MUHAMMAD YUNUS SURAKHVI, C J.---This appeal, by way of leave of the Court, has been directed against the judgment passed by the High Court on 21-5-2002, whereby the revision petition filed by the appellants herein was dismissed.
2. The necessary facts, giving rise to the present appeal, briefly stated, are that the respondent, Abdul Qayyum Qamar, filed a suit in the Court of Senior Civil Judge Mirpur to the effect that his actual name is 'Abdul Qayyum Qamar' which has been incorrectly written as 'Muhammad Qayyum Qamar' in the Matriculation Certificate. Thus, a prayer for correction of name was made by the respondent. The trial Court after necessary proceedings decreed the suit of plaintiff-respondent on 22-8-2000 and the decree was executed by entering the name of respondent as 'Abdul Qayyum Qamar'. The Azad Jammu and Kashmir Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education Mirpur (hereinafter to be referred as the Board) issued a new certificate to the respondent in light of provisions contained in section 4, Chapter 31, Volume II, of the Calendar of the Board which read as follows:-- "4. The original name shall invariably form a part of the name of candidate and shall be shown as such in all records of the Board with the addition of the word 'Old Name' between the two names.
No change shall, however, be made in the records pertaining to an examination taken before the change is sanctioned. Moreover, the date of sanction of the change shall also be recorded in the Certificate."
3. The Board in accordance with the provisions of aforesaid section not only entered the new name of the respondent but also entered his old name while acting upon the decree. The decree passed by the trial Court on 20-8-2000 became final as no one challenged the same before any forum.
Feeling aggrieved by the aforementioned entry made by the Board, the respondent moved a miscellaneous application on 2-4-2002 in the Court of Senior Civil Judge Mirpur, whereby he challenged the entry of old name with the new name in his Matriculation Certificate. The trial Court passed an order on 2-4-2002 that the certificate be issued according to the terms of decree drawn in light of its judgment dated 22-8-2000 and ordered that the appellants are bound to enter the name of respondent as 'Abdul Qayyum Qamar'. The trial Court also observed that the decree dated 22-8-2000 passed by it had attained finality, therefore, the appellants are bound by all the terms of the said decree.
4. This order was challenged through a revision petition by the Board before the High Court which was dismissed vide the impugned order dated 21-5-2002. It is the aforesaid order of the High Court which is the subject-matter of present appeal before this Court.
5. In support of appeal it was vehemently contended by Ch.Muhammad Azam Khan, the learned counsel for the appellants, that the Board had issued a new Certificate to the respondent in the light of provisions contained in section 4, Chapter 31, Volume II, of the Calendar of the Board and after issuance of said certificate, the decree passed by the trial Court on 22-8-2000 has been satisfied. The respondent filed a miscellaneous application in the Court of Senior Civil Judge Mirpur which is nowhere provided under any law. It was not an application for the execution of decree because the decree had already been satisfied. The learned counsel further contended that the findings of the learned Judge in the High Court that the trial Court had exercised its inherent powers under section 151, C.P.C. Are not correct because firstly no application under section 151, C.P.C. Was moved before the trial Court; secondly the provisions of section 151, C.P.C. Can only be invoked during the pendency of any cause in the Court. As there was no cause pending before the Senior Civil Judge, therefore, the application could not be moved under section 151, C.P.C. And any order made on such application was without jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the appellants in support of his case placed reliance on section 151, C.P.C. And reported cases titled Bashir Begum v.
Mian Abdul Rehman PLD 1963 W.P. (Lahore) 408, Sher Muhammad and others v. Khuda Bakhsh and another PLD 1961 W.P. (Lahore) 579 and contended that by accepting his appeal the impugned orders passed by the trial Court as well as the High Court may be set at naught.
6. Controverting the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Muhammad Yunus Tahir, the learned counsel for the respondent, strenuously submitted that the Board had issued the Matriculation Certificate against the terms of decree dated 22-8-2000. According to the learned counsel when the aforementioned decree had been executed, it was enjoined upon the Board to make an entry regarding the name of respondent in accordance with the terms of said decree but the Board instead of following directions incorporated in the decree passed by the trial Court, issued a certificate in favour of respondent wherein both the old and new names of the respondent were entered. Therefore the trial Court as well as the High Court were right in passing the impugned order in favour of the respondent. The learned counsel contended that the decree of the trial Court was to be acted upon as it was and the same could not have been changed or varied by the Board. The learned counsel contended that the trial Court as well as the High Court committed no illegality by passing the impugned orders.
