The petitioners filed suit for recovery of Rs.4,41,124 against respondent/ defendant in the Court of learned Senior Civil Judge, Kohat. The said suit was resisted by respondents/defendants by filing written statement. The learned trial Court after framing issues, recording pro and contra evidence of the parties dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 15-4-1999. Feeling aggrieved with the said judgment and decree the petitioners filed Appeal No.59/13 of 1999 in the Court of learned Additional District Judge, Kohat, which was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 5- I1-2002. Being not satisfied with the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below the petitioners have now filed the revision petition in hand.
2. Mr. Hamid Farooq Durrani, the learned Deputy Advocate-General argued that the suit filed by the petitioners was in time as under Article 149 of the Limitation Act the same could be filed within 60 years, but the learned Appellate Court wrongly held that the same was barred by time.
3. It was also argued that the petitioners had along with the memo. Of appeal submitted application for condonation of delay but the same was not considered and no reasoning whatsoever was given, while dismissing the appeal by the learned Additional District Judge.
4. I have heard the learned Deputy Advocate-General at length and perused the record annexed with the revision petition.
5. The argument of the learned Deputy Advocate-General that the suit filed by the petitioners was within time has a force in it. As per Article 149 of the Limitation Act suit for recovery of Government dues could be filed within a period of 60 years, therefore, the observation/finding of the learned Appellate Court that the suit was barred by time is against the law.
6. The argument of the learned Deputy Advocate-.General that the petitioners had with the memo.
Of appeal filed application for condonation of delay, but no reasoning was given while dismissing the application has no force. The perusal of the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Kohat shows that the learned lower Appellate Court has dismissed the application for condonation of delay on the ground that neither any cogent reason for condonation of delay was mentioned therein nor delay of each day was explained. The reasons given for dismissal of the said application was sufficient because it is by now settled law that in order to get the delay condoned, Ahach day's delay was to be explained. Reliance in this regard is placed on Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 5 others v. Jamaluddin and others (1996 SCMR 727) and Income Tax Officer v. Messrs Miran Bakhsh Ltd. And 25 others (1986 SCMR 1255).
7. Another ground for dismissal of the appeal was that the copy of the decree-sheet had not been annexed with the memo. Of appeal till the same was dismissed. The provisions of Order 41, Rule 1, C.P.C. Makes it compulsory for memo. Of appeal to be accompanied by copy, of decree appealed from and a judgment upon which it was founded. The filing of decree---sheet alongwith the memo. Of appeal is mandatory and failure to abide by the provisions of Order 41, Rule 1, C.P.C.
Would render the appeal incompetent.
Reliance in this regard is placed on the following reported judgments:--
(1) Mst. Musharaf Sultana v. Fazal Hussain (1993 CLC 1),
(2) Atta Muhammad and others v. Sultan and another (1996 CLC 1611),
(3) Messrs Manzoor Ahmed & Brothers v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan and 4 others (1990 MLD 2140),
(4) Abdul Majeed and 6 others v. Mst, Haleema and 18 others (1987 CLC 2331) and
(5) Abdul Sattar and 2 others v. Khuda-e---Dad (PLD 1986 Quetta 11).
8. Keeping' in 'view the provisions of Order 41, Rule I, C.P.C. And the dicta cited above, dismissal of appeal for non-filing of decree-sheet could not be said to be illegal and the Appellate Court was left with no alternative but to dismiss the appeal being incompetent.
9. So far as the revision petition in hand is concerned, the same is also barred by time. It appears that the Departmental Authorities were never serious in recovering the claimed amount. No doubt they kept on sending notices to respondent for recovery of the claimed amount and they filed a suit for the recovery also but the said suit was not properly pursued, which culminated into dismissal of their suit. The petitioners did not bother to file appeal in time. The appeal was barred by 4 days and as mentioned above, which was not accompanied by decree-sheet, no effort was made to obtain the decree-sheet and place the same on file till the appeal was dismissed. Even after the dismissal of appeal the, officials of the Department did not awake from their deep slumber. It is a matter of common knowledge that period for filing revision petition is 90 days. The judgment and decree in this case was passed by the learned Appellate Court on 5-11-2002 but the application for grant of certified copies was submitted on 19-1-2003 on which date the copies were handed over to the concerned officials, but the revision petition in hand was filed on 6-2-2003 i.e. With the delay of 3 days. The revision petition is accompanied by C.M.No.212 of 2003, which is an application for condonation of delay and the only reason put forth is that the learned Deputy Advocate---General had to appear on 4-2-2003 before the august Supreme Court of Pakistan at Islamabad, 5th being public holiday and the revision petition was filed on 6th of February, 2003. To me the reason put forth for getting the delay condoned is not sufficient because if the learned Deputy Advocate-General had gone to appear before the august Supreme Court, of Pakistan at Islamabad, his office was not closed and the subordinate staff was very much working there. Even there was another learned Deputy Advocate-General posted at Peshawar, who could file revision petition in time, but due to lethargic attitude of the officials of the petitioner's-Department, the revision petition was filed with the delay.
10. The argument of the learned Deputy Advocate-General that the matter remained under consideration for filing the revision petition and time was consumed in office routine, which was beyond control of the petitioners. Such a plea has never been accepted by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan as a valid ground for condonation of delay. A similar plea was taken in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Pir Ahmed Khan (1981 SCMR 37), wherein it was held:-- "The time said to have been spent during which the various authorities were examining the matter with a view to decide whether an appeal should or should not be filets cannot be excused. This Court has repeatedly laid down that so far as the limitation is concerned, the Government cannot claim to treat in any manner differently from an ordinary litigant. In fact, the Government enjoys unusual- facilities for the preparation and conduct of their cases and its resources are much larger than those possessed by ordinary litigants. If in spite of these facilities the Government cannot comply with the requirement of the law of limitation, then it is for it to take steps to have that law be changed."
The same view was taken by august Supreme Court of Pakistan in the afore-quoted case i.e. 1996 SCMR 727).
11. On the one hand I do not rind any I illegality or material irregularity or any jurisdictional error or defect in the impugned judgments/decrees of the Courts below and on the other hand the revision petition in hand is also barred by time. I, therefore, dismiss the same in limine.