1. ' MUHAMMAD NAWAZ ABBASI, J.---The above mentioned two appeals by the leave of the Court have been directed against the judgment, dated 14-9-1995 passed by a learned Judge in Chambers of High Court of Balochistan at Quetta in the revisional jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C.
2. ' The relevant facts in the background are that Mirza Faiz Ullah Khan, predecessor-in-interest of the appellants herein filed a suit in 1980 for declaration and permanent injunction in respect of land bearing Khasra No,995 situated in Mauza Aminabad, Halqa Chaghi, Tehsil Dalbindin. It was pleaded in the suit that plaintiff purchased a piece of land measuring 8 Rods, 11 Poles including Khasra No,995, in village Amin Abad from one Sardar Akbar Khan Sanjrani in 1953 through sale deed duly attested and since then was in its possession. It was averred in the plaint that all cultivable land in village Amin Abad originally belonged to Sardar Sanjrani under tribal system who from time to time used to sell the same to different persons and that predecessor-in-interest of the present respondents also purchased some land from Sardar Sanjrani in 1966, adjacent to the land of plaintiffs (predecessor of appellants) which was pre-empted by the appellants. The settlement of the land of village Aminabad was carried out in 1968 for the first time and during the settlement operation predecessor-in-interest of the respondents. In connivance with the revenue officials got incorporated his name as owner of Khasra No,995 in the Revenue Record. It was pleaded that the suit land was bounded by the three sides of the land owned by the appellants whereas tubewell was installed by the Irrigation Department on the request of their predecessor-in-interest.
3. ' The suit was contested by the respondents. In the written statement a preliminary objection relating to the maintainability of the suit being barred by time was raised and on merits it was pleaded that the land purchased by the predecessor-in-interest of respondents was different to that of the land in dispute and that settlement operation of land in village in 1968 was in the knowledge of the appellants. The learned trial Judge in the light of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence produced by them in support of their respective stand held that the suit was barred by time and dismissed the same vide judgment, dated 3-4-1990. The appeal preferred by the appellants against the dismissal of their suit was disposed of by a learned Additional District Judge-II, Quetta who vide judgment, dated 14-12-1991 reversed the judgment of trial Court and decreed the suit in favour of appellants. The respondents challenged the judgment and decree passed in appeal before the High Court through a Civil Revision and the High Court while accepting the revision petition set aside the judgment and decree in appeal and restored the judgment of dismissal -of suit decreed by the trial Court. The appellants through C.P. No,1351 of 1992 sought leave against the judgment of the High Court in which leave was granted and the appeal bearing No,805-Q of 1992 was allowed vide judgment, dated 9-9-1993 and the case was remanded to the High Court was with the following observations:-- ' "We consider, therefore, that a finding on the question of limitation should have followed the determination over the title of the land and thereafter the possession and its nature over the property and the question of limitation attracted to the facts so found established. Hence we accept the appeal, set aside the judgment of High Court and remand it to the High Court for decision on merits altogether without being influenced directly by any observation touching the merits recorded in this judgment."
4. ' The learned Single Judge in the High Court on remand of the case having heard the learned counsel for the parties and discussed the evidence in details, came to the conclusion that the appellants (plaintiffs in the suit) were not the owners of suit land and that suit was also barred by time. Consequently the judgment passed by the learned Additional District Judge-II, Quetta in appeal was set aside and that of the Senior Civil Judge, Quetta was restored.
5. ' The appellants being aggrieved of the judgment passed by the learned Judge in Chambers of High Court of Balochistan in the revisional jurisdiction sought leave to appeal in the Civil Appeal No,1149 of 1995 and in the connected appeal bearing No,1150 of 1995. The leave was granted in these appeals vide order, dated 29-10-1995 and 30-10-1995 respectively in the following terms:-- Civil Appeal No,1149 of 1995.
6. "2. Learned counsel for the petitioners has called our attention to the deed (Exh.P.6) by which the petitioner's predecessor-in-title Mirza Faizullah Khan had purchased this land from Sardar Ali Khan Sangrani and the latter's testimony as the petitioners witness. The document (Exh.P.6) read with Aks Shajra' (Exh.P11) and the testimony of Sardar Ali Khan Sangrani, it is contended, taken alongwith the other material on the record, particularly the document (Exh.P7) by which the dispute as to the boundaries of the disputed land was settled on 18-12-1977 proved the petitioners' title to the land in suit. The documents and the testimony of Sardar Ali Khan Sangrani, it is argued further, were not taken into consideration by the learned Judge in the High Court.
3. The contentions need consideration. Leave to appeal is granted to consider them. The parties shall maintain status quo as to possession during the pendency of the appeal".
7. Civil Appeal No,1150/95 "2. It is contended that it escaped the notice of learned Judge of the High Court that this suit also relates to Khasra No,996 which was not the subject-matter of the earlier suit and in any case the cause of action for the present suit was a fresh cause of action.
3. We have by an order, dated 29-10-1995 in Civil Petition No,115-Q of 1995 granted leave to appeal against High Court's judgment, dated 14-9-1995 whereby the petitioner's earlier suit was dismissed.
8. Further it appears that what led the petitioners to institute this suit was the threatened interference with their possession by the Revenue Officers. We, therefore, grant leave to appeal in this case also."
