I intend to decide the following revision petitions by one consolidated judgment having similar facts and law arising out of the one consolidated impugned judgment of the First Appellate Court dated 19-3-2002:
(1) C.R. No,620 of 2002.
(2) C.R. No,619 of 2002.
2. The brief facts out of which the present revision petitions arise are that the petitioner secured the open plot from the respondents near General Bus Stand, Okara on rent of Rs,1,125 per month. Rent agreement was also executed to this effect between the parties for a period of three years from 3- 6-1990 to 2-6-1993. Rent was thereafter enhanced from Rs,1,125 to Rs,2,196 per month. The petitioner filed an application to the R.T.A. For sanction of D-type Bus Stand under the provisions of the Punjab Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965 and the rules framed thereunder. The R.T.A. Sanctioned the D-type Bus Stand vide order dated 11-12.01993. N.O.C. Was also issued in favour of the petitioner by the Deputy Commissioner/Deputy Cr liector, Okara. The petitioner fulfilled all the formalities, rules and regulations of the respondents. The petitioner had constructed the building over the plot in question by spending more than Rs,8,00,000. The petitioner never violated the terms and conditions of the agreement and running the business and paying the rent regularly upto now to the respondents. Respondent No,2 sent the eviction notice to the petitioner on 23-4-2001 forthe vacation of the land in question. The petitioner after receiving the aforesaid impugned notice filed two following suits against the respondents before the learned Civil Judge 1st Class, Okara:--
(1) Suit for declaration and permanent injunction. Titled as Abdul Rashid v. M.C., Okara etc.
(2) Suit for permanent injunction. Titled as Abdul Rashid v. Province of Punjab etc. The respondents filed written statement, controverted the allegations levelled in the suit. The learned trial Court consolidated both the suits. Out of the pleadings of the parties the learned trial Court framed the following issues:--
(1) Whether the plaintiff has got no cause of action and locus standi to file this suit? OPD
(2) Whether the plaintiff has not come to the Court with clean hands? OPD
(3) Whether the suits are not maintainable in its present form? OPD
(4) Whether the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order 7, Rule 11, C P.0
(5) Whether the suit is false and frivolous, so the defendants are entitled to recover the special costs under section 35-A, C.P.C.? OPD
(6) Whether the relationship of landlord and tenant still exists between the parties? OPP
(7) Whether Notice No,365 dated 23-4-2001 issued by the defendants isillegal and inoperative and is liable to be annulled? OPP
(8) Whether lease deed between the parties has never been extended or renewed, so the defendants are entitled to eject the plaintiff from the disputed land? OPD
(9) Relief.
3. The learned Civil Judge decreed the suits vide judgment and decree dated 21-2-2002. The respondents have been aggrieved filed two appeals before the learned Additional District Judge, Okara, who accepted the appeals by one consolidated judgment and decree dated 19-3-2002, hence, the aforesaid revision petitions.
4. The learned counsel of the petitioner submits that judgments of both the Courts below are at variance. He further submits that the First Appellate Court reversed the findings of the trial Court without adverting to the reasoning of the trial Court. He further submits that petitioner did notviolate any terms and conditions of the agreement, therefore, the first Appellate Court erred in law to dismiss the suits of the petitioner without adverting to this aspect of the case. He further submits that the First Appellate Court admitted in para. 16 of the impugned judgment that the documents produced by the petitioner are almost about the admitted facts. He further submits that the petitioner is depositing the rent in the Court of the Rent Controller. The provisions of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 are attracted. The First Appellate Court did not advert to this aspect of the case. He further urges that the First Appellate Court erred in law to' give finding against the petitioner that the relationship of landlord and tenant has ceased its effect on 30-6-1993 with the expiry of three years lease period. The said finding is not.In accordance with the terms of the agreement which contain clause 4 that after the expiry of the period of three years the respondents are entitled to charge 10% excess rent. He further submits that D.W.1, Bashir Ahmad Nagi produced by respondents/defendants admitted the claim of the petitioner as is evident from the cross-examination. He further submits that D.W.1 did not mention a single word qua the suspension of Mr. Sardar Bukhsh Clerk of H.V.C. Municipal Committee who had allowed the petitioner to pay the rent mala fide. He further submits that judgment of the First Appellate Court is result of misreading and non-reading of the record.
