revealed that Mst. Bhoji had purported to alienate her property under legal necessity. In either case, the alienation was the main controvertial issue in the matter. We would really refrain from probing into the disputed point of facts. But at the same time for the settlement of the issues, the facts needed adjudication. Disputed facts were-
(i) if the property as actually alienated by Mst. Bhoji;,
(ii) if the reply of the first point is in affirmative, then whether it was made under legal necessity.
29. Naturally thereafter the next question would follow as to who was to resolve such disputed question of facts between the parties. Certainly such facts could not be automatically resolved, but were to be decided by some competent forum and under some provisions of law. Could that forum be----
(i) the civil Court of law, or
(ii) the Member, Board of Revenue, Baluchistan.
30. Indeed the reversioner has not impeached the alienation in the Court of law. However, at the instance of the tenants the Member, Board of Revenue has adjudicated all the disputed facts of law as well of facts on a Miscellaneous Application only. We were very anxious to seek guidance from the parties on this aspect of the case. We had repeatedly asked the respondents to show us, as to under what provisions of law ; the Member, Board of Revenue had entertained the application and passed the impugned order. But to our utter surprise and disappointment, we were neither directly nor indirectly replied on this aspect of the matter. However, the learned defence counsel for the respondents monotonously stressed that the property automatically escheated to the State. In other words they impliedly admitted that the Member, Board of Revenue had no jurisdiction to have passed the impugned order. It was urged by the learned counsel that after death of Mst. Bhoji the property automatically vested in the State. According to them any person having grievance against such transfer would have to establish his better entitlement in civil Court of law. They reiterated that it was not even necessary for the Member, Board of Revenue to have passed the impugned order at all. They maintained that' being functionary of the State, he could resume the property to State. On the other side, it could be said that the Tehsildar-cum-Sub-Registrar was also a functionary of the State, who by his action impliedly confirmed the alienation and made it an absolute one. However, the learned counsel have relied on cases, Noor Muhammad v. Mst. Sardar Khatun and others and The Municipal Committee, Sargodha v. Federation of Pakistan through the Deputy Commis--sioner, Sargodha.
31. "The enacted words are all plain words with well-defined meanings, entirely free from any ambiguity of any kind, or any difficulty created by any conflict or inconsistency in the words enacted. In such a case, the necessity of keeping very strictly to the actual words of the statute, to the strict grammatical meaning of the words, has been emphasised by the Privy Council over and over again, and the tendency to import into the words what is not there or to otherwise depart from the words has been consistently and strongly depreciated."
32. "The term vest is not necessarily a term of art. It pot only means that the thing which vests in a person must vest in him with full proprietary rights attached to it. It also includes the immediate right of user, enjoyment or control over a thing."
33. The learned counsel have further relied on the cases, Kundan and others v. Secretary of State for India and others and Secretary of State v.. Firth Girdhari Lal Shambhu Nath.
34. "Under that law not only is the gift to Ran Singh after the second marriage invalid, but the Crown would have had the power to impeach an unauthorized alienation by Mr. Indi before her remarriage.
35. If there is no proof of a customary rule the question is to be decided in accordance with Hindu Law, subject to any modification of that law by custom which may be proved."
36. "Where there is a vacant inheritance, the property lapses to the Crown by the rule of escheat. The escheat to the Crown is not due to any rule of succession. The right of escheat is a prerogative of the Crown and the said prerogative is recognized universally in every system of civilized jurisprudence. I would emphasise the fact that upon the death of a person without leaving any heirs his estate devolves upon the Crown under its general prerogative and not by the reason of any rule of succession---- Escheat is the vanishing point in the law of inheritance. Where succession ends, escheat begins.
37. Upon general principles, I am of opinion that the Succession Act is not applicable to the Crown, when it takes the property upon escheat."
38. Indeed, we fear to say that the above citations have any relevance with the facts of this case.
39. Besides they do' not support the contentions of the respondents. On the contrary, the case of Kundan supported stand of petitioner to some extent.
