' This revision petition impugns the judgment and decree dated 28-10-1998 passed by the learned District Judge, Mianwali, in appeal. By means of the impugned judgment and decree, the decree passed by the learned trial Court on 27-2-1997 was set aside and as a consequence, the suit of the respondent/plaintiff was decreed.
2. The facts of this case are straightforward. The respondent filed a suit to pre-empt a sale recorded in Mutation No,3118 dated 15-6-1995. Although the learned trial Court framed as many as 12 Issues, the nly issue in contention before me and before the Lower Appellate Court, was Issues No,8 relating to Talbs. The said issue was framed as follows:- "Whether the plaintiff has fulfilled the requisites of Talbs according to law? OPP".
3. The evidence on record shows that the son of the respondent/plaintiff, namely, Ashiq Hussain Shah identified the parties at the public assembly at which the impugned sale was recorded on the basis of statements made by the parties. This was done on 30-5-1995. There is other evidence on record to show that the respondent/plaintiff was aware of the sale transaction and had, in fact, not objected to the sale. It is not denied on behalf of the respondent/plaintiff that his son Ashiq Hussain Shah, in fact, identified the parties as Sarbrah Lumberdar and participated in the public assembly on 30-5-1995 at which the sale became public knowledge. In these circumstances, it is not credible that the plaintiff came to know of the sale on 18--6-1995 as alleged in the plaint. Another important aspect of the matter is that possession of the land was delivered to the petitioner/defendant prior to 30-5-1995 as this fact has been recorded in the proceedings of the public assembly, referred to above. This circumstance also was sufficient to show that the petitioner had knowledge of the sale transaction prior to the date alleged by him. In these circumstances, it is clear that Talb-e- Muwathibat was net made by the respondent/plaintiff in a timely manner.
4. In addition to the above, the learned trial Court rightly held that the two-week period allowed for making Talb-e-Ishhad was the maximum time allowed for making the said Talb. There was, as such, no justification for the delay of 8 days between the making of Talb-eMuwathibat and the notice of Talb-e-Ishhad which was issued on 26-6-1995.
5. The above circumstances have not been properly taken into account by the learned Lower Appellate Court. It was held by the learned District Judge that the mere fact the plaintiff's son participated in the public assembly as Sarbrah Lumberdar to identify the parties, did not, by itself, constitute evidence that the respondent/plaintiff had become aware of the sale on 30-5-1995.
According to the learned District Judge, direct evidence of the factum of knowledge was required to be produced on record. This finding, in my opinion, is not well founded. The Court is entitled to infer facts from circumstances where there is no direct evidence. The record of this case shows that the inference drawn by the learned trial Court was entirely justified on the basis of the evidence on record. The learned Lower Appellate Court has, in fact, misapplied the law by concluding that such inference was not legally permissible.
6. In view of the above discussion, the impugned judgment and decree dated 28-10-1998 are set aside. As a consequence, the judgment and decree dated 27-2-1997 passed by the learned trial Court stand restored.