KHAWAJA MUHAMMAD SAEED, J.---The supra titled appeal, with the leave of the Court, is directed against the judgment of the High Court passed on 6-3-2002, whereby the writ petition filed by the respondents, herein, was accepted and Special Judicial Allowance at the rate of 20% of their basic pay was granted to all the officers and servants of the Supreme Court including the respondents with effect from 9th October, 2000.
2. Relevant facts, briefly stated, are that the Supreme Court of Pakistan granted Special Judicial Allowance at the rate of 20% of their basic pay to all the officers and servants of the Supreme Court of Pakistan vide notification dated 9th October, 2000. The employees of this-Court through an application to the learned Chief Justice requested for the grant of Special Judicial Allowance in their favour as allowed to the employees of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. On the direction of the learned Chief Justice of the time, a meeting of the Council of Judges was convened on 17th November, 2000 which unanimously resolved as under:-- "The staff members of this Court through an application to the Hon'ble Chief Justice Azad Jammu and Kashmir made a submission with regard to the grant of special judicial allowance in their favour @ 20% of their basic pay as this allowance has also been sanctioned by the Supreme Court of Pakistan to its employees. Copy is placed below.
' The Council of the Judges held meeting today the 17th of November, 2000 and after giving serious thought to the matter under consideration accepted in principle that on the basis of parity Judicial Allowance @ 20% of basic pay may be granted to all officers and servants of the Court w,e,f, 9th October 2000, the date the said allowance has been given to the employees of the Supreme Court of Pakistan.
' The Finance Department be moved for financial concurrence."
The decision taken in that meeting was sent to the Law Department with the direction that it may be conveyed to the Finance Department for Financial concurrence. On 1st August, 2001 a notification was issued by the Law Department through which 20% Special Judicial Allowance was allowed to the officers of grade-16 and above whereas 10% Special Judicial Allowance to the employees below grade-16 with effect from 1st July, 2001. The respondents who are serving below grade-16 feeling aggrieved by this notification invoked the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 44 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974 (hereinafter to be referred as Constitution Act, 1974). After taking necessary proceedings as required by law the High Court vide judgment under challenge in the present appeal allowed the writ petition and directed the respondents (appellants herein) to pay 20%. Special Judicial Allowance even to the respondents in the light of the decision taken by the Council of Judges of this Court on 17th November, 2000.
3. Mr. Riaz Naveed Butt, the learned Additional Advocate-General, argued that the notification dated 1st August, 2001 was issued in the light of the decision of the meeting in which the present appellants and the Registrar Supreme Court participated. According to him the respondents, who are serving below Grade-16, have been given Special Judicial Allowance at the rate of 10% of their basic pay according to the nature of their job. He further argued that all the participants of the meeting took into consideration the duties assigned to the employees of this Court with utmost care and unanimously resolved that the employees of this Court in Grade-16 and above shall be entitled to 20% of the Special Judicial Allowance whereas the employees below Grade-16 shall be benefitted by 10% Special Judicial Allowance with effect from 1st July, 2001. As this decision was taken with the consent of the Registrar Supreme Court, therefore, the private respondents were not justified under law to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court.
