1. ' CH. RAHIM DAD KHAN, C. J.-A petition for leave to appeal from the judgment of the High Court dated 7-6-1977, given in a writ petition, instituted by the petitioner alongwith pro forma respondents Nos, 6 and 7 against respondents Nos, 1 to 3 for cancellation of Cinema Licence granted by respondents Nos, 4 and 5 in favour of respondents Nos, 1 to 3, has been submitted on the grounds that the learned Judges of the High Court though accepted the writ petition and cancelled the licence in favour of respondents Nos, 1 to 3 but failed to determine two points out of the various points raised in the writ petition. The grounds for cancellation of the licence taken in the High Court were -
(a) that no licence can be issued in favour of a minor ;
(b) that the District Magistrate could only recommend for the grant of a No-Objection Certificate but was not himself competent to issue a No-Objection Certificate ;
(c) that the Prime Minister was not a competent licensing authority ;
(d) that in view of the Government Orders No, Admin/I8676-80/75, dated 28-2-1975 and No, Admin/5995-98/71 dated 25/26-5-1971 prohibiting grant of exhibition licence for new Cinema at Mirpur no licence for exhibition of a new Cinema could be granted ; and
(e) that the grant of new licence at Mirpur is in contravention of the provisions of the Notification No, 511-571/SL/76, dated 4-2-76 prescribing 25,000 propulation as a Unit for grant of exhibition licence for one Cinema in a town or Municipality.
2. ' Obviously, the learned Judges of the High Court omitted to decide last mentioned two points raised in the grounds of Writ. The omission settle the points raised in the writ petition being apparent on the face of the record and "the points for decision being within narrow compass" we converted the petition into appeal during the course of arguments and thereafter treating it as an appeal heard and decide it accordingly.
3. ' It is quite clear from the copy of the writ petition and it is also conceded by the learned Advocate for respondents Nos, 1 and 3 that these points were raised by the petitioners in their writ petition and the High Court omitted to give its finding on them. But he contends that since the decision is in favour of the appellant who does not ask for its revocation ; interference would not be justified particularly in the circumstances when the appellant has already raised these two points in another writ petition that had been subsequently instituted in the High Court by him against fathers of respondents by which the order granted another licence for exhibition of a new Cinema at Mirpnr has been challenged.
4. ' After hearing the arguments and considering the authorities referred on the point and going through the relevant provisions of the Constitution we are of the view that when a case is made out for interference by this Court, by virtue of its plenary powers, it can pass all such directions, orders and decrees as may be necessary for doing complete justice. Section 42-A. Subsection (1) of the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Interim Constitution Act of 1974 reads : "(1) The Supreme Court shall have powers to issue such directions, orders or decrees as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it including an order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person or the discovery or production of any document."
5. ' It would appear that these provisions are identical with those contained in Article 187, sub-clause
(1) of the Pakistan Constitution of 1973 as well as with the provisions of the previous Constitution. In a case entitled Malik Feroz Khan Noon v. The State (1) and also in a similar case entitled All Nawaz Gardezi v. Col. Muhammad Yusuf (2) it has been laid down that the Supreme Court can issue all such directions, orders or decrees as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. It is observed by Mr. Justice Mohammad Munir Chief Justice, as he then was, in PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 333 (348) that : - "In the same manner, once a case for interference of the Court has been established, it will have to consider what relief is to be given to the appellant in order to meet the ends of justice. Before granting special leave it is not at all necessary to require the applicant to ask for the reversal of the whole judgment, decree, order or sentence."
6. ' Thus on grant of leave, the Supreme Court may in exercise of the power under section 42-A expunge passages from the judgment of High Court as was done by Supreme Court (Pak.) in PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 333 and PLD 1963 SC (Pak.) 51 and many other such cases. It can re-examine entire evidence where it appears that is misreading of evidence, etc. In short the Supreme Court has ample power to pass such decree or order as may be necessary for doing complete justice and may finally dispose a case itself or may remand a fit case to the lower Court for re-hearing of the same according to law and for resolution of the points inadvertently omitted by that Court.