40. On the other hand, Mr. Burney has positively drawn our attention to relevant provisions of Hindu Law, which have already been reproduced above. According to him section 185(A) of the Hindu law provides that such disputed unauthorized alienation was to be impeached by the reversioners including the Crown claiming by escheat during lifetime or after the Hindu widow's death. Without impeachment or adjudication it could not be automatically presumed that the alienation was fictitious, false or was made without legal necessity. According to the learned counsel all such facts were to be proved by the succecsors/reverioners in a Court of law.
41. Mr. Burney has fortified his contention by relying on cases Collector of Masulipatem v. Cavely Vencata Narrainapah and Girdharl Lail Roy v. The Bengal Government.
42. "In this case, the question raised was the right of the Government to seize as an escheat a Zemindary, in the Collectorate of Masulipatam, the property of a Hindu of the Brahmin case, who died without heirs, and without an adopted eon.
43. "In this appeal the suit was brought by the Bengal Government against the appellant, to establish the title of the Government, first, on the ground of an escheat, to a Zamindary situated in the Zillah Rungpore, as well as the movable property which had belonged to one Woopendro Chunder Roy, who had died without issue, and also, as it was alleged by the Government, without leaving any other person who was by the Hindu Law entitled to succeed as heir to his immovable and movable estate, and secondly, to eject the appellant from possession of the zemindary.
44. The respondent, therefore, was in the position of a plaintiff to an ordinary suit in the nature of an ejectment. The Government could only recover by the strength of their own title. Accordingly, it lay upon the plaintiff to prove, at least prima facie, that Woopendro Chunder Roy died without heirs, and, on the other hand, the appellant was entitled to defend his possession not only by proof of his own title, but by setting up any jus tertii that might exist."
45. The authorities relied upon by the petitioner clearly indicated that the Crown was arrayed as a party before the Court in either capacity where such alienations were the subject-matter of Hindu "Widow's Estate". The onus was on the State for proving that last reversioner Mst. Bhoji had died heirless. Besides the State taking by escheat had to pay to the trusts any legal charges, if any, previously affecting the estate i.e., maintenance, mortgages etc. There was logic in contentions of Mr. Burney. We have therefore to agree with his submissions.
46. On the other hand, it was incumbent upon the respondents to have satisfied us that----
(1) the property automatically escheated to the State ;
(2) the Member, Board of Revenue had the jurisdiction to declare that-
(i) Mst. Bhoji was dead,
(ii) she had died heirless,
(iii) the alienation was forged, fictitious one or made without legal necessity.
47. Indeed, the provisions of section 158(1) of the Hindu Law enunciate that alienation made by a widow was to be impeached by the reversioners. The section does not show the forum where such alienation was to be impeached. The Hindu Law is silent on this point. Naturally, in view of circumstances, we would have to fall on the general jurisdiction of the civil Courts which is conferred on it by section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code. The section says that the civil Courts shall have the jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Such being the position, we would not hesitate to hold that the alleged alienation should have been impeached by reversioners including the State claiming by escheat in a civil Court having pecuniary as well the territorial jurisdiction over the matter.
48. On these findings, we could very easily say that the Member, Board of Revenue had neither the jurisdiction nor the authority to have passed the impugned order. Besides the property could not automatically be escheated to the State.
49. Indeed, the respondents have miserably failed to rebut the contention of Mr. Burney, besides have failed to substantiate their contentions too. Thus we have no other alternative but to agree with the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner as earlier observed that---
(i) the property did not automatically escheat to the State,
(ii) the Member, Board of Revenue, Baluchistan had no jurisdiction or authority to have passed the impugned order of 25th November, 1975.
