' Through this single judgment, I propose to dispose of the instant F.A.O. No,79' of 2002 as well as the connected F.A.O. No,80 of 2002 - as common questions of law and facts are involved in both these appeals.
2. Precisely stated the facts of the case as contained in the appeals are that Assistant Revenue Superintendent Cantonment Board, Mardan instituted two ejectment petitions against Messrs Syed Brothers through Syed Muhtamim Shah', appellants for their eviction from the suit shops bearing No,13 and -13A situated at Shopping Plaza; Mardan on the ground of default in the payment of rent.
3. Both the petitioners were contested by the tenant-appellants by filing their written reply. Issues were framed and the case was fixed for the evidence of the landlord-respondent. During the pendency of the petitions before the trial Court, the tenant-appellants submitted an application dated 23-11-1999 for the return of the ejectment petition for lack of jurisdiction which was dismissed by the trial Court. Writ petition was filed before this Court by the tenant-appellants which was also dismissed vide judgment/order dated 8-6-2000. Again the proceedings were started in the trial Court w,e,f, 3-8-2000 but the appellants avoided to produce their evidence and ultimately the trial Court struck off their defence and passed an ejectment order in both the petitions on 14-2-2002 against the appellants. Hence the instant appeals.
4. Learned counsel for the appellants, inter alia, contended that the appellants were condemned unheard and were not provided opportunity to defend their case in adequate manner by not allowing opportunity of defence; that during the proceedings before the Rent Controller Mardan Cantt. The appellants submitted an application to the Rent Controller that they have moved the High-Court for the transfer of the cases as the Rent Controller being landlord cannot hear the case as he is himself a party.
5. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the transfer application moved by the appellants before the High Court has been dismissed and that their plea as to the transfer of the case from the Rent Controller that he is a party himself was set down, hence he has no locus standi to take such plea in appeal which had already been rejected by the High Court. Further advanced that vide subsection (11) of section 17 of Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 the Controller of Rents is competent to entertain the ejectment petition regarding Cantonment Board Buildings.
6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record as well as the case-law on the subject.
7. This Court vide its order dated 13-5-2002 while admitting the instant appeals to full hearing formulated the following moot points for consideration:- "(i) Whether under the law the Rent Controller Cantonment Board can entertain the ejectment petition under section 17 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 when section 3 of the Act envisages that certain buildings/properties including the properties owned by Cantonment Board are exempted and Act not apply to such properties;
(ii) Whether Assistant Revenue Superintendent was competent and authorise to file ejectment petition on behalf of the Cantonment Board; and
(iii) Whether an Officer of Cantonment Board can sit as a Judge of his own cause regarding properties owned by Cantonment Board which are administered by him and he is himself landlord on behalf of the Cantonment Board/Government of Pakistan".
8. Before entering into the merits of the 'case it will be appropriate to reproduce the relevant sections of law i,e, section 3 and subsection (11) of section 17 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 for ready reference which are pertinent in the matter under dispute:-- "(3) Act not to apply to certain building.---Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to:--
(a) any evacuee property as defined in the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act,1957: and
(b) any property owned by the Central Government, any Provincial Government, Railway, Port Trust or Cantonment Board and any property owned, managed or controlled by any other local authority undet the administrative control of the Central Government or of Provincial Government.
S.17 (11). Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or elsewhere, the Central Government or the Provincial Government, a Railway, a Port Trust, a Cantonment Board or any other local authority may also apply to the Controller to seek eviction of the tenant from its building whether owned, hired or requisitioned, in the event of non-payment of rent within the period hereinabove prescribed or for infringement of any of the terms of possession".
9. The first important question in the instant case is the interpretation of two provisions i,e, section 3 and subsection (11) of section 17 of Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963. In the former the Cantonments Board building are exempted and the said Act does not apply to the above buildings whereas in the latter provision it is provided that in case of eviction of the tenant of a building enumerated in section 3 of the Cantonment Board including others can seek eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent or infringement of any terms and conditions of the agreement.
While ascertaining the true meaning of the exemption clause it would be appropriate to bear in mind certain established principles of Interpretation of statutes which apply in the case of the present nature/kind. In case "Noor Shah v. Azmat Ilahi and others" (PLD 1966 (W.P.) Peshawar 159) it is stated as under:-- "(11) While ascertaining the true meaning of the exemption clause in which the petitioners rely, it would be well to bear in mind certain established principals of interpretation of statutes which apply in cases of the present kind. At pages 6 and 7 of Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, it is stated that:-- "The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning.--- At the same time, if the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result".
12. Again on page 36, the learned author has observed that:-- "It is said to be the duty of the Judge to make such construction a statute as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy".
