' Sabiha Bibi appellant obtained a decree for dissolution of marriage hem the Court of Ch. Fain Ahmed Adam, Civil Judge 1st Class. Narowal at Shakargarh against her husband Hassan Din respondent a the learned District Judge, Sialkot, reversed the decree. Hence the wend anted.
2. The first objection of the learned counsel for the respondent the that, under the Family Courts Act, no second appeal or revision is comperes". It is under section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1964, that an appeal has been provided in cases decided by the Family Courts. But this section speaks of only one appeal. Section 17 of the Act has clearly excluded the application, of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code except actions 10 and 11 thereof to therefore a Family Court. I, therefore, agree with the lest for the respondent that this second appeal is not competent and supported in my view by the ruling of Mr. Justice Qadeer-ud-Din given in Ab411 Hakim v. Mi. AN& Degums (1).
3. Howard, the learned counsel for the appellant contends that this Court has jurisdiction to sweet certain eaten of the Courts subordinate to it in monies of its authority under Article 205 of the Interim Constitution which o on responds to Article 102 of the Constitution of 1962. But before entertaining authority under this Article certain questions will have to be detonable, namely, (a) whether the Courts, acting under the Family Courts Ant are subordinate to the High Court; (b) whither supervision and control (1) PLD 1970 Katy. 293 an limited only to administrative matters Of extend also to judicial mittens and (cl what, if any, are the limits within which the authority under Article 255 should be exercised.
4. The question whether the Family Courts are subordinate to the High Court was considered in Mi.
0416711 s. Taj Din (1) wherein It was decided by Mr. Jute K. E Chauhan that the Family Courts are the Comte for all purposes and to the High Court. Similarly the question as to the nature of authority exercisable under Article 102 of the was examined in Mire Fade Parma v. Etitittl-114Die Ahmed Siddiq
(2) and it was held therein that the Article empowers the High Court to exercise judicial control over the decisions of the subordinate Courts. As to the extent of such authority it was laid down in that case as well as in MukhtAr v. Maknod-Flemas (3) that the power of judicial control under the Constitutional provisions should be used only in order to keep the subordinate Count within the bounds of their authority Le. To correct jurisdiction errors or prevent miscarriage of justice resulting from wee camphoric of any Constitutional provinces or the concerned know but it cannot be extended to interference on merits. Therefore, in order to determine whether in the present cafe MVOC411011 of the powers of this Court weeded Art le 205 of the Interim Constitution Is warranted, it is necessary lint to examine the pounds on which the wood appellate been preferred which has been held to be incompetent Throaty gonad Waned before me is that the decree Wag one for dissolution assonate was not appealable at all in view of robs anion 120) of section 14 of the Family Courts Act and therefore, the leveed Dirt exit Judge had jurisdiction to set aside the decree. The reply of the liaffM1 C0413434 for the respondent to this armament is that the case fell nudge Vie exception to claw t,7-; of the subsection, The mantle relates AO the ewe w the is dissolved on the ground that the husband has disposed of the wife, property or prevented her from exercising her legal over it. {{BLUR PAGE}} 6, In the present case, however' the deem man foe diets: of marries was not granted on this ground. The *Motion of the eppriOut this the respondeat had deprived her of her ornaments etc. au4 teleeppropekted them was consideredy the Family Court only in order to a beds fog /kite out It Is clear from the judgeteet of the said Court Wei Khnie lees aoti the sole groundn which the marriage was dim:vol. It we umi as an additional ground,
7. The other grounds on which the tteewe, use biugei wz of the husband to =Wein the wifand as obligati. I am, thereforeof the view thee tee dt`7` sad the learned Dietrot Judge hei co lot LetlCction t;,
8. Le view or suti 7 ot dig Feted! (7,i,Tete Act, there noay which this lurtedictional erret rata be mailed eact-pt by ercking authodty soda Article 205 of the ktertm C.Onstitetion. Ar.Edingly in ezereise that auth15ity. I se62i41. tS4 lodgment and decree passed by the Dikrici Judge as being wAiti.1Ut jaiir11..Eton
9. A question with regard to the juriedietion of the trial Conte has also
(I) F L D 1%8 Leh 987 (2) PLD 1P71 Kat. 118 13)PI.D1971Loh.673 {{BLUR PAGE}} ' been caked before me,. The learned counsel for the respondent contends that in view of sections 7 and 8 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, the Family Court had no jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage of the polio because the jurisdiction conferred upon the Family Court under section of the Family Courts Act is subject to the provisions of the said Ordinance In my opinion that is not the correct position of law,. Sections 7 and 8 of the Ordinance are applicable only when the parties to a marriage wish to dissolve it otherwise than through the intervention of the Family Court. The provisions of these sections do not oust the jurisdiction of the kamil 9 Courts conferred upon them by section 5 of the Family Courts Act read with the Schedule thereto in respect of dissolution of marriages, Therefore the decree of the Family Court cannot be said to be without jurisdiction.
10. It goes without saying that the Civil Judge who passed the decree was acting as a Family Court Judge although he does not seem to have described himself as such anywhere on the file.
Therefore, the original decree does not call for interference.
11. The appeal is disposed of accordingly,