This is an appeal cinder section 36 of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 196:1, against the order\dated July 2, 1968, of the Chairman of the Second West Pakistan Industrial Court, Karachi.
The impugned order was passed on an application under section 30 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance 1959, for permission to dismiss the appellant, Akhtar Ahmad, (hereinafter called the appellant).
2. The facts briefly put are these.
3. The appellant was employed as a Conductor in the Government Transport Service, Hyderabad, and held office in the West Pakistan Transport Service Workers' Union. On 29th November 1965, Karim Bux, who is a witness of respondent No. 2 i.e., the Government Transport Service, Hyderabad, checked the bus of which the appellant was the Conductor. He found 16 ticket less passengers from whom the appellant had already realised fare. At the time of the checking, the District Manager was also present.
4. The appellant was charge-sheeted and one Abdullah was appointed as Enquiry Officer. He examined the witnesses on behalf of the Government Transport Service in the presence of the appellant. The Enquiry Officer submitted a report on 2nd March 1966 to the District Manager.
Thereafter, the application under section 30 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance; 1969, giving rise to the impugned order, was made to the Industrial Court for permission to dismiss the appellant.
5. The learned Chairman, Second West Pakistan Industrial Court, Karachi, allowed the parties again to examine witnesses on their behalf. On behalf of respondent No. 2, Mr. Mahboob Rizvi, produced the orders of the Road Transport Corporation regarding the `Delegation of Powers', which is Exh. R-1.
According to the Delegation, of Powers, Exh. R-1, the District Manager could dismiss an employee of the G. T. S. drawing pay below Rs. 275.00 per month. Mr. Karim Bux, on behalf of G. T. S. stated that he checked Bus No. HD-972, along with the District Manager at Panjmoro Stand, of which the appellant was the Conductor. The Enquiry Officer Abdullah was also examined on behalf of G. T. S. The appellant gave his own statement on 5th June 1968, and produced Abdul Wahab, as his witness. He is a dismissed servant of the Government Transport Service. He deposed in respect of tickets issued from his R P. T. Book, which he stated, bad been stolen.
6. The learned Chairman after considering the arguments of the parties came to the conclusion that the enquiry in respect of misconduct of the appellant was fair, proper and impartial and granted the application to dismiss the appellant.
7. Before me the `learned Representative for the appellant contended in the first place, that the proceeding under section 30 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959, has been initiated by the District Manager, who was not authorised to do so. In this connection. Mr. Majeed, Representative of the appellant, submitted that under rule 6 of the Road Transport Corporation Rules, 1963, the Chairman and their Members could institute, defend or withdraw any proceedings or compound any offence. In other words, the submission was that it is only the Chairman acid Members of the Corporation who can file the application under section 30 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959. There is not much force in this contention. Under section 30 of the Ordinance of 1959, the word used is `employer'. Under section 30 of the Ordinance, 1959, no employer could dismiss an officer of a Trade Union during the pendency of the industrial dispute without the permission of the Industrial Court. What has to be seen, therefore, is as to whether the District Manager can be said to be an employer within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959. Employer is defined under section 2(f) of the Ordinance of 1959. It reads is under : "Employer includes-
(i) in relation to an industry carried on by or under .the authority of any department of a Government, the authority prescribed in this behalf, or where no authority is prescribed, the head of the department ; and
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority the chief executive officer of that authority."
8. The definition of employer, as reproduced above, is wide enough to include an officer, who has the authority to appoint and dismiss. The admitted position is that the District Manager is the appointing authority and has also the power to dismiss. The definition of employer is neither exhaustive nor inclusive. It is wide enough to include, as I have already observed, a person who is the appointing authority. I would hold that the application under section 30 of the Ordinance of 1959, could be a filed by the District Manager.
9. It was next contended that there was a denial of the principle of natural justice, inasmuch as the District Manager, who charge-sheeted the appellant, had witnessed the checking an passed the order dismissing the appellant. There is no force in this contention. The mere fact that it was in the presence of the District Manager that the checking took place and he initiated the proceeding against the appellant and ultimately dismissed him, would not be a denial of the principle of natural justice, in the absence of anything on record that the District Manager had any personal animosity against the appellant, which resulted in and unfair enquiry. The Enquiry Officer was produced before the learned Chairman. After giving a detailed statement of the enquiry in the examination-in-chief, he was cross-examined by Mr. Shamim Wasti, on behalf of the appellant.
The cross-examination runs as under :- "I produce the original letter of Exh. A. W. 2/5 as Exh. E-1. There is entry in the Register about the book of Abdul Wahab which was missing."
10. This is all the cross-examination of the Enquiry Officer. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Enquiry Officer acted in a prejudicial manner in holding the enquiry against the appellant. Karim Bux, the person who checked the bus, had also been examined before the Industrial Court. In his cross-examination, nothing has been made out, which can suggest that he was falsely implicating the appellant.
11. From the proceeding on the record, it appears that the District Manager acted in. a fair and impartial way in charge --sheeting and ordering enquiry against the appellant.
12. Lastly, it was submitted that certain evidence was brought on the record without legal proof of the loss of the original enquiry papers. It appears that the original of the record before the Enquiry Officer had been lost. Copies of the statements recorded by the Enquiry Officer were produced before the Industrial Court. In the cross-examination of the witnesses produced before the Industrial Court no suggestion has been m-ide that the copies produced are different from the contents of the original. No objection also was taken at the time when copies of original were being produced before the Industrial Court. In these circumstances, I will hold that the proceedings before the Industrial Court cannot be held to have been vitiated only on the ground of certain copies of the missing original documents. The fact remains that the Enquiry Officer and the checker were both produced before the Industrial Court. The appellant had an opportunity to test the statement of the checker and the Enquiry Officer. The Industrial Court cannot sit in judgment over the domestic enquiry so long as it was fair and impartial.
For the reasons given above, I will dismiss the appeal.