1. ' The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 10-9-2002 passed by the learned Sessions Judge Larkana in Sessions Case No,251 of 2002 State v. Hameer arising out of Crime No,27 of 2002 of Police Station Mahota under section 13(d) of the Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as Arms Ordinance) by which the learned Judge had convicted the appellant under the above mentioned section and sentenced him to suffer R.I. For 5 years, with benefit of section 382-B, Cr.P.C.
2. ' The facts giving rise to the present appeal are that on 13-5-2002 at about 2-30 p.m., complainant S.-I.P. Ghulam All Leghari alongwith his subordinate staff left the Police Station Mahota in connection with the investigation of Crime No,26 of 2000 under section 302/34, P.P.C. Vide Entry No,7 of the Roznamcha. At about 3-00 p.m. They reached near the bridge of Abandoned Ghar Wah on Aghani Link Road. They saw a person coming from canal side. He was armed with K.K. On seeing the police party the said person tried to slip away but he was apprehended at the spot. On inquires, the said person disclosed his name as Hameer, the present appellant. The complainant secured K.K. From his possession which was having 10 live bullets. The appellant could not produce the licence or permit of the weapon and ammunition therefore, he was arrested. The complainant prepared. The Mashirnama of the arrest and recovery which was attested by Mashirs A.S.-I.
3. Muhammad Ibrahim and H.C. Pehlwan. The appellant and the property were brought to the police station where the complainant lodged the F.I.R. The police after usual investigation, challaned the appellant in the Court of Extra Joint Civil Judge and F.C.M. Larkana from where the case was sent up to the Court of Sessions Larkana, for trial.
4. ' On 5-7-2002 a charge under section 13(d) of Arms Ordinance was framed against the appellant but he pleaded not guilty.
5. ' In support of the case, the prosecution examined two P.Ws. Namely P.W.1 Ghulam Ali Legahri (complainant and eye-witness) P.W.2 A.S.-I. Muhammad Ibrahim (Mashir of arrest and recovery of K.K. And bullets).
6. ' The appellant in his statement recorded under section 342, Cr.P.C. Denied all the allegations of the prosecution. He did not take any defence but claimed to be innocent.
7. ' After considering the material available on the record, the learned Judge formed opinion that an unlicensed K.K. And bullets were secured form the possession of the appellant therefore, he convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned above under the impugned judgment. The appellant was dissatisfied with the said judgment therefore, he has preferred the present appeal.
8. ' I have heard the Advocate for the appellant, Assistant Advocate-General for the State and perused the evidence with their assistance.
9. ' Learned Advocate for the appellant has stated that the accused was unrepresented before the trial Court as he could not engage an Advocate; that Roznamcha entry under which the police had left the police station was not produced in the evidence; that the K.K. Was not sealed at the spot; that the K.K. Was not sent to the Ballistic Expert for examination and report; that no private persons have been made as witnesses in this case by the police and that there is material contradiction in respect of holding K.K. By the appellant in the evidence of the witnesses therefore, the case of the present appellant is doubtful and prayed for his acquittal. In support of his contentions, learned Advocate for the appellant has relied upon cases of Abdul Sattar v. The State 2002 PCr.LJ 51 and Ashiq Ali v. The State 2002 PCr.LJ 450.
10. ' On the other hand, learned Assistant Advocate-General has stated that the case was challaned in the month of May, 2002 which was disposed of in the month of September, 2002, therefore, the appellant had sufficient time to engage an Advocate but he did not avail the said opportunity, as such for the fault of the appellant the prosecution cannot be blamed. He has further argued that the statement of the witnesses with regard to the leaving of the police station under the entry of the Roznamcha has not been challenged by the appellant; that it was not necessary to seal the crime weapon as the same was not used in any crime; that it was also not necessary to send it to the Ballistic Expert for examination and report; that the personal search of the accused was conducted near Link Road therefore, provisions of section 103 are not applicable. He has relied upon a case of State v. Muhammad Ameen 1999 SCM R 1367. Lastly, he contended that the contradiction pointed out by the learned defence counsel is not major therefore, it can be overlooked.
