Sabiha Bibi appellant obtained a doom for dissolution of marriage from the Court of Ch. Faiz Ahmad Aslam, Civil Judge let Class. Narowal at Shakargarh against her husband Hassan Din respondent In appeal the learned District Judge, Sialkot reversed the decree. Hence this second appeal.
2. The first objection of the learned counsel for the respondent is that, under the Family Courts Act, no second appeal or revision is competent. It is under section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1964, that an appeal has been provided in cans decided by the Family Courts. But this section speaks of only one appeals Section 17 of the Act has clearly excluded the application of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, except section 10 and 11 thereof to the proceedings before a Family Court. 1, therefore, agree with the learned' counsel for the respondent that this second appeal is not competent and I am supported in my view by the ruling of Mr. Justice Qadeer-ud-Din Ahmad given in Abdul Hakim v. Mst. Abida Begum. (PLD 1970 Kar. 293).
3. However, the learned counsel for the appellant contends that this Court has jurisdiction to correct certain errors of the Courts subordinate to It, in exercise of its authority under Article 205 of the Interim Constitution which corresponds to Article 102 of the constitution of 1962. But before exercising authority under this Article certain questions will have to be determined, "timely, (a) whether the Courts, acting under the Family Courts Act are subordinate to the High Court; (d) whether supervision and control are limited only to administrative matters or extend also to judicial matters arid (c) what, if any, are the limits within which the authority under Article 205 should be exercised.
4. The question whether the Family Courts are subordinate to the High Court was considered in Mst.
Gamon v. Taj Din (PLD 1968 Lah. 987) wherein it was decided by Mr. Justice K. E. Chauhan that the Family Courts are the Courts for all purposes had subordinate to tic High Court Similarly the question as to the nature of authority exercisable under Article 102 of the Constitution, of 1961 was examined in Mst, Farida Parveen v. Qadeer-ud-Din Ahmad Siddiqi (PLD 1971 Kar. 118) and it was held therein that the Article empowers the High Court to exercise judicial control ever the decisions of the subordinate Courts. As to the extent of such authority it was laid down in that cases as well as in Mst. Tehseen Akhtar v, Mahmood-ul-Hassan (PLD 1971 Lah. 875) that the power of judicial control under the constitutional provisions should be used only in order to keep the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority i.e. To correct jurisdictional error or prevent miscarriage of justice resulting from noncompliance of any Constitutional provision or the concerned law but it cannot be extended to interference on merits. Therefore, in order to determine whether in the present case invocation of the pouters of this Court under Article 205 of the Interim Constitution 1$ warranted, it is necessary first to examine the grounds on which the second appeal hat ban preferred which has been held to be incompetent.
5. The only ground urged before me is that the decree being one for dissolution of marriage was not appealable at all In view of subsection (2Xa) of action 14 of the Family Courts Act and, therefore, the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to set aside the decree. The reply of the learned counsel for the respondent to this argument is that the caw fell tender the exception to clause (q) of the said subsection: The exception relates tai the case where the marriage is dissolved on the ground that the husband has disposed of the wife's property or prevented her from exercising leer legal rights over it.
6. In the present case. However, the decree for dissolution of marriage was not granted on this ground. The allegation of the appellant that the respondent had deprived her of hot ornaments etc. And misappropriated them was considered by the Family Court only In order to find a basis for Khula but it is clear from the judgment of the said Court that Khula' was not the sole ground on which the marriage was dissolved . It was used only as an additional ground.
7. The other grounds on which the decree was based were the failure of the husband to maintain the wife and also to perform the marital obligations. I am therefore of the view that the decree is not applicable and the learned District Judge had no jurisdiction to it.
8. In view of section 17 of the Family Courts Act, there is no way in which this jurisdictional error can be rectified except by exercising authority under Article 205 of the Interim Constitution. Accordingly in exercise of that authority, I set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge as being without jurisdiction.
9. A question with regard to the jurisdiction of the trial court has also been raised before me. The learned counsel for the respondent contends that in view of sections 7 and 8 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1951, the Family Court hard no jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage 0 the parties because the jurisdiction conferred upon the Family Coast under section 3 of the Family Courts Act is subject to the provisions of the said Ordinance. In my opinion that is not the correct position of law. Sections 7 and 8 of the Ordinance are applicable only when the parties to a marriage wish to dissolve it otherwise than through the intervention of the Family Court. The provisions of these sections do not oust the jurisdiction of the FamilyCourts conferred upon them by section 5 of the Family Courts Act read with the Schedule thereto in respect of dissolution of marriages, Therefore, the decree of the Family Court cannot be said to be without jurisdiction.
10. It goes without saying that the Civil Judge who passed the decree was acting as a Family Court Judge although he does not seem to have described himself as such anywhere on the Me.
Therefore, the original decree does not call for interference.
11. The appeal a disposed of accordingly.