9. ' Learned counsel for the appellants has contended that the property in dispute was in possession of predecessor-in-interest of the appellants since 1953 and that the predecessor-in-interest of respondents during the settlement of land in 1968 in connivance of revenue officials through misrepresentation and manipulation in the record, got incorporated his name in the Revenue Record as owner of the suit land and disturbed the title of the appellant who on coming to know about the adverse entries in 1980 filed the suit without loss of time and that the High Court through misreading of evidence while coming to a conclusion contrary to the correct legal and factual position, non-suited the appellants. The learned counsel argued that there was sufficient evidence on record to establish that predecessor-in-interest of respondents while taking undue advantage of absence of predecessor-in-interest of appellants in village during the settlement operation arranged incorporation of his name as owner of suit-land. It was argued by the learned counsel that the claim of ownership of land made by respondents would be negated by the fact that the suit land was surrounded from all sides by the land owned by the appellants and further the tubewell was also got installed in the land by the predecessor-in-interest of appellants. However, the learned counsel without pointing out any misreading or non-reading of evidence made an attempt to convince us that concurrent finding of the two Courts on the question of fact was defective and the judgment of the Appellate Court passed in appeal would represent the correct legal and factual position.
10. ' Learned counsel representing the respondents on the other hand has argued that the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents having purchased the land from the original owner was in its possession as owner in his own right and that the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants was never owner of this land.
11. ' We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and also perused the record with their assistance. This is an admitted fact that settlement operation of the land was undertaken in village Amin Abad in 1968 and since then the respondents through their predecessor-in-interest being shown as owners of the land in the Revenue Record. The appellants have not brought on record any document to show that prior to 1968 the disputed land was owned by them in the Revenue Record and the entries relating to their ownership of the land in the Revenue Record were changed in 1968. The learned counsel for the appellants when confronted with this situation he submitted that the land was originally belonged to Sardar Sanjrani which was being regulated under tribal system and prior to 1968 whosoever was in possession of land would be deemed to be its owner.
12. He added that prior to 1968 the appellant having purchased the land from Sardar Sanjrani were in its possession. The learned counsel explained that under tribal system, the land was in control of Sardar Sanjrani as its owner and the predecessor-in-interest of appellants became its owners through said Sardar Sanjrani and also got installed a tubewell in the land by the Irrigation Department.
13. ' The learned counsel thus concluded that in the given facts the adverse entries relating to the ownership of the appellants in the Revenue Record would neither negate their possession of the land with tubewell nor affect their right of ownership.
14. ' The learned Judge in the High Court having diluted upon the controversial question of fact in the light of evidence of the parties, came to the conclusion:-- ' "Perusal of record and statements of witnesses reveal that the respondents/plaintiffs could not prove either the title or possession of the land as described above their own witnesses showed ignorance about the possession of the land whereas on the other hand petitioners/defendants proved their title, ownership and possession. It is admitted fact that the settlement operation was carried out in 1968 of 1969 and the disputed land was entered in the Revenue Record on the name of petitioners after lapse of almost 12 years. If it is admitted for the sake of arguments that the late Mirza Faiz Ullah Khan was not present during the settlement operation but is a fact that Mirza Ismail representative of Mirza Faiz Ullah Khan was very much present when the revenue officials were staying in the house belonging to Mirza Faiz Ullah Khan, therefore, undoubtedly the suit filed by the respondents in the year 1980 for declaration and permanent injunction entries made in the Revenue Record in 1968/1969 was barred by time. In this regard unreported judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court is relevant. Relevant para therefrom is reproduced hereinbelow:-- ' "The explanation tendered by the petitioners for filing suit after about 22 years is hardly believable.
15. It is a matter of common knowledge that when settlement operation commences in a particular village all the owners and persons interested therein participate in the proceedings and at least become aware of it. As regards the other contention, the High Court had taken care of it by itself evaluating the evidence on record and holding that the respondents were in exclusive possession and the respondents were duly supported by entries in the revenue record as far back as 1966, and there was no explanation as to why entries in the revenue record were not challenged by the petitioners for over two decades."
16. ' The judgments cited by Mr. Tahir Muhammad Khan are distinguishable and not applicable in the instant case. As observed hereinabove that the respondents failed to prove their ownership or possession, therefore, it cannot be said that there was any recurring cause of action available to them.
17. ' In view of what has been discussed above the revision petition is accepted and the judgment of learned Additional Judge-II, Quetta is set aside and judgment passed by learned Senior Civil Judge is upheld.
18. ' Parties are left to bear their own costs."
19. The claim of the appellants was that the suit land originally being a barren land was under the control of Sardar Sanjrani under tribal system and they having purchased the same from the said Sardar in 1953 made it cultivatable and were in its possession as owners and in proof thereof they produced a compromise deed executed by Sardar Sanjrani in their favour in 1971 which was incorporated in the Revenue Record. However, it was not deniable that during the settlement operation from 1968 to 1970 the suit land was mutated in the name of predecessor-ininterest of respondents and the appellants also became owner in the village in the Revenue Record in consequence to the settlement operation, therefore, the plea of lack of knowledge of entries in the Revenue Record in the name of respondents was not available to them which was rightly rejected by the High Court. The perusal of record would show that the claim of possession of land as owner of the predecessor-in-interest of appellants prior to the settlement of 1968 was not proved through any evidence. There is also nothing on the record to show that how Sardar Sanjrani acquired the title of ownership of land and in what manner he transferred his title to the predecessor-in-interest of appellants in 1953. It is not disputable that the barren land which is not the private property of any person and is not made part of Revenue Record through settlement is deemed to be the State property. The entire land being of same character was not as such a private property before 1968 in the Revenue Record, therefore, the same would be deemed to be the State owned land, the ownership of which of a private person on the basis of possession would not be recognized in law unless it is specifically established that such person by afflux of time became its owner.
20. ' We having considered the case of the parties in all prospects have come to the conclusion that there can be no exception to the view of the matter taken by the learned Judge in the High Court and suit was rightly dismissed being barred by time and also on merits. The finding on the question of fact relating to the ownership and possession of land arrived at by the High Court cannot be reopened before this Court through the appraisal of evidence.
21. ' For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any substance in these appeals which are dismissed with no order as to costs.