4. On the other hand, Mr. M. Tabassum Aftab Alvi, the learned counsel for the respondents, supported the judgment of the High Court. According to him on the basis of parity Special Judicial Allowance @ 20% of basic pay was granted to all the employees of this Court with effect from 9th October, 2000, the date when the said allowance was given to the employees of the Supreme Court of Pakistan by the learned Judges of the said Court. According to the learned counsel the decision of the learned Judges of this Court was sent to the Law Department of Azad Jammu and Kashmir for further necessary action. The Law Department under law was bound to issue a notification in conformity with the decision of the Council of Judges of this Court whereas the notification issued by the Law Department on 1st August, 2001 was derogatory to the direction of the Council of Judges because according to this notification a discrimination was created by allowing 20% allowance to the officer of Grade-16 and above and 10% to the employee below Grade-16. He further argued that the learned Judges had clearly given a direction that this Special Judicial Allowance shall be granted to the employees of the Court from 9th October, 2000, the date when the said allowance was given to the employees of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, whereas under the notification dated 1st August, 2001 the employees of this Court were held entitled to this allowance with effect from 1st July, 2001. The private respondents, in these circumstances, were justified in challenging the legality and propriety of this notification before the High Court. The learned counsel further argued that all the employees in Azad Jammu and Kashmir on the accepted principle of parity are enjoying pay and other privileges which their counterparts are enjoying in the Punjab. The Judges of this Court are enjoying the same pay and other privileges which are admissible to the Judges of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. In the same way the officers of this Court in Grade 16 and above are enjoying the same pay and privileges which are admissible to their counterparts in the Supreme Court of Pakistan whereas the remaining staff has been deprived of the pay and other attached privileges without any lawful justification.
5. We have attended the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record of the case. In the earlier part of this judgment we have reproduced the decision which was taken by the learned Judges of this Court on 17th November, 2000. In that decision the Council of Judges on the basis of parity allowed 20% Special Judicial Allowance of their basic pay to all the officers and servants of this Court with effect from 9th October, 2000, the date the said allowance was given to the employees of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The matter was sent to the Law Department in order to move the Finance Department for Financial concurrence. The Law Department, therefore, was not justified in law to issue notification derogatory to the directions of the Council of Judges of this Court. Under the provisions of Constitution Act, 1974 the Supreme Court has got very wide powers to issue such directions, orders or decrees as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it. It is laid down in the Constitution Act, 1974 that all executive and judicial authorities throughout Azad Jammu and Kashmir shall act in aid of the Supreme Court. However, any persons feeling aggrieved from any order, direction or decree of the Supreme Court subject to the provisions of law may seek review of the order, direction or decree of this Court with the permission of the Court. This shows that without the permission of this Court no executive authority can pass any order which would be derogatory to the direction of this Court. It has been laid down in numerous authorities that the observation made by the Judges of this Court in a case in the nature of obiter dicta shall be binding upon the Courts and the other executive authorities. In a case titled Syed Sajjad Hussain v. Secretary, Establishment Division, Cabinet Secretariat, Islamabad and 2 others (1996 SCMR 284) the Supreme Court of Pakistan observed as under:-- "We are not satisfied with the reasons advanced by the learned Tribunal that the appellant could not be given the requisite relief because he had resigned from the Commission. The appellant's appeal was rejected wholly on flimsy grounds which could not be upheld in view on the rule laid down by this Court in Mazhar Ali's case referred to above. Needless to observe that the law declared by the Supreme Court would bind all the Courts, Tribunals and also the bureaucratic set- up in Pakistan as mandated by Articles 189 and 190 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973." (Underlining is ours).
