' This judgment shall dispose of Writ Petition Nos.23333/97, 26493/97, 26491/97, 26492/97, 23332/97, 28451/97, 28452/97, 20998/98, 17706/98, 22319/99, 14286/99, 11078/99, 12814/99, 12813/99, 18857/99 and Writ Petition No,9/2000 as common questions are involved in these cases and they were ordered to be heard together.
2. In all these cases grievance petitions filed by the respondents under section 25-A of the Industrial Relation Ordinance, 1969 were allowed by the learned Labour Courts. Feeling aggrieved the petitioners filed appeals before the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal which were admitted and the orders were suspended in terms of section 38(8) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.
3. The plea taken by the petitioners was that under the said provision of law the interim order stands vacated upon the expiry of 20 days from the date of its issuance and since the date of hearing has been fixed it a point of time beyond the said period, the said remedy is not efficacious and adequate.
4. All these cases were admitted in the years 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000. The orders of the learned Labour Court were suspended.
5. I have been informed by the learned counsel that the appeals have not as yet been decided because of the pendency of these writ petitions.
6. Learned counsel presses the same plea noted by me above. Now section 38(8) of I.R.O. 1969 provides in clear terms that where a learned Tribunal stays the operation of the order of the Labour Courts the matter shall be decided within 20 days of the appeal being preferred and in case the matter is not decided within the said period, the order of the Tribunal shall stand vacated. In my humble opinion the provision has been made with a purpose and for the benefits of the workman.
The intent and purpose of these writ petitions is to achieve indirectly what cannot be done directly.
The question arises whether this is permissible under the law. To my mind the answer must be in the negative. In somewhat similar circumstances while interpreting Article 199 (4-A) (4-B) of the Constitution in the case of Zahur Textile Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 1999 SC 880). Chief Justice Ajmal Mian (as his Lordship then was) observed as follows:-- "12. Adverting to Mr. Abdul Majeed Pirzada's submission that clause (4-A) of Article 199 does not put any embargo on the powers of a High Court to modify its first interim order and that six months period can be reckoned from the modified order, it may be observed that it is a well-settled proposition of law that what cannot be done directly, the same cannot be done indirectly. Since clause (4-A) of Article 199 expressly provides for the expiry of an interim order on the expiry of six months period, the above provision cannot be rendered ineffective or redundant by passing a fresh interim order on a fresh application. This was so held by this Court in the case of Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad v. United Sugar Mills Ltd. (PLD 1977 SC 397)."
7. These are rather unfortunate cases where appeals required by law to be decided within sixty days remain undecided for years together.
8. The writ petitions accordingly are disposed of with a direction to the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal to decide the cases as early as possible. Learned counsel informs that the learned Appellate Tribunal at the moment is on leave. A copy of this order be immediately remitted to the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal, Punjab, Lahore. It is hoped that the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal shall take all steps to decide all these appeals within 15 days after the expiry of the vacations No orders as to costs.