MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J.--- The present appeal, instituted by Director General L.D.A. Etc., under Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, proceeds against judgment dated 14.2.2000, whereby the learned Single Judge in Chamber accepted respondent No. 1's Constitutional Petition (W.P. No. 3834/1999).
2. The instant appeal appears to have been filed on 10.10.2000, challenging the judgment dated 14.2.2000, thus the appeal has been filed after the expiry of period of limitation, prescribed for filing the appeal in this Court, therefore, the appellant has filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for the condonation of delay in filing the appeal.
3. Brief facts necessary for the disposal of the present appeal are that respondents Nos. 1 and 2 filed the Constitutional Petition (W.P. No. 3834/1999) against the appellants and respondents Nos. 3 and 4, praying therein that the appellants may be directed to transfer plot No. 14-K, Sabza Zar Housing Scheme, Lahore by declaring condition of non-transferability in the agreement, statedly, entered into between LDA and the Lahore High Court Bar Co-operative Housing Society, as illegal* and without jurisdiction. The appellants resisted the said petition and filed report and parawise comments, however the learned Single Judge in Chamber, after hearing the parties, while following an unreported judgment, relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents, accepted the said petition and directed the appellant to transfer the plot in favour of respondents Nos. 1 and 2, after receiving the legal dues from them, in accordance with law, vide judgment dated 14.2.2000, which has been called in question through the filling of the present appeal, which is grossly barred by time.
4. So far as the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, is concerned, it has been stated, as ground for condonation of delay, that the arguments were concluded on 14.2.2000, however no Judgment was announced on that day and the petitioner was not informed, thereafter, about the announcement of the judgment. According to the contents of the petition, it, subsequently, transpired that the judgment had been written, but not announced, thereafter an application for obtaining the certified copy was made and on the subsequent receipt of the certified copy of the judgment the present appeal was filed. It has been further asserted in the application that delay if any in filing the appeal was beyond the control of the appellant, therefore, the appeal may be decided on merits
5. The learned counsel for the appellants, while reiterating the contents of the application, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, has submitted that the judgment was not announced on 14.2.2000 and when, subsequently, the appellants came to know that the judgment has been written, the concerned official applied for obtaining the certified copy of the judgment. It has also submitted that no intimation was given by the Copying Agency to the appellant regarding the preparation of the certified copy, thus it is sufficient ground for the condonation of delay.
6. Upon the examination of the record of the case, we find that the learned Single Judge in Chamber passed and announced the impugned judgment on 14.2.2000, certified copy, annexed with this appeal, was applied on the same day i.e. 14.2.2000 on behalf of the appellants and although the same was prepared by the copying agency on 16.2.2000, yet` the functionaries of the appellant did not collect the copy of the judgment on the aforesaid date and the same was in fact received on 27.3.2000. It is further evident from the record that the appeal was filed on 10.10.2000 before this Court.
7. Considering the contents of application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and the contentions raised by the learned counsel, we find that the same are not in consonance with the record of the case. The plea of the appellant, as narrated in the afore-noted application, regarding the non- announcement of the impugned judgment on 14.2.2000 is belied from the fact that the appellant on the same day applied for obtaining the certified copy of the judgment. If the said judgment was not announced on 14.2.2000 or reserved, there was no occasion for the appellant to immediately file an application, before the Copying Agency, for obtaining the certified copy of the judgment. It has been stated in the application that when "subsequently", it transpired that the judgment has been announced, an application for obtaining the certified copy was made. On the face of the record, this assertion is also false as noted above, the copy was applied On the same day when the learned Single Judge passed and announced the judgment, therefore, there was no occasion of "subsequently attaining" the alleged knowledge in this regard. So far as the contention of the learned counsel that no notice was served by the Copying Agency informing the appellants about the preparation of the certified copy, suffice it to say that admittedly, the certified copy of the judgment was delivered to the functionaries of the appellant on 27.3.2000, while, as noted above, the appeal was fired on 10.10.2000, as such the appeal was instituted after the lapse of six months and 13 days even after the receipt of copy of judgment, for which no explanation has been rendered on behalf of the appellants either in their application or in the arguments of the learned counsel. In view of this, the second contention raised by the learned counsel is of no avail to the appellant. After the receipt of the certified copy of the judgment by the functionaries of the appellants they slept over the matter for a considerable period of more than six months, for which no apparent explanation/reason is forthcoming.
8. As noted above, the present appeal is barred by approximately 8 months. Even if the period is to be recroded from the date of the delivery of the certified copy, even in that case, the appeal is barred by more than six months and no sufficient cause, for such an inordinate delay has been shown. It is settled law that in order to be entitled for the condonation of delay, within the para- meter of law, each day's delay has to be explained by the party, who is seeking condonation of delay. In the present case, we find that the appellants have comprehensively failed to establish their case within the para-meter of Section S of the Limitation Act warranting the condonation of delay. The grounds alleged in the application have been dealt with by us in the preceding paras.
9. Up-shot of the above discussion is that we do Snot find that there are "sufficient grounds" for filing the instant appeal beyond the period prescribed under the law and no sufficient reasons have been made out by the appellants for the condonation of inordinate and unexplained delay and the present application is devoid of merits, thus the same is dismissed in limine.
10. Even otherwise, we find that on merits, the appellants have got no case. The learned Single Judge in Chamber accepted the Constitutional petition, filed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 after having coming to the following conclusion: "It is admitted fact that this Court has decided the question of law finally in the un-reported judgment relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner afore-mentioned and the learned counsel for the respondents failed to point out that the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is distinguished on facts and law. Keeping in view the principle of consistency this writ petition is accepted in terms of the aforesaid writ petition. Respondents are directed to transfer the plot in favour of the petitioner after receiving the legal dues from the petitioner in accordance with law."
Learned counsel of the appellant even could not point out any legal infirmity in the impugned judgment warranting interference therein and we are inclined to maintain the said judgment.
11. In the above perspective, as the appeal in hand is grossly barred by time and also devoid of merits, thus we are constrained to dismiss the same in limine on both the counts.