50. Under these circumstances, the impugned order is declared as to have been passed without lawful authority.
51. The contention of the respondents that the petitioner had no locus standi to pursue this constitutional petition is also devoid of force. In an unequivocal words it was alleged by the petitioner that Mst. Bhoji had mortgaged the property for consideration of Rs. 16,000 with him. The mortgage was with the condition, if it was not redeemed within a stipulated period, the mortgage should be deemed to be a sale and an absolute sale. According to the learned counsel, the - alienation had created a vested right in favour of the petitioner and the impugned order of the Member, Board of Revenue, Baluchistan manifestly had affected his right in the property. It could hardly be said that the right of the petitioner was not affected by the abovesaid order so as to term him as an aggrieved person with the provi--sions of Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
52. Very recently in cases of Imtiaz Bashir v. Special High Powered Committee through Secretary Health, Government of Baluchistan, Quetta and 4 others Constitution Petition No. 157/77 and Miss Farida Naz v. The High Powered Appellate Committee and 4 others in Constitutional Petition No. 169/77, this Division Bench while dealing with such position has observed as under :---- "It had also been contended by the respondents that the petitioners had no vested right which entitled them to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. This necessitates the reproduction of Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
53. It reads as under :------ "Subject to the Constitution, a High Court may, if it is satisfied that no other adequate remedy is provided by law,-
(a) on the application of any aggrieved party, make an order-
(i) directing a person performing, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province or a local authority to refrain from doing anything he is not permitted by law to do, or to do anything he is required by law to do ; or
(ii) declaring that any act done or proceeding taking within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court by a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province or a Local authority has been done or taken without lawful authority and is of no legal effect ; or Clause (a) of subsection (1) contemplates that action could be taken on an application of any aggrieved party. An action under this Article could be only taken on the motion of aggrieved party alone. Any action which affects interest of a person ; the person becomes "an aggrieved person".
54. Indeed such aggrieved person shall have the locus standi to institute petition under this Article."
55. On the same principles, we do not hesitate to hold that the petitioner is an aggrieved person within the meaning of Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. In view of such circumstances, the petitioner has the locus standi to file the present petition before this Court.
56. The contention of the respondents that the alleged mortgage deed was ab initio, illegal, void and as such, it did not need help of any Court for its cancellation, is also without force. The petitioner in clear words has said that Mst. Bhoji had alienated the property under legal necessity. Indeed, the law recognizes such alienation by a Hindu widow. However under the circumstances, it was yet to be determined, whether the alienation was made under legal necessity or not. The validity of the document yet being under determination, it could not be said that the document was illegal or void at this stage. The case of Wall Muhammad and others v. Sakhi Muhammad and others relied on by the respondents did not help them.
57. The contention of the respondents that disputed questions of facts being involved in the matter, the petitioner had to seek relief by a civil suit from a civil Court is also without force. Indeed, we are always reluctant to probe into such disputed questions of facts involved in the matter. However, we would leave such facts for its decision from a competent authority having jurisdiction to probe into the legality of alleged alienation and to deal with the matter subsequently. Presently our worry is whether the impugned order was passed with lawful or without lawful authority.
58. Earlier we have bled that the Member, Board of Revenue had no lawful authority to pass the order.
59. This objection also met the same fate as the other earlier ones.
60. The last contention of the respondents is that the petitioners were not to be allowed to retain the ill-gotten wealth, I.e., the alienation based on fictitious and forged document, under the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. We have in the preceding paragraph, observed that the validity of the document yet being under determination by a civil Court of law, it could not be presumed that the document was a forged or fictitious one. This contention failed too.
61. We will not touch the contention of Mr. Burney that the respondents being the tenants of the petitioner were barred from challenging the title of the petitioner as it would too prejudice case of the parties pending before the civil Court.
62. For the foregoing reasons, we have reached to a positive conclusion that the impugned order of 25th November, 1975 passed by the Member, Board of Revenue, Baluchistan was without lawful authority, as such the order is declared to be void, illegal and of no legal effect.
63. With these observations, the petition is disposed of.
64. M. A. RASHID, J.-I am in respectful agreement with the conclusions arrived of by my learned brother that the Member, Board of Revenue had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order and that the escheat takes place only upon the happening of certain events ; which events must be proved before a Court of law to claim a property through escheat. And I may add that this proposition of law applies with greater force in cases where possession of the disputed property is not with the State.