1. ' The preliminary statement of the complainant was recorded by myself and learned Member IV, Mr. Masud Afzal Khan on 14-6-1977 and the case was fired for further proceedings for today. At the outset, Mr. Abdul Latif Afridi, the learned counsel for the respondent raised an objection that complaint in its present form was incompetent and could not be proceeded with unless the Registrar or his nominees had filed the complaint in terms of section 13, clause (b) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. This section contains the details of powers and functions of the Registrar and its clause (b) authorises the lodging of a complaint inter alia for unfair labour practice, by himself or by a persons duly authorised by him. The learned counsel for the respondent submits that since this complaint has not been filed by the Registrar or by his nominee, the Commission has no jurisdiction to proceed with it.
2. ' Mr. M. S. Bokbari, the learned counsel for the complainant has referred me to subsection (9) of section 22-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 which was recast with retrospective effect by Ordinance XIX of 1974. Section 22-A details the powers of the Commission and subsection (9) clause (a) thereof authorises the Commission to vitiate prosecution, trial or proceedings or take action with regard to any matter relating to its functions on the application of a party or of its own motion. Mr. Abdul Latif Afridi, the learned counsel for the respondent, however, maintains that the amendment does not affect the provisions of section 13, clause (b) and this complaint should have been filed by the Registrar or person authorised by him. As I read the provisions of law on the subject, I find that the powers given to the Registrar are independent of the powers detailed in section 22-A, subsection (9) under which the Commission may proceed on the application of a party or of its own motion. I find that in clause (f) of subsection (8) of section 22-A in sub-clause (0 powers have been given to deal with the cases under section 53, other than subsections (1) and (5) of that section. Further in clause (g) of subsection (8) of section 22-A, the Commission has the unfettered powers to deal with the cases of unfair labour practice specified in sections 15 and 16 on the part of the employers, workmen, Trade Unions or either of them etc. It is, therefore, clear that the powers conferred /A on the Commission under section 22-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1969 which was subsequently amended with retrospective effect, will have precedence over section 13 which specifically deals with the powers of the Registrar. The law nowhere says that the Commission's jurisdiction to initiate prosecution, trial or proceedings shall be barred on a complaint filed by the Registrar. Wherever it is intended to lay down a condition precedent, the Legislature does this in unambiguous terms. 1, therefore, find that the powers of the Registrar are quite distinct from the powers given to the Commission which are wide enough to enable the Commission to take action on the application of a party or suo /now. If the intention of the law was that no complaint should be entertained without having been moved by the Registrar or his nominee, the Legislature would not have given unfettered power to the Commission to move on the application of a party or of its own volition. I, therefore, overrule the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondent and proceed to frame charge against the respondent in this case.