13. On the same subject the following observations appear in Craies, 'Statute Law' pages 82 and 83:-- "The mere fact that the results of a statute may be unjust or absurd does not entitle this Court to refuse to give it effect, but if there are two different interpretations of the words in an Act, the Court will adopt that which is just, reasonable and sensible rather than that which is none of those things....Therefore, if a too literal adherence to the words of enactment appears to produce an absurdity or an injustice, it will be the duty of a Court of construction to consider the state of the law at the time the Act was passed (a) with a view to ascertaining whether the language of enactment is capable of any other fair interpretation, (b) or whether it may not be desirable to put upon the language used a secondary (c). Or restricted meaning (d) or perhaps to adopt a construction not quite strictly grammatical.
' But where the words of an Act of Parliament are plain the Court will not make an alternation in them because injustice may otherwise be done".
14. In the same contest their Lordships of the Supreme Court have made certain very valuable observations in the Commissioner of Income-Tax Karachi v. Mst. Khatija Begum (PLD 1965 SC 472).
"The words of a Statutes where there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the subject which the Legislature had in view".
"To arrive at the real meaning it is always necessary to get an exact conception of the aim, scope and object of the whole Act, to consider according to Lord Coke(i) what was the law before the Act was passed; (ii) what was the mischief of defect for which the law had not provided; (iii) what remedy Parliament I B has appointed; and (iv) the reasons of the remedy".
' The reading of the above two sections reveals that Rent Controller, Mardan Cantonment Board had the jurisdiction to pass an eviction order in respect of the buildings mentioned above. Moreso it is pertinent to notice that Rent Controller, Mardan Cantonment is also an Executive Officer of the Cantonment Board who is simultaneously a Rent Controller as well as a landlord and signatory to the rent deed taken place between the parties in respect of the buildings in dispute. So while entertaining and taking cognizance of ejectment applications he is himself on the one hand a party/applicant being a landlord and on the other hand is a Judge of his own cause.
Notwithstanding the fact the ejectment applications in the case in hand were filed by the Assistant Revenue Superintendent.
10. The second question arises in these appeals is whether the Assistant Revenue Superintendent can file ejectment petitions and ,whether he has locus standi or/cause of action. The answer would be in negative as he is neither a landlord nor a signatory to the rem deed. The agreement was signed/countersigned by the Executive Officer, Mardan which is astonishingly not exhibited before the trial Court so whether in absence of any tenancy/lease agreement it can be said that the terms and conditions _of agreement are violated or infringed. Admittedly when regular monthly rent is not deposited in the Cantonment Board Officer or in the relevant;Revenue Branch, the concerned official or even the Qasid visit the tenanting building and collect the outstanding rent but in the instant case there is nothing brought on record to show that the Assistant Revenue Superintendent was authorised by the Cantonment Board to collect the rent on behalf of the Executive Officer, in reply to the contentions of the learned counsel for the respondent that under section 2(g) of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963, the Rent Controller may be a landlord who receive rent in respect of any building whether on his own behalf 'or on behalf or for the benefit of any person, or as a trustee, guardian or receiver and includes a tenant who, being authorised under the terms of his lease so to do, sublets the building and any other person for the time being deriving title, from the landlord. The record is silent that the Assistant Revenue Superintendent was authorised to collect the rent from the appellants. It is understood that the Cantonment Board has Tax/Revenue Branch for receiving rent taxes from the residents of Cantonment Board which branch consists of several employees including Naib'Qasid etc. It usually so happens that in cases of default even Naib Qasids used to contact the person against whom, the arrears of rent and property taxes etc. Are outstanding. If such liberal meaning to the term "landlord" are given then each and every officials including Naib Qasids of Cantonment Board fall within the definition of landlord. So in absence of any such authority or any evidence that the Assistant Revenue Superintendent has ever been authorised to collect the rent from the tenant/applicants, he cannot be termed as "landlord" and for all practical purposes the Executive Officer Mardan Cantonment Board was the landlord and not the Assistant Revenue Superintendent. In the circumstances of the case the very eviction petitions were filed by an unauthorised and incompetent person who has no locus standi or/cause of action to file the same.
11. Adverting to the third crucial point that as to whether the Executive Officer Cantonment Board, Mardan who is also a landlord and party to the case, can take cognizance of the eviction petitions in respect of the buildings owned by the Cantonment Board and can sit as a Judge of his own cause. There is plethora of case-laws by the apex Supreme Court of Pakistan and High Court jurisdiction that one cannot sit as a Judge of his own cause. Reliance is placed on (1998 M LD 1628) and (1994 CLC 939). So in my view the Rent' Controller, Cantonment Board Mardan who is a landlord as an Executive Officer and has also countersigned the rent deed was not at all competent to adjudicate upon the matter of his own Department himself.
12. Be that as it may, in view of the above I am constrained to hold that neither the Assistant Revenue Superintendent was competent and authorised person to file neither eviction petitions nor the Rent Controller. Mardan Cantonment, who had signed the agreement and also as landlord being an Executive Officer of Cantonment Board was party to the lis could sit as a Judge in the instant case.
13. In the wake of the above detailed discussion both the appeals are accepted, the impugned judgments/order passed by the Rent Controller, Mardan Cantonment dated 14-2-2002 are set aside and the ejectment petitions are dismissed with no order as to costs.