5. The learned counsel of the respondents submits that Mian Abdul Rashid did not deny the suggestion in cross-examination that Mr. Sardar Bukhsh Clerk was suspended due to mala fide and connived the receipt of the rent in favour of the plaintiff/petitioner. He further submits that the lease period had already expired, therefore, the First Appellate Court was justified to reverse the finding of the Trial Court. He further urges that the petitioner was Vice-Chairman of the Municipal Committee, therefore, he secured the plot on rent mala fide with the connivance of the staff of the Municipal Committee. He further urges that sanction of D-type Bus Stand was cancelled by the competent authority, therefore, the judgment of the First Appellate Court is valid in the eyes of law.
He further submits that provisions of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance are not attracted.
6. The learned counsel of the petitioner in rebuttal submits that judgment of the First Appellate Court is based on surmises and conjectures as is evident from the finding of the First Appellate Court on Issue No,8 in para. 17 as well as finding on Issues Nos.6 and 7 as is evident from para. 16 of the impugned judgment. He further submits that respondents accepted the rent from the petitioner after the expiry of the period of the rent deed agreed between the parties, therefore, relationship of landlord and tenant remains intact.
7. I have given my anxious consideration to the contentions of the learned counsel of the parties and perused the record.
8. The sole question arises in these cases is whether the provision of Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 is attracted or not. The provision of Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 is not applicable qua the land in question in view of the Notification No,Judl-i-17(7)/59, dated 20th June, 1962 which was issued by the competent authority in exercise of the powers conferred, by section 3 of West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, the Governor of West Pakistan is pleased to direct that the provisions of the said Ordinance shall not apply to those buildings or lands belonging to Local. Body administering an urban area which are used as shop or are of commercial nature. Iri arriving to this conclusion, I am fortified by the law laid down by this Court in Muhammad Asghar v. Ikrarnuddin and another (NLR 1981 UC 66). It is also admitted fact that the period of lease had already been expired. The First Appellate Court had given findings of fact against the petitioner that petitioner occupied the premises without consent of the landlord as the petitioner deposited the rent with the connivance of Mr. Sardar Bukhsh Clerk, H.V.C. Branch of Municipal Committee who was suspended due to aforesaid reason as is depicted from the cross- examination of P.VV.1. Mian Abdul Rashid petitioner/plaintiff. It is settled principle of law that a tenant occupied the premises without the consent of the landlord is a tenant by sufferance and his status is not better that a trespasser and can be ejected at any time. In arriving to this conclusion I am fortified by the following judgments:-- Rehman Cotton Factory v. Nictunan Company Limited (PLD 1976 SC 781); ,Moor v. M. Singh (1958 IC 18 (PC)) and Punjab National Bank v. S.D. Chaudhry (AIR 1943 Oudh 392).
9. The First Appellate Court has reversed the findings of the trial Court on the aforesaid issues after reappraisal of the evidence on record with cogent reasons in terms of the law laid down by the superior Courts. It is pertinent to mention here the findings of the First Appellate Court on the aforesaid issues, it may by noticed that in his capacity as Appellate Court, the First Appellate Court possessed the jurisdiction to come to his own conclusion on the basis of evidence adduced before the trial Court by the parties and resultantly, he could competently reverse the findings of the Trial Court on the question of fact involved in the aforesaid issues. It is an established proposition of law that findings on question of fact or of law, howsoever erroneous the same may be, recorded by a Court of competent jurisdiction, cannot be interfered with by the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, under section 115, C.P.C. Unless such findings suffer from jurisdictional defect, illegality or material irregularity, as per principle laid down in N.S. Venkatagiri Ayyangar and another v. The Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras (PLD 1949 PC 26).
10. In view of what has been discussed above, these revision petitions have no merits and the same are dismissed.