1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL CHEEMA, J.-Rahdar Khan petitioner herein seeks review of this Court's judgment dated 28-1-1975 by which his petition for special leave to appeal against the order of the Peshawar High Court dated 12-6-1974 was dismissed.
2. The background of this litigation has been briefly traced in the order under review and need not be reiterated, suffice it to say that the dispute relates to the transfer of an evacuee shop of which the petitioner claims to be in possession and respondent No. 4 its owner, for having purchased the same in an open auction.
3. The grounds which weighed with this Court in refusing leave to appeal were that the petitioner waited for seven Sears to submit his belated L.S. Form, that he did not clear the arrears of rent and that even otherwise, he could not establish his possession of the shop before the target date Le.
4. 20-12-1958.
5. It was explained to the learned counsel at the very outset that he should keep in view the limited scope of review is this Court which could be sought on any of the grounds mentioned is Order XLVII, rule 1 of the C. P. C. In civil matters, namely, discovery of fresh evidence, error apparent on the face of the record or any other sufficient cause.
6. While trying to meet the points which disposed the Court to tie dismissal of the petition, learned counsel contended that once the delay in the submission of the L. S. Form was condoned, it no longer remained a relevant consideration to be construed to the prejudice of the petitioner. As regards the default in clearing the arrears of rent, learned counsel frankly admitted that this has not been done even till today but however, tried to explain it away on the ground that the D. S. C. On being approached in this regard did not allow the payment of rent on the false pretext that the petitioner did not qualify for transfer as he was not found to be in possession before 20-12-1958 which like the clearance of arrears of rent was an essential qualificatory legal requirement for the transfer of the shop.
7. Having heard the learned coun3ei quite at length, we are not satisfied that a case is made out for reopening the matter. A perusal of tae order of the Settlement Commissioner and of the learned Judge in tie High Count shows that when the shop was purchased by respondent No. 4 in the first instance, the petitioner was not entitled to seek its transfer under the law as it then stood. The first order of resumption of the property from respondent No. 4 dated 7-1-1955 which alone opened the door for the petitioner was held to be illegal for want of a proper notice. Again learned counsel has nut been able to satisfy us even at ibis stage that his client was in actual possession of the shop before the target date. He frankly, admitted that no rent had been paid by him either. While judging the relative merits of the two litigants, the Courts were fully justified in upholding the transfer in favour of respondent No. 4 in preference to the petitioner. The petition has no merit and is accordingly dismissed.