7. ' The omission on the part of the Court to decide these two points raised in the writ has involved the petitioner into further litigation because the question whether the Licensing Authority having regard to the points raised, could or could not issue a licence for exhibition of new Cinema remained unresolved. Had the Court given its decision on these points one way or the other, that would have finally adjudicated the matter on the points and thereby would have put an end to further litigation.
8. ' As regards the proposition that it was still open to the petitioner to raise these points in subsequent writ petition which he has already filed in the
(1) PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 333 (2) PLD 1963 SC (Pak.) 51 High Court against fathers of the present respondents on grant of a licence for exhibition of new Cinema it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that in case he had not challenged the finding in this case it would have operated against him as res judicata. In support of his arguments he placed reliance on 1968 SCMR 1204 wherein it is held : "We have asked Mr. Zafar Mahmood, who appeared for the petitioner, to explain how a second writ petition could lie when the first one had been dismissed on the merits. He attempted to argue that as the order on the first petition had not dealt with the ground which was the basis of the second petition, there was no bar to the second petition, being entertained. We are not impressed by this argument. There were only two possibilities in respect of this ground which had undoubtedly been raised in the earlier petition, though not dealt with in the learned Judge's order. Either that ground was not pressed at the time of the arguments or, if pressed, it was inadvertently not dealt with by the learned Single Judge. On the first hypothesis it was not open to the petitioner to urge the same ground again by way of a second petition. On the second hypothesis he should have sought redress by way of appeal from the order of the learned Single Judge and eventually by a petition for special leave to appeal from this Court. He did not resort to that course, but instead decided to put in a fresh writ petition. We agree with the High Court that the second writ petition, in the circumstances, did not lie. The petition for special leave is, therefore, dismissed."
9. ' This authority is on all fours with the facts of the present case and agreeing respectfully we hold that it was necessary for the petitioner to approach this Court by way of leave to appeal in order to avoid the adverse consequences that were to follow in case he had not come in appeal.
10. ' Another licence for exhibition of a new Cinema in Mirpur Town had been granted by the Licensing Authority in favour of the fathers of the present respondents; who themselves were representing as guardian of the minors-respondents in this petition. Second writ has also been filed by the petitioner and that this point has already been pressed at the time of arguments in the impugned order and if the petitioner had not challenged it by a petition for leave to appeal, he would have been precluded from raising this point in his subsequent writ.
11. ' In 1970 SCMR 323 Mr. Justice Hamoodur Rahman considered the similar omission where the impugned order did not disclose the application of the mind of the High Court to the merits of the case that were before it. Referring to PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) '272, his Lordship remarked :- "In view of the fact that a substantial question was raised by the applicant invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, it was, as observed by Munir, C. J., 'the undoubted duty of the High Court to state what the precise point raised by the applicant was and the grounds on which it was rejected." To the same effect are the observations of this Court in the case of Mollah Ejahar All v.
12. Government of East Pakistan and others where an identical single sentence order had been made.
13. This Court was at pains to point out that 'a judicial order must be a speaking order manifesting by itself that the Court has applied its mind to the . Resolution of the issues involved for their proper adjudication' because 'litigants' who bring their disputes to the law Courts with the incidental hardships and expenses involved do expect a patient and a judicious treatment of their cases and their determination by proper orders."
14. ' These observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court of Pakistan apply to the facts of the present case with equal force. High Court o Azad Jammu & Kashmir in its judgments has often observed that the decision of the Supreme Court have binding force on Courts in Azad Kashmir but it is regretted that some of the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court of Pakistan have not been receiving due attention by Azad Jammu & Kashmir High Court which, on question of procedure, are very mud illuminative and provide a correct guidance.
15. ' It is a well-settled law that judgment should conform with the provision of the law i. e. It should contain concise statement of the case, the point for determination which have been raised in the case, the decision thereon and reasons for such decision. The impugned judgment does not show that the learned Judges applied their mind to all the points raised in the ground of the writ petition.
16. They omitted to decide two important points. This disregard to the provisions of the law and inadvertent omission has no only wasted their valuable time but has caused unnecessary expens and trouble to the litigant public as well as encouraged further litigation.
17. ' We would have decided the case ourselves but it would be proper to have the view of the High Court on these two points before giving our own decision. We are, therefore, constrained to remand the case for decision of the High Court on remaining two points. As no notice was issued to the respondents for disposal of this case we make no order as to costs.