11. ' I have given due consideration to the arguments. A perusal of the record reveals that the case is based upon two witnesses namely complainant A.S.-I.P. Ghulam Ali Leghari and Mashir Muhammad Ibrahim Junejo. Their evidence showed tha: on 13-5-2002 at 2-30 p.m. They left the police station alongwith other staff in connection with investigation of Crime No,26 of 2000 after making Entry No,7 in the Roznamcha. They reached at the bridge of abondoned Ghar Wah situated on Link Road. They saw the appellant coming who was having K.K. On seeing the police party he tried to slip away but he was apprehended alongwith a K.K. Which contained 10 live bullets. On inquires, the appellant disclosed his name and failed to produce licence of arm and ammunition therefore, he was arrested and such Mashirnama was prepared. Both the witnesses were cross- examined by the appellant. Except the denial of his involvement in the case no other question was put to the witnesses therefore, the evidence of both the witnesses went unchallenged. There is no enmity between the appellant and police officers or any enmity was suggested between them by the appellant in the cross-examination. Both the witnesses are independent and natural witnesses as they left the P.S. In connection with the investigation of a crime. There is no motive or any cause with the witnesses to falsely implicate the present appellant. As such the evidence of both the witnesses is natural and trustworthy which has been rightly relied upon by the learned trial Judge.
12. ' As regard the submission of the learned Advocate for the appellant that the accused was not represented by any counsel before the trial Court as he could not engage the Advocate. The appellant himself furnished explanation for not engaging an Advocate. Sufficient time was given to the appellant to engage an Advocate but he did not avail the said opportunity as such for the default of appellant, the prosecution cannot be blamed.
13. ' As regards the non-production of the entries in the Roznamcha about the departure of the police from the police station and non-sealing of the property at the spot, the learned Advocate for the appellant has relied upon the cases of Abdul Sattar and Ashiq Ali (supra). In both the authorities apart from the above two discrepancies, there were other discrepancies in the evidence. After considering all the material facts of the cases and other discrepancies jointly, it was observed that the non-production of Roznamcha and non-sealing of the property at the Wardat (alongwith all the other discrepancies) created doubt in the prosecution case. In the present case there are no discrepancies or infirmities in the evidence of the prosecution except the above two discrepancies therefore, solely on the above mentioned discrepancies, the entire evidence of the prosecution cannot be brushed aside particularly when the statements of the witnesses went unchallenged.
14. Furthermore, it is pointed out that the sealing of the property at the Wardat is essential when the crime weapon is used in the commission of a crime and from the scene of offence empties are recovered, in order to connect the weapon with the empties, so as to prove that it was the same weapon which was used in the commission of the crime. In the present case there is no allegation or evidence that K.K. Was used in the commission of any crime or empties were secured from the place of such incident so as to connect the K.K. With the said empties. It is pertinent to point out that under sections 8 and 9 of Arms Ordinance mere possession of unlicensed arms and ammunition, by itself is an offence punishable under section 13(d) and (e) of the Arms Ordinance.
15. Under the present circumstances of the case non-sealing of the property is not the requirement of law therefore, it is not necessary to seal the same at the place of recovery.
16. ' As regards the argument that the K.K. Was not sent to the Ballistic Expert, it is already pointed out that mere possession of unlicensed arms and ammunition is an offence and covered by section 13(d) and (e) of Arms Ordinance under which it is not necessary that the weapon or arms should be in working condition. As such the argument has got no force at all.
17. ' As regards non-association of private persons, it is pointed out that section 103. Cr.P.C. Is applicable when a search is made in respect of a house. In the present case there was no search of a house but the appellant was apprehended near the road and K.K. Was secured from his possession. In such situation, the rule laid down in the case of State v. Muhammad Amin (supra) will be attracted under which their lordships of the Honourable Supreme Court have observed at page 1371 as under:-- "It is-by now settled law that provisions of section 103, Cr.P.C. Do not apply if the recovery is not made in pursuance of search of house, but is made elsewhere, for instance on the Highways or the road sides or the public places like Railway Stations, Bus Stands and the search of baggage or of the person at the Airports."
18. ' As regards the contradiction in the evidence, learned Advocate for the appellant has pointed out that the complainant stated that the K.K. Was in the hand of the appellant whereas Mashir stated that it was on the shoulder of appellant. This type of contradiction usually occurs in the evidence. It has not affected the prosecution story in any manner as the E fact remains that K.K. Was secured from the possession of the appellant either he was holding it in his hand or having it on his shoulder but it was the appellant who was carrying the same and the same was secured from his possession. This contradiction is minor in nature which can be overlooked in the present circumstances of the case.
19. ' After considering the material available on the record, I am of the considered view, that the prosecution have proved their case against the appellant beyond any shadow of doubt. As such the impugned judgment does not require any interference. The appeal has no merits and the same is dismissed.