' In Ihsan-ur-Rehman v. Mst. Najma Perveen (PLD 1986 SC 14.) the litigated controversy was argued by the parties in the Supreme Court of Pakistan. However, the relevant statute was amended prior to the decision of the Supreme Court. Therefore, an application was moved by the aggrieved party that in the light of the amended statutes the matter at issue be resolved. The Supreme Court observed as under:- "Although the presumption is that redundancy is not to be imputed to an enactment nor ignorance of law is to be imputed to the law-making Agency; but this presumption can differ from case to case. And in proper situations the superior Courts have even made corrections where the legislature is demonstrably shown to have made a visible error. Here one visible error is that the Karachi view was deemed to have been subordinated to the Lahore view which on no jurisprudential basis can be upheld as correct. The two judgments were not rendered by the same Court as it used to be the situation when the West Pakistan High Court had different Benches at Karachi and Lahore. Secondly for more weighty reason the amendment would not be deemed to have diluted, in any way, the effect of the law declared by this Court in Sakhawat Ali's case which was decided on 22nd of March, 1981 while the amendment was made on 26th of March, 1980. The declaration of law in the case of Sakhawat Ali by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in pursuance of the mandate of the Constitution will override the amendment made in section 47 and nullify its effect by virtue of Article 189 of the Constitution. (Underlining is ours)
6. In the instant case it becomes clear that the law laid down by this Court is necessarily to be followed. This Court has followed the authorities including the authority of this Court in a case titled Azad Government and others v. Muhammad Fazal Qureshi and others (Civil PLA No,55 of 2002 decided on 6-5-2002) wherein the benefit of parity has been given to the aggrieved employees of the High Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. It is celebrated principle of law that the jurisdiction conferred by an Act impliedly gives powers to the authority for doing all acts and implying means which are found essentially necessary for the execution of such directions issued in the exercise of vested jurisdiction. We are sorry to observe that in the present case the Law Department issued the notification dated 1st August, 2001 without moving the Council of Judges seeking review of the order, direction prior to the issuance of notification in derogation to the decision of,the Council of Judges which, in our view, amounts to disobeying the order of the Council of Judges. The learned Judges of this Court in their meeting held on 17th November, 2000, had accepted the right of all employees for grant of 20% Special Judicial Allowance to them and such decision could not be changed or nullified by the Law Department by issuing a notification derogatory to such direction on the basis of some meeting convened by it with the Registrar of this Court. This act by itself amounts to disobeying the order of the Council of Judges.
7. In a case reported as Kamaluddin and 30 others v. Province of Punjab and others (1986 PLC (C.S.)
807) the facts of this case were that before introduction of National Pay Scales in 1972, the Readers of their Lordship the Chief Justice and the Judges of the High Court were enjoying the pay scale of Rs,275-600 whereas the judgment writers were receiving their salaries in the pay scale of Rs,285-
500. On the introduction of National Pay Scales in 1972 the employees of the High Court in aforementioned categories were given NPS-11. However, subsequently the judgment-writers were placed in NPS-11 with effect from 2-12-1975. The other category of Stenographers who were serving as Secretaries to the Chief Justice and other Judges of the Lahore High Court were upgraded from NPS-11 of NPS-16 and their upgradation was given effect from 17-10-1974. The judgment-Writers and Readers were demanding their upgradation from NPS-11 to NPS-16. The Chief Justice of the High Court recommended their case to the Provincial Government on 3rd May, 1981. The Provincial Government approved the recommendations for their upgradation. However, the Finance Department did not agree with the recommendations and allowed the judgment-Writers and Readers NPS-12 instead of NPS-16 froM 22-6-1981 by issuing a notification on 27-6-1981. The matter was taken to the Service Tribunal and the Service Tribunal set aside the notification on the ground that upgradation of posts from NPS-11 to NPS-16 was approved by the Chief Justice of the High Court, therefore, the Finance Department was not justified to pass derogatory notification by upgrading such employees from NPS-11 to NPS-12. The Finance Department was directed that the posts of judgment-Writers and Readers in the High Court shall be upgraded to NPS-16. In the said case it may be mentioned here that the recommendations made by the Chief Justice of the High Court in favour of Readers were not binding upon the Finance Department. Even then the recommendations were upheld by the Service Tribunal whereas in the instant case in the light of provisions contained in section 42-A of the Constitution Act, 1974 and the rules made thereunder for exercising the authority of this Court, the executive authorities cannot exercise their authority in such a manner which may amount to infringe, impair or curtail any of the right granted by the Judges of this Court. Any executive authority having any doubt about any direction or decision taken by this Court could get the same resolved by submitting a review petition. It cannot bypass a direction or order of this Court which may attract the invocation of section 45 of the Constitution Act. The learned Judge in the High Court was justified in setting aside the notification issued by the Law Department on the basis of meeting held by the Registrar of Supreme Court with the appellants as the same was contrary to the direction of the Council of Judges.
' For the foregoing reasons, finding no force in this appeal the same stands dismissed with costs.