The instant petition i,e, C.R. No,105 of 2000, has arisen out of a suit filed by the petitioner, whereas, the other C.R. No,106 of 2000, arises out of the proceedings and the order on the application under section 47 filed by the petitioner, therefore, both these petitions are being disposed of together.
2. There is a chequered history of litigation between the parties, which is abridged to only necessary facts. The dispute between them is pertaining to Plot No,233, situated in Jinnah Colony, Faisalabad. This plot, was purchased by Mst. Ikram Bibi/petitioner, through open auction but the title documents were not yet executed in her favour when she entered into an agreement to sell dated 30-.5-1970, with Imam Din, predecessor-in-interest of respondents Nos.6 to 12, for the consideration of Rs,45,000 out of which, an amount of Rs,23,050"was paid as earnest money by Imam Din to Mst. Ikram Bibi, and the balance was payable on the date of the finalization of the transaction, which as agreed between the parties, was one year. After the demise of Imam Din, his successors, respondents Nos.6 to 12, on 29-5-1973, filed a suit for specific performance, which was contested by Mst. Ikram Bibi and after the framing of issues, the plaintiffs concluded their evidence, but the evidence of Mst. Ikram Bibi, was closed under Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C. However, the suit was decreed on 24-6-1975 in favour of the plaintiffs. This decree was never challenged through any appeal, etc. But Mst. Ikram Bibi filed a suit on 27-10-1977, challenging the aforesaid decree on the basis of fraud, this suit was dismissed, her first and second appeals were also dismissed.
Thereafter, the respondents applied to the Urban Rehabilitation Officer, the auctioning authority for the transfer of the said plot in their favour, which was allowed. Petitioner preferred an appeal, but without any success; then again the petitioner filed a suit challenging the original order dated 7-6- 1976 as also the order in appeal of the URO; she also filed an application under section 47, C.P.C.
This suit was dismissed by the learned trial Court on 30-1-1995, appeal filed by the petitioner, has also been dismissed on 16-10-1999. Hence C.R. No,105 of 2000. The other revision is against the orders passed on the application under section 47, C.P.C. Filed by the petitioner, claiming that the decree on account of its non-execution within the requisite time has lapsed and the petitioner is discharged of his liability under the decree.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that a decree for specific performance by itself does not confer title upon the decree-holder, which remains vested with the judgment-debtor till such time, sale-deed is executed in pursuance of the execution proceedings and because the respondents never sought the execution, resultantly, any transfer made in their favour by the URO, is illegal and unlawful. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the judgments reported as Muhammad Ishaq v. Muhammad Siddique (PLD 1975 Lahore 909) and Haji Abdul Rehman and others v. Noor Ahmed, etc. (PLD 1974 BJ 25). It is also contended that by that time execution petition of the respondents, had become barred by time and therefore, respondents cannot seek the implementation of the original decree dated 24-6-1975. It is further submitted that before giving effect to the decree in its record, the URO never gave any notice to the petitioner, thus petitioner has been condemned unheard. Petitioner has obtained loan from the House Building Finance Corporation, which he repaid and certificate in this behalf was issued on 7-5-1977.
4. Conversely, learned counsel for the respondents contends that the petitioner had earlier filed a suit on 2-9-1980 on identical cause of action, which was subsequently withdrawn without permission of the Court therefore, this suit is hit by Order 23, Rule 1. It is also stated that the suit of legal heirs of Imam Din, simpliciter was not for specific performance. Rather they also sought declaration about the title to the property, which was accordingly decreed and resultantly, there was no need to seek execution of the decree through the process of Court. It is also stated that present contesting respondents in fact had purchased the property in good faith from the legal heirs of Imam Din for a consideration of Rs,5,00,000; the balance amount due to the department which roughly was Rs,21,000 has been paid by the legal heirs of Imam Din and property was duly transferred to them;possession was also with the legal heirs of Imam Din, which stood transferred to the contesting respondents, on account of her purchase. In order to meet the legal argument raised by the petitioner's side, the learned counsel for the respondents states that where the decree itself stands satisfied, there is no need for seeking execution, and resultantly, when department on the basis of the decree, had transferred and conveyed the property in the name of legal heirs of Imam Din, even if they have not sought the execution yet a valid title had passed on to them, which they had further transferred in favour of respondents. In support of his contention, learned counsel has relied upon (Bai Karimabibi Daudbhai v. Abderehman Sayad Banu (1922 Bombay Law Reporter 496), Rup Chand and others v. Allah Jawaya (1922 Lail. 459), Mst. Hussain Bibi v. Siraj Din (PLD 1998 Lahore 548) and National Bank of Pakistan, v. M/s. Ch. Auto & Tools Agency (PLD 2001 Lahore 135).
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Although, a decree for specific performance does not by itself covey or transfer a title of the suit property, upon the decree-holder, who in order to seek the legal title qua the property, has to obtain the execution of a deed of conveyance, which ordinarily is done through the process of execution of the decree, However, there is no bar that the implementation of the decree for specific performance cannot be otherwise made, except through the execution process. It is quite possible that without compelling the decree-holder to initiate the execution proceedings, the judgment-debtor himself executes necessary instrument transferring the title to the decree-holder. In such situation, the decree stands satisfied but without there being any step or the proceedings, conducted by the Court in the execution. According to 1992 Bombay Law Reporter 496, "A decree for specific performance is capable of being executed by the defendants as well as by the plaintiff". The view of 1922 Lahore 459 is that "The decree had been given effect to out of Court though it may not have been technically executed in the sense in which the word is used in the C.P. Code and inasmuch as it had been satisfied, nothing further remained to be done in execution". In judgment reported as PLD 1998 Lahore 548, it is held that "the proposition of law, is well-settled that the Limitation Act merely bars the remedy or Assistance of Court for execution of the decree, but does not extinguish the right or title based on the decree".
6. The ratio of aforesaid judgments supports the view, that notwithstanding the execution process, a decree for specific performance can be given fullest effect of the transfer of the title in the property subject-matter of the decree, otherwise, than taking resort to the execution proceedings under the C.P.C. Applying the above principle to the case in 'hand; when the respondents had applied to the URO, for the execution of the conveyance deed, and the deed had been executed in his favour, it would be deemed to be for and on behalf of the petitioner, because the decree had attained finality and even if any execution was brought by the respondent, the Court in the facts of the case, would have directed the Department to execute the conveyance documents. The petitioner in such an eventuality, would not have been able to resist the execution under any circumstances, as has been conceded by his counsel, when questioned in the Court. Even according to PLD 1975 Lahore 909, the conveyance document can be executed directly by the judgment-debtor or by the Court, to convey a title to the decree-holder. I would advance this principle to a further extent that where the Government Department which is ultimately obliged and responsible for the purpose of conveying the legal title, has given effect to the decree, it would mean to have been done both for and on behalf of the judgment-debtor and the Court. Thus the contention that despite the fact that the deed had been executed in favour of the respondent by the URO, but because the process of the execution under C.P.C. Has not been followed to achieve the goal, the transfer of title be held invalid, is misconceived and has no force, accordingly is hereby repelled. In the light of what has been stated above, both these revision petitions have no force and the same are hereby dismissed.