7. After hearing the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, it may be stated that the respondent herein filed a declaratory suit in the Court of senior Civil Judge Mirpur for correction of his name as 'Abdul Qayyum Qamar' instead of 'Muhammad Qayyum Qamar'. After necessary proceedings the decree was passed by the trial Court on 22-8-2000. On the basis of terms of this decree, the new name of respondent was entered in the Matriculation Certificate but at the same time relying upon section 4, Chapter 31, Volume H, of the Calendar of the Board, the appellants also entered the old name of respondent. The respondent moved a miscellaneous application on 2-4-2002 in the Court of Senior Civil Judge Mirpur, whereby he challenged the entry of old name with the new name in the Matriculation Certificate. The trial Court passed an order on 2-4-2002 that the Certificate be issued according to the terms of decree drawn in light of its judgment dated 22-8-2000 and ordered that the appellants are bound to enter the name of respondent as 'Abdul Qayyum Qamar'. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the trial Court, the appellants moved the High Court through a revision petition but the same was dismissed. The decree passed by the trial Court on 22-8-2000 had attained finality as the same was not challenged by the appellants before any forum. Thus, the appellants were bound to act in accordance with the terms of said decree but they violated the same by making an addition keeping in view section 4, Chapter 31, Volume II, of the Calendar of the Board.
8. It has rightly been pointed out by Mr. Muhammad Yunus Tahir, the learned counsel for the respondent, that Chapter 31 of the aforesaid Calendar deals with those matters in which an application is to be moved to the Board for the change in the name of surname of registered students in their Certificates and all other provisions of this Chapter are having clear nexus with those applications; for instance under subsection (v) of section '1 of the aforesaid Chapter, a fee of Rs,250 has to be deposited in certain, cases, whereas this Chapter has nothing to do with the decrees of the Civil Court. A decree passed by the Civil Court is either to be challenged by the opposite party or in case of its finality, is to be acted upon according to the terms and conditions laid down in it.
9. The contention raised by Ch. Muhammad Azam Khan, the learned counsel for the appellants, is that the High Court has observed that the trial Court has exercised its powers under section 151 C.P.C. Which has no application in the instant case because there was no cause pending before the Court. The inherent powers, according to the learned counsel, can be exercised by the Court when a cause is pending before it. After careful consideration of the aforesaid argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants, the same stands repelled for the following reasons:--
(i) The trial Court did not mention in its order that it exercised the powers under section 151, C.P.C.;
(ii) A simple application was moved before the trial Court that an appropriate order may be passed because the appellants are acting in derogation of the terms of decree dated 20-8-2000 which has attained finality;
(iii) Even if a wrong section is mentioned, it is no ground for setting aside the order; and
(iv) Section 151 C.P.C. Itself does not abridge or limit the inherent powers of the Court to make any order whether a cause is pending before it or not. For proper appraisal of the proposition involved, section 151 C.P.C. Is reproduced below:-- "Saving of inherent powers of Courts Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court."
10. So far as the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the appellants are concerned, the first authority titled Bashir Begum v. Mian Abdul Rehman (PLD 1963 W.P. (Lahore) 408), according to the learned counsel, squarely applies, so far his contention is concerned, which is to the following effect: "Inherent powers of Court will not be exercisable after the case has been disposed of. The Court is not competent to review judgment in exercise of such powers even if the decree-sheet is still to be drawn up. The facts and circumstances of the case-law relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants have nothing common with the facts of the present case.
11. The next authority cited by the learned counsel for the appellants titled, Sher Muhammad and others v. Khuda Bakhsh and another (PLD 1961 W.P. (Lahore) 579 has no relevancy to the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants rather it advances the case of respondent wherein it has been observed as under:-- "Sections 151 and 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure make it clear that even after a Court has disposed of a suit, it can exercise powers under those sections and indeed a part of section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure could come into play only after a suit, in the proceedings of which correction is sought, has been disposed of, because till a suit is disposed of, there is neither a judgment nor a decree in that suit except in those cases in which a preliminary decree has to precede the final decree as in cases for accounts. Sections 152 and 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure confer powers on Courts to make necessary corrections in their proceedings, orders, judgments and decrees, which powers are unlimited by the law of limitation or in any other manner, and those powers can be exercised even if no application in that behalf has been made to the Court."
12. The High Court inadvertently mentioned that the trial Court exercised its jurisdiction under section 151, C.P.C. Merely by mentioning a wrong section, the order does not become perverse or against law. As stated in the aforementioned authority, under sections 152 and 153, C.P.C. The trial Court had ample powers to rectify any wrong or to pass any appropriate order whether a cause was pending before it or not.
13. In the light of what has been stated above, finding no force in this appeal, the same stands dismissed with costs.